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Abstract
The alliance between the Left and organised labour in the majority of 
European countries is not over, contrary to the arguments of much of the current 
literature on industrial relations and electoral socialism. During the 1980s and 
1990s, social democratic governments approved over 70% of their socio­
economic policies in cooperation with trade union confederations. These policies 
are distinct from the Keynesian model of the post-war decades which directly 
benefited labour, and are based on the monetarist macroeconomic regime. As a 
consequence, the alliance can be renegotiated only under certain conditions, 
which do not always exist. This thesis builds a comprehensive framework to 
account for party/union interactions, including instances of renegotiated alliances 
and also of more strained relationships. In order to do so, it examines the 
constraints and incentives faced by each actor separately, and then brings them 
together. Quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as historically-informed 
discursive approaches and game theoretical modelling, are employed.
In an age of globalisation and social fragmentation, social democratic 
parties no longer need trade union partnerships for purposes of economic 
management, but they retain electoral incentives to include unions in policy 
making. These incentives are contingent upon union acceptance of limited gains 
from policy negotiations: excessive concessions to unions would alienate non­
union workers from the social democratic vote. In turn, organised labour is able to 
accept modest gains (which, under an unfavourable overall scenario are 
nonetheless positive) only if it is very cohesive. I show that confederation 
democracy -  not coercion as traditional neo-corporatism would contend -  is 
negatively correlated to wage militancy because it contributes union cohesion, and 
therefore it is key to determining party/union cooperation. The argument of the 
renegotiated alliance explains the importance of decision-making processes in 
determining outcomes, the enduring political relevance of trade unions, and the 
characteristics of the social democratic electorate.
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Chapter 1
The End of the Alliance between Social 
Democratic Parties and Trade Unions?
Odi et amo. Quare idfaciam, fortasse requiris.
Nescio, sedfieri sentio et excruciorJ
Gaius Valerius Catullus
Is the alliance between social democratic parties and trade unions over, 
as many commentators seem to believe? Have de-industrialisation and 
globalisation undermined the pivotal left-wing alliance in Western Europe? These 
questions are of central importance to the character and structure of the European 
Left, and have been heavily debated among political scientists and political 
practitioners in the last several years. The answers are almost invariably given 
from either the party perspective or the union perspective, rather than focusing on 
the features of their actual interaction, and these answers have tended to conclude 
that this once solid partnership has had its day. This thesis argues instead that the 
party/union alliance has indeed changed since the ‘Golden Age’ o f the social 
democratic compromise in the post-war period, but it is not over.
11 hate and I love. Wherefore would I do this, perhaps you ask? / 1 do not know. But I feel that it 
happens and I am tortured.
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Scholars of party politics contend that social democratic2 parties no 
longer have an interest in sustaining a strong policy collaboration with the trade 
unions: they argue that this would reduce their chances of electoral success 
because over the last twenty-five years in Western countries, the balance of power 
and influence between capital and labour has tilted towards the former (Scharpf 
1991; Kitschelt 1994). Industrial relations specialists also follow this analysis, 
observing that unions can no longer rely on their old political allies, and therefore 
their political clout is greatly reduced (Femer and Hyman 1992b; Ross and Martin 
1999a).
These conclusions all rely on a key assumption that is not always at the 
forefront of analysis, namely that the party/union alliance is associated to, and 
only to, the traditional ‘Keynesian’ set of economic policies, including a strong 
role of the state in the economy, significant redistributive policies, and demand- 
side management of the economy (Piazza 2001). However, once this assumption 
is dropped and left to empirical verification, the party/union alliance seems more 
vital than expected. Systematically collected information from 15 European 
countries shows that during the 1980s and 1990s social democratic governments 
processed over 70% of their economic policies in open collaboration with trade 
union confederations.
Details of these measures of the party/union alliance are given early in 
Chapter 2. Here it suffices to say that even if the party/union alliance seems less 
stable over time than it used to be, even if the magnitude of its results in terms of 
number of policies is reduced, and even if  the set of economic policies is very
2 This thesis is concerned with the mainstream reformist parties o f  the Left, and uses the 
descriptors ‘labour’, ‘socialist’, and ‘social democratic’ in a loose manner. This habit is very 
common in the literature and to my knowledge never severely challenged. For a similar loose use 
o f the descriptor ‘social democratic’ see for example: Kitschelt (1994) or Ladrech and Marliere 
(1999).
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different from the one pursued in the post-war decades, the party/union alliance 
has undergone a deep renegotiation, but not a rupture. In other words, this thesis 
shows that, during the 1980s and the 1990s, policy collaboration between social 
democratic governments and trade unions was still a significant phenomenon in 
many European countries. Compared to previous decades, the policy outcomes of 
party/union interaction are more varied and they are not systematically associated 
with increased public spending, as it used to be during the years characterised by 
the so-called “Keynesian consensus” (Hall 1989). Nonetheless, a very intense 
collaboration in socio-economic steering is visible in many countries.
This thesis will investigate the political and institutional factors that 
affect the relationship between parties and unions, and that cause them to 
renegotiate or to dissolve their alliance. It will ask the following question: given 
the new social and economic context that developed in European countries during 
the 1980s and 1990s, which factors account for renegotiated party/union alliances 
vis a vis more strained types of relationships? In pursuing this objective, the thesis 
aims to bridge the literature on industrial relations, on the political economy of 
socialist parties, and the classic party politics literature, in order to offer a 
comprehensive understanding of recent occurrences within the European Left 
movement.
There are weighty empirical and political reasons to support the choice 
of focusing the research strategy of this thesis on the party/union interaction as the 
main study object. First, in many influential pieces of recent literature, the 
party/union relationship is treated as an independent variable in order to explain 
occurrences in either the party or the unions.3 From a methodological viewpoint,
3 For example Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Gallagher and Williams 1989a; Femer and Hyman 
1992a; Kitschelt 1994; Ladrech and Marliere 1999; Martin and Ross 1999.
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this approach generates a problem of endogeneity: the actor is affected and affects 
the relationship at the same time. As a consequence, neither the existing literature 
on social democracy nor that on trade unions is able to explore the role that each 
of the two actors has had on the alliance, and on its new features, since the 1980s. 
This thesis focuses on the relationship itself. Therefore, I will not deal with the 
effect that different types of alliance have on each of the two actors, but I will be 
able to identify which political and institutional variables lead to different types of 
relations, i.e. renegotiated alliances or non-collaborative approaches.
In addition, it is relevant to broader theories of political contestation to 
know if, and if so how, different types of party/union interaction can still be 
understood under a single framework. If social democrats and organised labour 
react to similar variables in different countries along defined patterns, this would 
reinforce the view that political cleavages between the right and the left still hold, 
with labour weighting down heavily on the side of the mainstream left. It would 
open new political reflections on the permanence of the social constituencies of 
political parties during globalisation.
In the last several years, various phenomena under the subheading of 
“globalisation” -  such as the internationalisation of markets and the increased 
mobility of labour -  have inspired a stream of literature in the political economic 
disciplines oriented towards observing the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992). In a 
nutshell, this approach tends to downplay the room for manoeuvre of national 
actors. Indeed, under highly competitive globalised markets, technically optimal 
solutions gain predominance over ideology-driven preferences (Scharpf 1991). 
This thesis supports instead the view that constellations of organised interests at 
the national level, and therefore modes of policy interaction, can still differentiate
t 17
the polities of different European countries. Therefore, divergence in policy 
outcomes is still likely to occur.
The Argument in a Nutshell
The data I have collected show that during the 1980s and 1990s social 
democratic parties continued to process the majority of their socio-economic 
policies, over 70% of the total on an average, with the cooperation of trade union 
confederations. It must be emphasised, however, that instances of non 
collaboration are therefore as high as to account for nearly 30% of total instances.
The core claim of this thesis is that under globalisation and in the post- 
industrial society, trade union confederations and social democratic parties still 
have key incentives to cooperate in policy making. In order for these incentives to 
operate, however, organised labour must be very cohesive: therefore, it must 
adopt democratic decision-making rules that cut across occupational sectors, a 
system to which I refer as “confederation democracy.”
The overall economic context of the 1980s and 1990s is not favourable 
for labour. Growth is stagnant, unemployment on the rise, and the world 
consensus among policy makers and economists has shifted from the maintenance 
of full employment to inflation control. However, if  union leaders can persuade 
members to abide by the “new” social democratic policy program they can still 
achieve policy gains. The new policy program does not include the policy 
measures ideal-typically preferred by unions, including, for example, increased 
public spending, increased cash transfers, and employment protection legislation -  
all of which were dumped by social democratic programs. However, policy gains 
can lock trade unions into a prominent role in the management of labour markets 
(which looks very much like an uncertain investment for the future) as well as
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shelter union rank-and-file from the worst effects of the ongoing labour market 
liberalisations.
However, given the stringency and harshness of this renegotiated 
compromise, and given the limited availability of short-term payoffs for union 
rank-and-file (such as increased transfers or increased welfare benefits, see Mares 
2006), only democratic unions can unify members around this harsh compromise, 
and fill the interpretation gap that is likely to arise between leaders and members 
over the appropriateness of compliance. Discussion, persuasion, voting and a clear 
democratic accountability of leaders before members (which reinforces their 
legitimacy and credibility) will contribute to narrowing the information gap, 
reduce the impact of factionalism, and ultimately avoid wage and policy drift at 
local level. In the absence of a democratic means of decision-making, trade unions 
will lose the strategic capacity to abide harsh compromises, and will need 
increased side-compensations to ensure compliance. Given that social democrats 
are not ready to revert to “old” Keynesianism and thereby secure an increasing 
level of benefits for union members, fragmented unions are likely to be evicted 
from the policy-making arena.
From the perspective of the social democratic government, the picture is 
similar, albeit from the opposite perspective. Social democrats no longer have 
economic reasons to seek union compliance. Given that inflation is controlled by 
independent central bankers, social democrats no longer need union cooperation 
to control wage dynamics. However, they still retain core electoral reasons to 
include them in policy making on issues related to welfare state institutions and 
labour market reforms. In the post-industrial society, the “old” dilemma between 
working class and non-working class votes has changed. The new social
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democratic dilemma is more subtle as it includes materialistic and non- 
materialistic issues: this scenario complicates the task of cutting distributive 
compromises between different portions of the social democratic electorate. By 
systematically involving trade unions in the definition of policies, social 
democrats ensure that they can win the maximum number of votes through 
market-appealing and libertarian policies, while minimizing losses from 
traditional unionised working class.
To achieve this aim, however, the social democrats are only willing to 
offer limited payoffs to unions because otherwise they would lose too much of the 
non-union support. Therefore, in order to embark on negotiations with organised 
labour, they first have to believe that the unions are sufficiently cohesive for the 
signatures of leaders under peak agreements to entail the compliance of rank-and- 
file. If, instead, the union confederation is fragmented, the party will attempt to 
balance its dilemmas unilaterally.
This argument is based on original empirical material that I have 
gathered through systematic content analysis of primary sources, secondary 
sources, and interviews with key informants. In turn, this material has been 
processed through an array of different quantitative and qualitative methods, as 
well as formalised and discursive approaches. In particular, I combined both 
large-N and small-n research settings so as to exploit their properties fully. Before 
detailing the research strategy and outlining the plan of this thesis, I will now 
introduce the historical background upon which this dissertation rests. The 
historical method will help to clarify the limits and scope of my analysis, and the 
departure point from which my conclusions will be reached. The second section 
of this chapter will then review the explanation offered by the existing literature
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of the fate of the party/union alliance. Section three will clarify the methodology 
adopted to overcome the shortcomings of existing accounts, and will present the 
plan of the rest of this thesis.
1.1 The Historical Background
The ‘Golden Age’
From the beginning of post-war period until the 1980s, social democratic 
parties and trade unions in northern European countries fostered a very distinctive 
policy program. In their respective roles as the political and industrial wings of the 
labour movement these two actors developed a strong alliance that, when 
successful, resulted in a very identifiable kind of welfare capitalism (Esping- 
Andersen 1990).
This socio-economic project found its complement in the moderate 
attitude of trade union confederations. The large bodies of organised workers were 
the obvious social allies of social democratic governors. They supplied the party 
with mass support and votes. Moreover, under social democratic governments, 
they moderated their wage claims in order not to hinder the overall governmental 
spending strategy. Workers did not need to look for high nominal wage increases 
in order to improve their welfare, and rather sought to keep them at a sustainable, 
slow, pace. Wage moderation would keep inflation low, while public spending 
would keep internal demand, and therefore employment, high. In economic terms, 
this means that the alliance between social democrats and the unions had the 
effect of mitigating the trade-off o f the Phillips curve (Cameron 1984).
Until the 1980s, the party/union alliance can be conceptualised as based 
on two intertwined foundations: a social foundation and a policy foundation. The
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social foundation is related to the support provided to the party by the working 
class as a social bloc. Social democratic parties in post-war Europe could not be 
considered “class” parties in a strict sense. The industrial working class had never 
represented the majority of citizens in any western democracy, and therefore 
social democrats had attempted to forge inter-class alliances ever since their 
rejection of a revolutionary means to power. Nonetheless, at the core of their 
social support rested the working class, organised by trade union confederations 
(Przeworski 1985: 35-37). When social democratic parties were able to win 
office, the working class would be the main beneficiary of the socialist economic 
program that, to put it very simply, aimed at separating the destiny of the workers 
from the volatility of the markets (Esping-Andersen 1990: 47).
The second, policy, foundation of the “social democratic paradigm” was 
the “political exchange” by which trade unions would moderate their claims in 
order to facilitate the governmental spending policy and avoid inflationary 
pressures (Cameron 1984). In Europe, the best economic performances were 
linked to the existence of large trade union confederations, encompassing workers 
from a variety of sectors, that, by exerting strong control on their affiliates and 
members, were able to trade moderation for political relevance, i.e. lower wage 
increases in the short-run for higher economic benefits in the long run (Pizzomo 
1978; Lehmbruch 1984). The social and policy foundations of the party/union 
relationship were complementary and mutually reinforcing. Moreover, when 
implemented for a sustained period of time, they generated increased consensus 
towards the socio-political bloc constituted by the party/union alliance (Esping- 
Andersen 1990: 105-143).
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Until the 1980s, the “social democratic paradigm” was attempted or 
implemented only in northern Europe, while southern European socialists were in 
opposition or still struggling against authoritarian regimes (Gallagher and 
Williams 1989). The literature reflected this difference, identifying northern social 
democracy and southern socialism as distinct branches o f the same family, i.e. 
while different, they shared the same broad ideology. The difference in the 
party/union alliance between northern and southern Europe was considered one of 
the main differentiating features between these two political milieus. In southern 
Europe, where a party/union collaboration in policy making had never been 
realised, the union movement happened to be more militant, more fractionalised, 
and more politicised, reflecting relatively big divisions along political lines 
(Bergounioux 1983; Marliere 1999 5-6).
The Crisis
Between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s this picture 
changed considerably. Northern European socialists experienced serious electoral 
setbacks that questioned the effectiveness of their strategy (Kitschelt 1994: Table 
1.1 page 5). The most striking and famous example comes from events in Britain. 
The long-lived tradition of collaboration between the Labour party and the TUC 
did not produce acceptable socio-economic outcomes. Inflation was out of control 
and public spending was not helping to decrease unemployment; frequent strikes, 
mass rallies, and secondary actions by the unions marked the “winter of 
discontent,” which eventually resulted in electoral loss for the Labour party and 
the rise of Margaret Thatcher (Scharpf 1991: 83-88; Mares 2006: 202).
Meanwhile, southern European Social Democratic parties experienced 
stunning electoral success in France, Spain, Greece, and Italy. All of these parties
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were bred on ideologies very similar to those of their northern sisters. Their 
statutes identified as their ultimate -  utopian -  goal the establishment of a socialist 
society, and a strong role for the state in the economy was the crucial means by 
which this goal could be achieved. However, when southern European socialists 
gained power, they almost never attempted to pursue traditional social democratic 
policies. The most exemplary of such case among southern European socialists in 
the 1980s is to be found in France.4 The Parti Socialiste (PS) won the 1981 
elections with the mandate of implementing “Keynesianism in one state,” while in 
most of the Western countries, a new economic consensus grounded on the 
principles of monetarism prevailed. However, Keynesianism was short-lived in 
France: soon after the electoral victory, economic policy was reversed. Between 
11 and 12 June 1981, the French devalued their currency and inaugurated a new 
restrictive policy aimed at curbing inflation, while supply-side measures were left 
with the burden of improving growth and employment (Hall 1987; Colombani and 
Portelli 1995). The cutting of spending plans, and the intense industrial 
restructuring led by the socialist government sparked opposition from trade unions. 
If in Britain the party/union alliance had failed in its mission, in France it 
appeared no longer to exist. Mass demonstrations of workers against the socialist 
government seemed to show that party/union policy collaboration had become a 
forgotten relic.
These episodes in France and Britain can be considered as thresholds in 
European political history both because of the direct influence they had on the
4 Even though geographically France is a central rather than a southern European country, it is 
generally grouped by the literature with the southern group together with Italy, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal. France’s political system shares with these countries a number o f  relevant features: a 
plurality o f  union confederations, the Catholic influence in organised labour, the fact that socialists 
gained office later on in the post-war period, and, perhaps, wine and the shore o f  the 
Mediterranean sea (Bergounioux 1983; Gillespie and Gallagher 1989).
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polities of the two countries, and for the influence they exerted on the 
understanding of the European left by social scientists and political practitioners. 
The party/union alliance was considered a stable feature of Western European 
policy regimes until the 1980s. Additionally, the policy program that the two 
actors had pursued through their alliance had been clearly identifiable. However, 
after the “winter of discontent” and the “U-turn,” stability and clarity were both in 
question. Which factors of change have impacted specifically on the party/union 
alliance? How has the relationship between these two actors developed since the 
1980s?
Factors of Change
Between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, industrial 
economies have witnessed structural changes that affected both the social and the 
policy foundations of the party/union alliance. With regard to the former, de­
industrialisation strongly affected the very class structure of advanced economies. 
In relation to the latter, the internationalisation of capital markets -  under the 
quasi-fixed exchange rate regime of the European Monetary System — seriously 
limited the room of manoeuvre available to national politicians in the political 
economy. As a consequence the two foundations were seriously undermined, 
bringing the majority of observers and scholars to contend the end of the 
traditional alliance of the Left.
From Industrial to Post-industrial Society
The increasing importance of the service sectors over the industrial 
sector within advanced economies is a well documented occurrence o f the post­
war era. The pace of de-industrialisation increased over time. Even if the pace of
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change was not the same in all the countries, the phenomenon eventually affected 
the whole of Western Europe (Maddison 1995; Crouch 1999).
The industrial society, centred on the male breadwinner, quickly 
declined between the mid 1970s and the mid 1980s and a more complex and 
fragmented post-industrial society took its place. Service sector jobs were much 
more varied than jobs in industry, and the presence of women in the labour force 
increased considerably. As a consequence, the interests, values and identities 
formed in the workplace multiplied. The welfare state, which had successfully 
sheltered the majority of the population from hardship and materialistic worries, 
increasingly allowed the pursuance of non-materialistic objectives and ideals 
(Inglehart 1977).
The trade unions had a difficult time in facing these changes. The service 
sector is relatively fragmented and lacks hubs or locations of industrial mass- 
production, where in the past manual workers would have spent their days, and 
where collective identities were previously shaped by the unions. Union 
membership in the 1980s and the 1990s has duly declined, even if not uniformly 
across countries. Most importantly, the trade unions did not manage to penetrate 
the new sectors and the new cohorts of workers. Empirical data show that, when 
compared to the whole of the working force, union members are still 
disproportionately male, not young, and are employed in traditional industries 
(Ross and Martin 1999b; Ebbingghaus 2002).
The compositional change of the labour force into a myriad of different 
groups, the emergence of non-materialistic preferences, and the relative 
weakening of trade unions are mirrored by the decreased salience of class voting. 
Table 1.1 reports the Alford index for 20 countries over the three decades between
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1960 and 1990: the higher the score of the index, the higher the support for social 
democrats from the working class rather than from other classes.5 Data show that 
the working class is less and less compact in its support of left wing parties, or, 
alternatively, that these parties are increasingly able to capture consensus from 
other sectors of the society. However, class support has not vanished altogether. A 
positive score in the index still shows that the share of working class voting Left 
is higher than the share of non-working class voting left. Moreover, in a number 
of countries, such as Finland, Sweden and Great Britain, the score is still 
relatively high.
In other words, de-industrialisation has increased the propensity of social 
democratic parties to move from their traditional core constituency in order to win 
electoral majorities. In doing so, these parties have to manage more complex 
policy programs, where material concerns must be matched with non-materialistic 
objectives, and this spawns new potential contradictions. In fact, the industrial 
working class is associated with traditional sets of values in the personal sphere, 
while more modem professions are naturally more liberal both in the conception 
of the society and in their approach to the market (Kitschelt 1994: 30-37).
5 The Alford index is the index most used to measure the incidence o f  class voting. It is based on 
the division o f  workers into manual and non-manual categories and the distinction o f  parties into 
Left and Right. The index is the difference between the percentage o f  manual workers that voted 
left, and the percentage o f non-manual workers that voted left (Alford 1962). This index has been 
discussed extensively but when tested against other measures o f class voting proved robust in its 
conclusions (Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1999: 30-31)
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-  _
Australia 29.3 27.8 |w 1
Austria 27.4 28.9 18.3
Belgium 25.4 17.9 16.4
Britain 38.3 24.3 23.4
Canada 7.7 - 4
Denmark 52 28.1 20.9
Finland 50.2 36.9 35.7
France 18.3 17 11.7
Germany 24.8 14.9 13.4
Greece - 12.3 9.7
Ireland 14.1 8.7 7.3
Italy 14.5 17.8 13.1
Luxemburg - 24.8 18.8
Netherlands 14.7 21.8 15.5
Norway 32 33.8 20.5
Portugal - - 14.9
Spain - 18.4 15.5
Sweden 40.7 37.3 32.7
Switzerland - 17.6 12.8
United States 7.7 10.9 8.1
___________________________ J
Mean 26.5 22.2 16.6
Std. Deviation 14.2 8.6 7.8
Table 1.1 -  Alford Index in Twenty Countries (1960-1990).
The Alford index measures the level o f class voting as the difference 
between the share of manual workers voting for left wing parties and the 
share of non-manual workers voting for left wing parties. Source: 
Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf (1999: 36).
Internationalisation o f Capital Markets.
The period between the end o f WWII and the mid 1970s has been 
considered marked by a “Keynesian consensus” whereby the primary objective o f  
economic policy was to support full employment, generally through a constant 
increase in public spending (Hall 1989). The social democratic policy program, 
aiming at reaching a balance between market economy and state economy, was 
well suited to the overall world economic environment. Starting in 1973, when the 
Bundesbank decided to curb rising inflation through restrictive monetary means, 
the consensus shifted from the defence o f full employment to the control o f
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inflation. When the same path was eventually followed by a reluctant Sweden in 
1991, the reversal of the world economic consensus was complete and well- 
guarded by newly independent central banks across the continent (Notermans 
2000: 166-221). Figure 1.1 shows that since the 1980s, the
unemployment/inflation ratio in European countries has shifted dramatically.
There is a debate in the literature about the factors that ultimately 
determined this shift in consensus (for a brief and effective explanation see 
Przeworski 2001 note 9 page 320). However, massive rises in prices experienced 
in many countries urged the adoption of anti-inflationary measures. Heated price 
dynamics appeared to have a double cause in the oil shocks and the renewed wage 
militancy that had been spreading throughout Europe since the late 1960s. The 
reaction of the biggest economies was then to curb inflation by cutting money 
supply, with the immediate effect of increasing unemployment. The upsurge of 
neo-liberal leaders, such as Reagan and Thatcher, which expanded anti- 
inflationary policies into a coherent set of neo-liberal economic policies, 
reinforced the process towards a new consensus: given the increasing 
liberalisation of the capital market and the quasi-fixed exchange rate regime, 
running inflation rates constantly higher than other countries became extremely 
expensive (Notermans 2000: 170).
To sum up, the combination of a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime in 
Europe, along with high capital mobility, made (comparatively) higher inflation 
rates extremely expensive, and therefore not sustainable. As a consequence, 
budget policy became restrictive and the traditional social democratic demand- 
side policy lost the ability to foster employment because its inflationary 
consequences became too expensive (Scharpf 1991: 248). Supply-side policies,
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primarily aimed at improving corporate profitability and, through this, 
investments and employment, became the cornerstone of both centre-left and 
centre-right political economic strategies (Boix 1998: 16-51). In this context, 
social democratic parties attempted to devise a specific kind of supply-side 
economic strategy, aimed at improving employment performances. This focused 
on public investments in training, and other active labour market policies that 
could improve employability without crowding out private investments and 
economic growth (Boix 1998: 51-81).
However, once the inflation rate became controlled by the central bank, 
trade unions were no longer needed for the implementation of the “new” social 
democratic political platform, even if this platform is still grounded on public 
spending. Empirical studies, both qualitative and quantitative in nature, show that 
social democrats still spent more than conservatives after 1973, even if the kind of 
expenditure has changed (Cusack 1997: 391; Boix 1998: 130-156).
However, public spending for training, active labour market policies, 
and some unemployment insurance did not require wage moderation to be 
economically sustainable, because independent central banks were vested with the 
mission of controlling price levels through monetary means.
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Figure 1.1 -  Inflation and Unemployment in Europe
Consumer price index (annual change) and unemployment rates in fifteen European economies. 
Source: European Commission (2006a, b).
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The Research Question
Given that the social and policy foundations that were supporting the 
alliance between social democratic parties and trade unions during the post-war 
decades no longer hold, what is driving the party/union relationship during the 
1980s and 1990s? What motivates collaboration or non-collaboration between the 
two actors, and what policy results are derived from different types of interactions? 
This is the research question of this thesis, which is motivated by the fact that the 
end of the social and policy foundations of the party/union alliance did not result 
in a clear-cut interaction between the two actors, which was consistently 
observable across European countries. This indeterminacy is apparent both in 
prima facie  evidence, and through analytical reasoning.
From an empirical viewpoint, in the period between 1980 and 2000, i.e. 
when the de-industrialisation and internationalisation of the capital and goods 
market were at an advanced stage, it was possible to observe both sustained 
party/union alliances and confrontational relations between the two actors.
In France in the early 1980s, the two Mitterrand septennials were 
marked by the strained relationship between the socialist governments and 
organised labour (Ross 1987). In Spain, where the socialists won office around the 
same period, the trade unions organised two general strikes against the 
government (Astudillo Ruiz 2001). In Sweden, the early 1990s were also marked 
by a strained party/union relationship. Unions’ opposition to the policy of the 
socialist financial minister resulted in his resignation and eventually led to 
electoral loss for the party in 1991 (Notermans 2001: 213). Later on in the century, 
the relationship between New Labour and the TUC seemed very far from the 
tradition o f the British Labour movement, which has been characterised in the
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past by intense policy collaboration. Indeed, both the party and the unions insisted 
in marking their respective autonomy and the policy content of the party/union 
alliance in the UK remained very scarce (Glyn and Wood 2001 216-219).
Beside these examples of non-collaborative or even confrontational 
relationships, one finds sustained collaborations. In the late 1990s, in countries as 
different as the Netherlands, Italy, and Portugal, left-wing governments and 
unions collaborated on a wide range of socio-economic issues. These included 
reforms of the labour markets, and of welfare state provisions which were often 
accompanied by nationally-agreed income policies (Fajertag and Pochet 1997; 
2000). Moreover, these complex policy packages were discussed and approved 
also in countries once considered unlikely to witness collaboration between the 
government and organised interests groups due to structural institutional 
deficiencies (Baccaro 2003). In particular, many of these countries lacked a highly 
concentrated, hierarchical union confederation, as well as an enduring tradition of 
social democratic governance.
So much for the clear empirical variation into the 1980s and 1990s, but 
simple analytical reasoning could suggest motives that could bring parties and 
unions to renew their collaboration in spite of the end of the traditional social and 
policy foundations.
First of all, the decreased salience of class voting does not entail that 
votes o f the working class became altogether irrelevant for social democratic 
parties, or that they no longer exert an influence. Indeed, positive values of the 
Alford index (Table 1.1) suggest that the share of manual workers voting for left 
wing parties is still higher than the share of non-manual workers, and this is likely 
to have an impact on the policy and behaviour of elected politicians. Second, even
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if  a new social democratic policy strategy does not need union collaboration to be 
implemented, the party might still benefit from an alliance with a large social bloc 
that is also the only mass organisation that can be found in post-industrial 
societies. Indeed, even if the shift in the world economic consensus towards a 
low-inflation regime has now rendered wage moderation unnecessary to control 
price levels, it is still a powerful tool in improving cost competitiveness, and 
therefore growth and employment. Third, union collaboration regarding welfare 
and labour market reform can help social democrats in solving the usual 
equality/efficiency dilemma of advanced capitalist economies, which has become 
stricter than ever in the economic context that has developed since the 1980s. In 
other words, during the 1980s and the 1990s many welfare state institutions 
needed reforms in order to cope both with international pressures, and with 
endogenous budget problems. The involvement of unions could facilitate the 
identification of the best routes to make economic reforms compatible with social 
needs (Rhodes 2001; Culpepper 2002; Hassel 2003b; Regini 2003). Fourth, given 
that the internationalisation of markets and the development of the service sectors 
have weakened the unions capacity in the labour market (Ebbingghaus 2002), 
unions could compensate this through an increased role in the policy arena. 
Indeed, even under an unfavourable overall macroeconomic framework, trade 
unions could influence the policy outcomes of social democratic governments, 
and in this way have an interest in concluding negotiations with them. 
Consequently, while the socio-economic developments of the mid-1970s 
prompted a change in party/union dynamics, in theory they did not preclude the 
renegotiation and reorganisation of the party/union alliance.
34
Against this background, it is perhaps useful to restate the core research 
question of this thesis. Given that the social and policy foundations that were 
supporting the alliance between social democratic parties and trade unions during 
the post-war decades no longer hold, what is driving the party/union relationship 
during the 1980s and 1990s? What motivates collaboration or non-collaboration 
between the two actors? In other words, which incentives and constraints, and 
which institutional configurations, push them to renegotiate or to terminate their 
alliance? What policy results are derived from different types of interactions?
In the next section I will start by reviewing the main conclusions that the 
literature has drawn on the patterns of party/union interactions observed since the 
late 1970s. I will show that the prevailing view of the literature concerned with 
this topic considers the party/union alliance as over, by force of the changed 
incentives of the social democratic parties. However, the methodological 
heterogeneity of this literature, which constantly switches its research object, does 
not allow for a systematic benchmark for the conflicting results suggested by a 
limited number of country-level case studies that exist.
Therefore, in order to reach a convincing answer to my question, I need 
to take a comprehensive methodological approach. This will have to start with the 
systematic collection of data on my dependent variable, i.e. the party/union 
alliance.
1.2 Reviewing a Composite Literature
In the previous section I underlined that two major changes in the 
economy and the societal structure of western countries have had a significant 
impact on the traditional party/union alliance. The policy programmes that this 
alliance once pursued are no longer viable, while the social bloc that supported
policy collaboration between the two actors has diminished in size and political 
relevance. In this section I will show that, perhaps unsurprisingly, most of the 
literature has concluded this analysis by declaring the party/union alliance dead, 
and leaving little, if any, scope for further collaboration between the two actors. In 
the previous section I highlighted that empirical observations are mixed and that 
sustained collaborations have continued during the 1980s and 1990s, even though 
this has not happened uniformly across countries and over time within country. 
What does the literature say about the variations that we have observed since the 
mid-1970s? Are these variations convincingly explained by the existing literature? 
I suggest that the answer to this question is no. Indeed, after analysing both 
general conclusions and specific case studies, I will suggest an overall approach 
that could refine our theoretical and empirical understanding of contemporary Left 
in Europe.
The End of the Alliance or Sustained Social Democracy?
The party/union alliance features as an explanatory variable in many 
studies focusing on the trajectories of either socialist parties or trade unions in 
contemporary Europe. The great majority of these studies endorses the argument 
whereby under a globalised, post-industrial economy, organised labour is de­
linked from electoral socialism because the latter has abandoned its original 
policy program grounded on income redistribution and the maintenance of full- 
employment through public spending, and has instead targeted low inflation as the 
priority for economic policy.
The origin of this assessment of the party/union alliance is probably a 
simple methodological issue. While analysing only one of the two actors, authors 
in party politics or industrial relations need to treat as independent from their
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study object all the interviewing variables, and therefore they need to treat the 
relationship with the other actor, as constant as far as is possible. The best way to 
deal with this methodological problem is to understand the party/union alliance as 
coincident with the traditional social democratic policy package (the paper that is 
most transparent on this interpretation is authored by James Piazza (2001), 
whereas in other studies this assumption remains rather implicit). Indeed, when 
the party/union alliance is equated to the policy outcome that it used to produce in 
the post-war decades, only the ‘de-linking’ conclusion seems possible.
Books like Femer and Hyman’s (1992a) or Ross and Martin’s (1999a) 
are devoted to contemporary trade unionism. In the introductions to both books, 
the authors lament the fact that “ [in] many countries social democratic 
governments took the lead in implementing liberalizing policy shift” (Ross and 
Martin 1999a: 15) induced by the “economic context” and by the increasing 
dominance of capital over labour (Femer and Hyman 1992b: xix). As a 
consequence, in European countries trade unions have remained orphaned by their 
political ally and, more generally, have seen their political clout much reduced.
In fact, from the point of view of social democratic parties, powerful 
trade unions are considered to be detrimental to their electoral fortunes. The 
contemporary social democratic electoral dilemma was sketched out in a seminal 
book by Herbert Kitschelt (1994). Electoral competition is no longer fought only 
along a socialist/capitalist divide, but also over the new liberty/authority cleavage 
that cuts across it and is dominated by post-materialist values.6 In this new context, 
if they are to win elections, social democratic parties have to manage a greater 
variety of interests and beliefs, rather than rely on a single well-defined bloc of
6 Kitschelt builds on Inglehart (1977; and 1987)
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interests. Therefore, a collaborative relationship with trade unions, which may be 
reinforced by formal links (as used to be the case in Sweden and the UK), is a 
liability rather than an asset for social democrats, because it limits their leverage 
on economic policy to forge an alliance that could include a multiplicity of 
different social groups (Kitschelt 1994: 225).
Again, Kitschelt’s conclusions clearly depend on the assumption that a 
collaborative relationship between trade unions and Social Democratic parties will 
bring about traditional Keynesian-type policy. Indeed, only in this case would the 
relationship hinder the ability of social democratic governments to pursue the 
management of a greater variety of interests and values, and, ultimately, to be 
electorally successful.
All these interpretations attribute the end of the alliance to a strategic 
decision made by social democratic parties in their effort to adapt to the new 
socio-economic scenario. “Social democratic parties now display a disarming 
enthusiasm for economic orthodoxy [...] and a shrinking role for organised labour 
in the political economy of the Left” (Howell 2001: 33).
Different Views Are Contested
A different conclusion was drawn in a series of studies that supported 
the view according to which the traditional “political exchange” could also be 
sustained in a globalised scenario (Garrett and Lange 1991; Garrett 1998; Garrett 
and Way 1999). As we saw earlier, the social democratic paradigm in the post­
war period, i.e. public spending versus wage moderation, was associated with a 
smoother Phillips curve, so with comparatively lower levels of unemployment and 
inflation (Cameron 1984). Similar statistical regularities can apparently also be 
found in the period after 1980.
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According to this view, there are winners and losers in globalisation, as 
not all social groups benefit from the internationalisation of capital and goods 
markets. Groups that are threatened by these changes demand policies that will 
shelter them from the harshness of markets, therefore opening a new political 
space for social democrats. They will continue to use public spending in order to 
foster a more equitable distribution of resources, and indeed Garrett (1998) finds 
that the effect of partisan policies on a country’s level of public spending 
increased rather than decreased as the integration of world economy progressed. 
In a number of different works, alone and with different co-authors (Garret and 
Lange 1991; Garrett 1998; Garrett and Way 1999), Garrett argues that a sustained 
collaboration between parties and unions is possible, along the tracks laid down in 
previous decades. Indeed, spending policy is effective in fostering growth only 
when is associated with large encompassing trade union confederations in which 
the influence of non-tradable sectors is low. In fact, the latter are the less adverse 
to inflation as they do not take the risk of being priced out by international 
competitors, and have a tendency to claim unsustainable wage increases. Hence, 
when the correct institutional setting is present, a virtuous circle of public 
spending is still a viable option, although it will lead to high deficit levels, higher 
interest rates and higher inflation. The efficiency and reliability of the corporatist 
system work as an incentive for domestic investors to stay, and for foreign 
investors to enter the country. In other words, through institutional mechanisms, 
social democratic parties and encompassing trade unions can offer a valuable 
alternative to the orthodox recipes for growth (Garrett 1998).
These conclusions and the reliability of the quantitative analysis 
underpinning them have been heavily contested in a subsequent work by Torben
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Iversen (1999: 167), which explains economic performances through a new 
institutional theory whereby the inflation/unemployment trade off is determined _ 
by the interplay of wage bargaining and monetary institutions. However, Iversen’s 
game theoretical equilibrium model is based on the assumption that “trade unions 
enjoy strategic capacity” (Iversen 1999: 109, emphasis in the text). In so doing, 
Iversen relies on the existing interpretation of the conditions under which unions 
enjoy strategic capacity (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979a; Lehmbruch and 
Schmitter 1982; Goldthorpe 1984). However, I will show in the next section that 
the shortcomings of this literature are key to addressing my research question on 
the motives behind renegotiated party/union alliance. Hence, Iversen’s 
explanation of economic performance does not address the needs of my 
investigation.
In summary, the prevailing view among industrial relations scholars is 
that social democrats have detached from organised labour by changing their 
policy platform. Theories on electoral socialism reinforce this view by arguing 
that social democrats have an actual electoral disincentive to collaborate with 
organised labour. Conversely, Garrett and co-authors argue that some room for 
manoeuvre could exist for sustained collaborations, on the condition that unions 
incorporate the traditional institutional “pre-requisites” for “political exchange,” 
namely concentrated membership, a hierarchical leadership, and a small relative 
weight of public sector unions.
All of these conclusions to some extent are contradicted by three papers 
that have focused specifically on the issue of the party/union alliance. One of 
these papers deals with it from a large-iV perspective, whereas the others are two 
case studies on Spain and Sweden.
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Thought-Provoking Papers Suggesting Alternative Research Paths
Three recent papers have directly addressed the issue of the party/union 
alliance, and each has approached the subject in a different way. Not surprisingly, 
each has reached a different conclusion (Astudillo Ruiz 2001; Piazza 2001; Aylott 
2003).
From a large-N perspective, James Piazza (2001) aims to prove that the 
forces of globalization (defined as the liberalisation o f trade and capital accounts) 
have caused the de-linking of social democratic parties and trade unions across 
OECD countries. Through regression analysis he shows that, between 1980 and 
1995, the increase in globalization is negatively correlated to increase in union 
density and positively correlated to the abandonment of Keynesianism by social 
democratic governments. From these two empirical results he concludes that 
globalization undermined the party/union alliance. Therefore, according to Piazza, 
the alliance coincides in form and substance with what he calls “Keynesian 
policies,” namely “generous social spending” and “nationalized industry” (id. 
426). Keynesianism was abandoned exactly when internationalisation of markets 
was increasing, therefore if one considers the alliance dependent on it (or, more 
forcefully, simply coincident with it) it is no surprise to find it dissolved. The 
great virtue of Piazza’s paper is to have made transparent this assumption (i.e. 
party/union alliance = Keynesianism), which implicitly underpins the “de-linking” 
argument found throughout the literature. This means that if this assumption is left 
to empirical verification, the de-linking conclusion can also change. In other 
words, if trade unions could agree on a set of economic policies based on 
economic orthodoxy (e.g. retrenchment of the welfare state, labour market 
liberalisations, etc.) the party/union collaboration could be sustained over time.
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Indeed, the conclusions of two other papers, grounded on single-country 
case studies are quite different, as they do not identify party/union alliance with 
Keynesian policies. They are based on the cases of Spain and Sweden, both of 
which, for different reasons, can be considered critical case studies: the latter is a 
typical northern European social democratic country, and the former is, 
conversely, a southern country where socialists gained power only at a much later 
stage (Astudillo Ruiz 2001; Aylott 2003). The study on Sweden focuses on the 
organisational ties between the party and the unions, while the study on Spain 
looks at policy coordination between the two actors under the socialist 
governments.
The Cases o f  Sweden and Spain
Sweden is one of the countries where the social democratic paradigm has 
been applied for longer and with remarkable success. Not surprisingly, Sweden 
was the last country to enter in a low-inflation regime, therefore abandoning 
traditional Keynesianism. Here, the party/union alliance has been among the most 
stable and strong. Nicholas Aylott (2003), however, does not focus on the policy 
program that unions and the social democratic party decided to follow in the 
1990s. He instead concentrates on the dynamics between the two organisations, in 
particular on the extent to which trade unions are able to influence party decisions 
even after the so-called divorce, i.e. the demise, in 1987, of the rule according to 
which unions members were automatically also members of the social democratic 
party. Aylott’s empirical findings show that, even though the party/union 
relationship has undoubtedly changed in the sense that the “old assumptions of 
common purposes between the political and economic wings of the labour 
movement can no longer be taken for granted,” (Aylott 2003: 387) this does not
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mean the end of a strong and privileged relationship. The unions, in fact, maintain 
a strong hold at every level of the party decision-making structure. Moreover, the 
efforts of both the actors to ensure a fruitful collaboration are “even stronger” (id.) 
than before, when the ties were taken for granted. In fact, mutual interests in 
collaboration are still present. The LO (the Swedish blue-collar trade union 
confederation) can still supply mass-communication services, through its 
connections with a great portion of the working population, and the SAP (the 
Swedish Social Democratic party) can still supply the LO with a significant role 
in policy making.
The case study of Spain (Astudillo Ruiz 2001) focuses instead on policy­
making. It concentrates on the reasons why, since 1983, the alliance between the 
socialist government and the socialist trade union confederation, the UGT, has 
failed, as the two anti-governmental general strikes indicate it has. Astudillo Ruiz 
(2001) notes that, even though the government did not implement demand-side 
management, its economic policy was still distinctly socialist as it was based on a 
substantial increase in public spending, aimed at reducing inequality and 
improving employment through supply-side measures. The party/union alliance, 
however, could not endure because of the lack o f cohesion of the labour 
movement. Indeed, the socialist trade unions (UGT) were fighting a battle against 
the communist confederation, the CCOO, for workers representation. In the 1980s, 
Spain’s economic cycle was buoyant, and this pushed the CCOO towards more 
militant attitudes. Therefore, in order not to lose consensus among workers, the 
UGT had no choice but to follow the same stance, thus hindering any chance of 
coordinating with the social democratic government. The Spanish case is 
particularly interesting at the light of the fact that most of the literature holds the
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changed social democratic strategy responsible for party/union de-linkage. Policy 
coordination failed here, however, despite the reiterated efforts made by the party 
throughout its governmental mandate (for a similar conclusion see: Boix 1998: 
134-137).
Reconciling a Variety of Conclusions
The three papers just reviewed reach different conclusions and offer 
different insights, but they can become complementary if one aims to build an 
overall framework. Piazza’s paper identified the assumption one needs to drop in 
order to have an empirically-based understanding of party/union interactions since 
the 1980s. The Astudillo Ruiz paper observes that, since the late 1980s, the 
party/union alliance in Spain had been impossible for impediments coming from 
institutional features of the union movement. This implies that, given more 
appropriate institutional means, the “new” policies that socialists had 
implemented in Spain, different from the traditional “Keynesian” set, could 
indeed be combined with a sustained alliance with the trade unions. The study on 
Sweden indirectly endorses this view, as it tells us that even with changed 
constitutional rules, the day-to-day interaction between unions and the party can 
be sustained as unions are still able to influence party politics.
This logic somehow remains in contradiction with the conclusions 
analysed in the previous section. Indeed, among scholars of European political 
economy, sustained party/union collaboration should still be based on a “political 
exchange” between wage moderation and spending policies (Garrett 1998). From 
a small-« perspective, instead, the chances of party/union collaborations seem 
linked only to cases in which trade unions can tolerate economic orthodoxy and
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the end of Keynesianism. In summary, it is not possible to reconcile these 
different conclusions unless a systematic approach to the topic is undertaken.
Indeed, the different approaches to the party/union alliance reach 
different conclusions because they are based on limited sets of empirics and, most 
importantly, on different research questions. In the preceding discussion I have 
reviewed literature that has argued a variety of conclusions: (1) that social 
democrats and unions can generate good economic performance even in a 
globalised economy, and find social support for it among the ‘losers’ of 
globalisation; (2) that European trade unions are politically isolated by social 
democratic parties because the latter no longer centre their electoral strategy on 
them; (3) that the party/union alliance must be loosened if the party wants to win 
elections, and this is what is happening in many countries; (4) that party/union 
‘de-linkage’ is proved by strong correlations between globalisation and the end of 
Keynesianism, but at country level collaborative interactions are visible under 
certain institutional settings.
These different conclusions on the party/union alliance depend on the 
fact that these authors engage at least four different debates in the political 
sciences, in different ambits where the pivotal left alliance plays a role. (1) The 
debate on the impact of trade unions and partisanship on economic growth; (2) 
The debate on the state and future of trade unions; (3) The debate on the state and 
perspectives of electoral socialism; (4) A very partial debate on the party/union 
alliance itself, on its developments and perspectives.
Given the heterogeneity of the approaches, in order to tackle my research 
question I need to address the topic in a systematic manner which will necessarily 
start with a complete empirical mapping of my key dependent variable, the
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party/union alliance. This will allow me to benchmark theoretical conclusions 
reached by scholars of party politics and industrial relations, as well as grounding 
my own explanation on a transparent set of empirical evidence. The complete 
measure of party/union alliance in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s will 
represent by itself one of the contributions of this thesis. In fact, the literature 
dealing with the evolutions of the party/union alliance lacks a debate grounded on 
shared data and terminology.
In the following section, which concludes this introductory chapter, I 
will clarify the methodology and structure of the rest of this study.
1.3 Methodology and Plan of the Thesis
This thesis applies a standard research design based on the identification 
of a dependent variable, that is, the party/union alliance, and independent 
variables able to explain it. As such, it will investigate the institutional and 
political factors that influence different alliance patterns across countries and 
within countries over time, as well as the policy consequences of different types 
of party/union interactions.
Since the seminal book by King et al. (1994) suggested the adoption of 
common methodological standards in different types of social enquiry, political 
scientists have increasingly sought to combine the rigour of quantitative analysis 
with the depth of qualitative analysis. The classic divide between scholars 
interested in “explaining” political phenomena (i.e. quantitative methodologists) 
and those interested in “understanding” political phenomena (i.e. qualitative 
methodologists) was addressed by political scientists through the combined use of 
both approaches (APSA 2002). Following examples set by recent influential 
works in political economy (including for example: Boix 1998, Iversen 1999,
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Mares 2006), this dissertation firstly builds its theoretical framework focusing on 
the large-7V (Chapters 2 to 4) and then tests its conclusions through detailed 
comparative analysis of the small-/? (Chapter 5).
I have shown in the previous section that the literature dealing with the 
party/union interaction is plagued by extreme heterogeneity in its approach to its 
empirical object, motivated by the variety of different research questions 
addressed. Therefore, the first step towards tackling my research question will be 
to measure the patterns of party/union interactions in European countries between 
1974 and 2003. The measurement exercise will generate a hypothesis that will 
guide the rest of the study, which will then focus on each of the two actors in turn, 
devoting one chapter to the unions and one chapter to the social democratic 
parties respectively. The final empirical chapter will then revert to examine their 
interaction at the country level, leading the thesis to the conclusions of the final 
chapter.
Plan of the Thesis (Guide for Readers)
“Interaction,” “relationship,” and even “alliance,” are very vague terms. 
I will therefore spend Chapter 2 working to build an analytically specific 
definition of “party/union alliance,” and to measure it. By doing so, I will give 
this study a transparent basis, which will ease the task of assessing its conclusions 
against existing theories. I will suggest that if the party/union alliance is 
operational, this has to be visible in terms of policy results in socio-economic 
issues under centre-left cabinets. 1 will show that in Europe, between 1974 and 
2003, mainstream centre-left governments designed over 70% of their socio­
economic policies in accordance with organised labour. This finding is 
counterintuitive to most literature predicting party/union divorces. Given that both
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the social and policy foundations of the traditional party/union alliance have faded, 
the factors driving the alliance during the 1980s and 1990s remain unclear. This 
puzzle is then divided in two different questions. How can trade unions comply 
with socialist policies if  these are grounded on neo-liberal orthodoxy, and 
therefore do not allow for substantial payoffs for organised labour, such as 
increased transfers or increased welfare benefits? Why are socialists still pursuing 
collaboration with organised labour, given their changed set of electoral 
incentives? The answer that I suggest is based on the analysis of my measure of 
the party/union alliance, and it contends that party/union collaborations will occur 
when organised labour adopts democratic decision-making rules across 
occupational sectors (i.e. at the confederation level), because this ensures union 
cohesiveness. In turn, I argue that social democratic parties retain electoral 
incentives for cooperation with cohesive trade unions.
Chapter 3 addresses the key contention of my hypothesis, by suggesting 
an amendment to “neo-corporatist” theories. Conventional neo-corporatist 
theories contend that encompassing unions must embed two key institutional 
features in order to adopt co-operative, as opposed to militant, behaviour. First, 
the membership must be concentrated in the lowest possible number of unions. 
Second, unions must be centralised, i.e. decisions taken by leaders must be 
complied with by the whole body. Contrary to conventional views, this chapter 
shows that democratic decision-making mechanisms are more suited than 
hierarchy to achieving the centralisation of union confederations. This is because 
democracy reduces the fractionalisation of the confederation by increasing the 
legitimacy of decisions and leaders. This conclusion is corroborated by fresh 
empirical data processed through panel-data regression analysis: a variable on
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confederation democracy, that I have designed and measured, is negatively 
correlated with wage militancy.
After having analysed the unions’ side, in Chapter 4 I switch my 
attention to the party side of the equation. Historical accounts show that social 
democratic parties underwent a strong process of policy reappraisal in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and have converged on the endorsement of economic orthodoxy. At 
the same time, the systematic content analysis that I have carried out shows that 
social democratic governments increasingly attempted to involve trade unions 
formally in welfare policies and labour market reforms. In other words, social 
democratic parties have shifted their policies towards the Right side of the 
political spectrum while at the same time increasingly seeking the formal 
endorsement of their traditional constituency on this policy shift. This is 
understandable when seen through the lens of the spatial model o f party 
competition proposed by Herbert Kitschelt (1994). In the post-industrial social 
scenario, social democratic policies must be able to satisfy simultaneously a 
variety of different, and potentially conflicting, preferences. Therefore, the new 
policy platform has to rest on a sequence of distributional compromises, both on 
materialistic and ideological issues. The formal involvement of cohesive trade 
union confederations can help social democrats to identify the best compromise, 
that is, the point at which the maximum number of votes can be gained through 
market-friendly liberal policies, while minimizing the loss from traditional 
working class constituencies. Chapter 4 ends with a substantial game theoretical 
section that brings together the two sides of my equation, i.e. the unions and the 
party. The formalisation of the game highlights that in a context characterised by 
decreasing (or low) union density, and when the social democratic policies
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strongly depart from traditional Keynesianism, sustained party/union 
collaboration is strongly dependent on the level of union confederation democracy.
Chapter 5 will test my theoretical conclusions against the trajectories of 
the party/union alliance in Italy and the United Kingdom respectively, as two 
critical case studies. The qualitative method will allow me to show that political 
and organisational cohesiveness is key to explain the emergence of concertation 
under centre-left cabinets in 1990s Italy. Over the same period, the Labour 
government and the Trades Union Congress in the UK ceased to maintain their 
old tradition of “political exchange.” Indeed, the British Labour movement 
showed an extremely pronounced degree of ffactionalisation throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. Decreasing union density throughout the 1980s and 1990s exacerbated 
the fractionalisation problem, so that the New Labour retained no incentive for 
including unions in policy making. From a comparative perspective, however, the 
overall political economic approach of the two governments is very similar. Low 
inflation and economic orthodoxy have formed the cornerstone both o f the Italian 
and the British Left. In Italy, however, trade unions were able to retain, through 
concertation, a stronger hold in the management o f the labour market, and, as a 
consequence, in Italian society and polity.
Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, will then summarise the main 
findings and highlight their theoretical implications for neighbouring fields in 
political economy, thereby suggesting avenues for future research. My 
conclusions on trade unions, including the importance of decision-making 
processes and the important magnitude of union involvement in policy-making, 
can have an impact on research strategies on European unemployment. 
Additionally, they suggest that in a strongly fragmented society, the political clout
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of trade unions might well increase, rather than decrease. Finally, the argument of 
the renegotiated alliance suggests that given that trade unions remain at the core, 
of social democratic constituencies in many European countries, the centre-left 
and centre-right differ systematically with regard to their underlying electorate. 
This affects our expectations of the future developments in European politics, 
because under certain conditions policy contestation on economic issues, which 
has strongly decreased since the early 1980s, could increase again in the future.
This dissertation aims to contribute a critical account of the assumptions 
that are generally made in current political economic interpretations of advanced 
industrialised countries, by focusing on one partisan aspect of policy-making. It 
duly begins, in the next chapter, with the analysis, definition and measurement of 
the alliance between the social democratic parties and trade unions in Western 
European countries, which has been considered dead for a long time, perhaps 
prematurely.
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Chapter 2
Mapping the Party/Union Alliance and 
Suggesting an Understanding of Its 
Determinants
When Rubens was divorced he found himself [...] once and for 
all ‘beyond the borders o f love.’ [...] It is necessary to understand 
this apparent contradiction: beyond the borders o f love there is 
love.
Milan Kundera, Immortality
To be politically meaningful, the party/union alliance must produce a 
tangible policy outcome. In an active alliance, social democratic governments 
should undertake policies addressing socio-economic issues in collaboration with 
their sister trade union confederations. This means that the two actors are able to 
find a common purpose, to identify shared objectives, and that they prefer this to 
having no collaboration.
This assumption forms the basis of the work developed in this chapter, 
which builds an analytical understanding of the party/union alliance so that I may 
measure it across countries. The development of a transparent measure of the
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party/union alliance is the first step I need to take towards answering the research 
question of this study, i.e. what institutional and political factors have determined 
patterns in the party/union relationship in Western Europe since the advent of 
globalisation?
Indeed, a set of systematically collected empirical data will allow a 
benchmark of the conclusions of other studies to be drawn, in order to develop a 
comprehensive hypothesis in this chapter, and to test it in the rest of the thesis. 
Before undertaking this task I will now clearly identify the actors to whom I will 
refer, i.e. the parties and unions that form the universe under observation.
A body of literature defines the mainstream centre-left parties within 
each political system as “social democratic” (Featherstone 1988; Kitschelt 1994; 
Ladrech and Marliere 1999; Glyn 2001b; Notermans 2001). Even though the 
trajectories of different parties are embedded in different states, they share a 
number of features: their roots are traceable to the Industrial Revolution and to 
socialist thinkers who aimed to improve the working and living conditions of the 
working class; they take a reformist approach, rejecting violence and revolution as 
a means to political change. For these parties “Representative democracy became 
[...] simultaneously the means and the goal, the vehicle for socialism and the 
political form of the future socialist society.” (Przeworski 1985: 15)
The social democratic parties maintained ideological differences with 
other political movements having theirs social base among workers, in particular 
the Communist and the social Christian movements. In relation to this, it must be 
noted, that in a number of countries, particularly in Southern Europe, trade union 
confederations grew up along political cleavages, so that often more than one 
union confederation emerged (Hyman 2001).
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The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the party/union alliance. 
In order to simplify the measurement task, I do not include in my index non­
socialist unions, such as Communist unions or Christian unions unless, in a later 
stage o f their development, they fundamentally altered their ideological basis and 
became mainstream socialist unions. Therefore, the party/union alliance to which 
my operationalisation refers consists of social democratic parties and 
ideologically near union confederations. Other confederations are kept in the 
background. Table 2.1 details the universe under observation by matching the 
union confederations and the parties this study is focusing upon for each European 
country.
The next section of this chapter will spell out the criteria I have used to 
provide an indicator of party/union collaboration in European countries. My 
results show that, during the 1980s and 1990s, European social democratic 
governments processed an average of 72% of their economic policies in formal or 
informal collaboration with their sister trade union confederation. Careful analysis 
o f the index will allow me to assess in a systematic manner the conclusions 
reached by previous literature. I will show that patterns of collaboration (non- 
collaboration) do not correspond necessarily to expansive (restrictive) policy 
packages. At the same time, there is room to believe that organisational features 
o f trade unions play a crucial role in determining pattern variations across and 
within countries over time.
This hypothesis will be tested in the rest of the thesis, firstly with 
reference to the large-N, and then through two critical case studies on Italy and 
Britain respectively.
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• 18 IIP IppM M M
Austria 6 g b SPO
Belgium ABW /FG TB SP/PS (BSP/SPB until 1978)
Denmark LO SD
Finland SAK SDP
France CFDT PS
Germany DGB SPD
Greece GSEE PASOK
Ireland ICTU Labour
UIL (1974-1991); PSI (1974-1991);
Italy UIL and CGIL (1992-2003) PDS-DS (1992-2003)
Netherlands N W PvdA
Norway LO DnA
Portugal UGT PS
Spain UGT PSOE
Sweden LO SAP
United Kingdom TUC Labour
Table 2.1 -  Trade Unions Confederations and Social Democratic Parties: Still Allies?
See List of Abbreviations for details.
2.1 Unpacking the Party/Union Relationship
How is it possible to know whether, in a given country, in a given year, 
the party/union alliance was alive and operating, or if  it was dissolved? In other 
words, how is it possible to recognise the party/union alliance? The Swedish case 
(Aylott 2003) suggested that formal links between the two actors are not 
necessarily a good proxy: in this Scandinavian country the dissolution o f formal 
links has not undermined an intense alliance whereby trade unions and party 
politicians actively seek common ground and objectives. Another possibility is 
then to focus on the type o f policy platform furthered by social democratic parties, 
as most o f the literature does. In this case the party/union alliance would be
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likened to pro-labour spending policies. However, the Spanish case (Astudillo 
Ruiz 2001) demonstrates that spending policies are not necessarily conducive to 
collaboration between parties and unions either, making this approach inadequate 
too.
Arguably, there is a third approach to this relationship that could 
subsume the above two, while avoiding their weaknesses. Intuitively, an operative 
party/union alliance should produce policy outcomes in order to be considered 
politically important. Consequently, the alliance can be recognised as active each 
time a social democratic government develops its policies in collaboration with 
the trade union confederation. Parties and unions are through this able to identify 
a common purpose and shared objectives. Additionally, agreement on a given 
policy implies substantial interaction between the two bodies, irrespective of 
formal links.
It should be emphasised that “collaboration” is not understood here 
simply as the practice of democratic governments consulting interested parties 
before issuing a bill. It refers to a stronger type of interaction that aims to produce 
a piece of legislation, or otherwise further a policy, upon which the trade unions 
openly agree.
Which policies should be considered to constitute the ambit within 
which the party/union alliance operates? How it is then possible to recognise 
examples of collaboration versus failed coordination? I established in the last 
chapter that up until the 1980s the party/union alliance was centred on an 
exchange between wage moderation and state intervention in the economy 
(Goldthorpe 1984; Notermans 2000). Additionally, the “social pacts” that were 
agreed in many European countries during the 1980s and 1990s contained
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numerous provisions including labour law and social security reforms, as well as 
income policies (Fajertag and Pochet 1997; 2000; Rhodes 2001). Consequently, in 
order to operationalise the party/union alliance it is sensible to focus on three 
policy areas that make up the core of socio-economic steering: macroeconomic 
management, social security, and labour law and employment regulation. In this 
way it is possible to design an indicator that can be applied to the entire post-war 
period.
Of course, these policy areas do not represent all areas of potential 
collaboration.7 However, it is arguable that collaboration in the design and 
implementation of policies in socio-economic matters combines the mechanics of 
actual interplay between actors (i.e. formal or informal organisational ties between 
the two organisations), with the tangible resultant policy. Moreover, by focusing 
on the outcome irrespective of its content (e.g. expansive versus restrictive 
economic policies, de-regulation versus re-regulation of labour markets) the 
coordinating ability of the two actors is emphasised -  as opposed to focusing on 
the success or failure of their policies in economic terms. Indeed, the analysis of 
the efficacy of different sets of economic policies logically follows the analysis of 
the results of party/union interaction.
On this basis, I designed and measured an indicator of the party/union 
relationship across fifteen European countries (as displayed in Table 2.1) over a 
period of thirty years (1974-2003) through the systematic coding of textual 
information. The next sub-section gives necessary details on the design of the 
indicator, and I then present the results of the measurement.
7 For example, during periods when parties are in opposition, they can join with the unions to 
oppose conservative policies through social mobilization. Another typical example o f  
collaboration is the financing o f  electoral campaigns by trade unions (see: Minkin 1992).
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Design of the Indicator
The design of the indicator is based on a coding frame that, allowing 
systematic comparison of textual information, permits rigorous content analysis 
(Krippendorff 1980; Bauer 2000: 139).8 The general reliability of the indicator is 
enhanced by keeping the frame as simple as possible (Bauer 2000: 144).
With reference to each policy area, each country gets a score of 1 in each 
year when there is textual evidence that the policy-making process included a 
formal or informal collaboration with the trade unions. It gets a score of 0 
otherwise. It is worth repeating that “collaboration” is not understood here as the 
practice of democratic governments consulting interested parties when developing 
or changing a policy. It refers to a stronger type of interaction that aims to produce 
a piece o f legislation or change a policy with the open agreement of the trade 
unions.9
As I clarified in the previous section, this study focuses on socialist 
parties and unions. Therefore, if  in a given year there is textual evidence that a 
socialist government furthered a given policy in agreement with the socialist 
confederation the score would be 1, irrespectively of any opposition from other 
confederations.
Following the same logic, during years in which the social democratic 
party is in opposition, the country is taken out of the sample. In other words, the 
measure does not refer to a constant sample of countries, but only to countries in 
which the social democrats hold cabinet positions. This rule is needed because a 0 
score indicates that the social democratic government does not collaborate with 
the trade unions. As a consequence, the final measure of the party/union alliance
8 “Content analysis is a research for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their 
context.” (Krippendorff 1980: 21).
9 See the Statistical Appendix for the detailed codebook.
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will be given as a share, and not in absolute values: it will indicate the share of 
party/union collaborations out of the total of possible instances.
In order to make clearer the meaning of this indicator, and its limitations, 
I will now give a few examples of collaborative relationships for each coded 
policy area. This exercise will especially highlight the importance of including 
both formal and informal types of party/union collaboration. The differences 
between these two types of interaction will play a crucial role at a later stage of 
this dissertation, in identifying the approach of social democratic parties towards 
organised labour (Chapter 4).
Macroeconomic Management
In a given year, a given country would score 1 in this policy area each 
time textual evidence shows that: (1) the trade unions openly agree via official 
documents or public statements to the macroeconomic policy of the social 
democratic government; or (2) the trade unions agree to fix a ceiling to wage 
increases either solely with the government, or in partnership with the employers’ 
organizations (often referred to as “income policy”). In these instances trade 
unions collaborate with the socialist government on macroeconomic management, 
in the case of either an expansive or a restrictive political economic course. The 
first example qualifies as informal collaboration; the latter is a formal 
collaboration as it entails precise obligations for the parties involved. This 
criterion for differentiating between formal and informal collaborations is the 
same across all policy areas.
A typical example of income policy is the National Agreement signed by 
the Swedish LO with the employers’ organization SAF in 1974, which among
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other provisions fixed the wage increases for that year at 3.3%.10 An example of 
collaboration in macroeconomic management without income policies can be 
found in Italy. In 1984, a decree-law issued by the socialist-led Italian government 
abolished automatic wage indexation. The socialist and Catholic confederations -  
UIL and CISL -  openly backed the policy, considerably easing its path to 
approval.11
Social Security
This policy area includes all the spending measures for welfare 
provisions, including pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance, and 
even training measures that involve public spending. The score would be 1 in all 
the instances in which: (1) the unions participate in drafting the policy -  as 
indicated either by open negotiation on the policy with the government, or by the 
fact that the government eventually includes in the policy most of the unions’ 
requests; or (2) the unions are directly involved in the management of welfare 
provisions. Typical examples of the latter are the so-called Ghent system of 
unemployment insurance (Rothstein 1992), that in different periods is found in the 
Nordic countries, and continental countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark 
and France. Often the two criteria of drafting and involvement overlap. For 
example, in France in the early 1980s the unemployment benefit system for the 
private sector, run jointly by employers and unions and largely funded by the state, 
found itself under increased financial strain. In 1985, the two employers’
10 European Industrial Relation Review (EIRR), No.2 February 1974, page 10-11.
11 The socialist and Catholic unionists were also ready to sign a tripartite agreement on it, but this 
proved impossible for the communist union, the CGIL, because o f its ideological opposition. See 
section 5.2, and EIRR, No. 122 March 1984, page 4 and No. 126 July 1984, page 4.
12 The burden on public finance is the strongest threshold between the social security and labour 
law policy areas. In fact, certain policies, e.g. training policies, can be conceptually placed in both. 
When public spending is included they belong to the first area, and when it is not to the second 
area.
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organizations (CNPF and CGPME) signed an agreement with the four main union 
confederations to make it financially sustainable until 1987.13
Labour Law and Employment Regulation
This area differs from the previous one mainly because it does not 
involve public spending, except for the role that the state plays as an employer. 
This area includes both the codified rights and duties of employees, and the 
codified rights and duties of organised labour. The instances in which a country is 
given a 1 score are similar to the ones given for the previous policy area, i.e. the 
existence of textual evidence of union collaboration in drafting the policy, or 
union involvement in the implementation of the policy. An example of the first 
occurred in Belgium in 1995. Here, pressed by the strong pressures of the 
socialist-led government, the trade unions and employers’ organization agreed on 
a text that would form the basis of future labour legislation. The accord included a 
number of corrections to employment regulations. The corrections aimed at 
reducing labour costs for corporations, while shifting a greater share of extra­
wage expenses on measures to favour employment, such as training or childcare.14
These are illustrative examples of the substance that my indicator aims 
to capture. I will now cover a few methodology issues, before proceeding to show 
the results of the measurement exercise.
Measurement and Sources
One of the primary aims behind this approach to measurement is to 
come up with a technique which is both easily replicable and reliable for cross­
country comparison. To this end, all the information I have coded comes from the
13 EIRR, No. 143 December 1985, page 4.
14 EIRR, No. 255, page 16.
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same source: the European Industrial Relation Review (EIRR).15 The measure is 
easily replicable because this journal is available in standard political science 
libraries and is published in English. If the detailed rules spelled out in the 
Statistical Appendix are followed, any researcher should get the same results, plus 
or minus a random error.
Furthermore, using a single source improves cross-country comparison 
because every country is treated in the same way: using different sources for 
different countries would assign a different bias to each country. In addition to 
this, I have coded all the issues of the EIRR, thus excluding all the problems and 
possible limitations linked to a sampling exercise: in fact my measure covers the 
complete observed universe (Bauer 2000: 145).
For every country, once collaborations or non-collaborations in each 
policy area are recorded, the intensity of the party/union alliance for that year can 
be expressed as the mean of the three scores. The country indicator is therefore a 
discreet variable that can assume four values (0; 0.33; 0.66; 1) indicating the fact 
that the two actors collaborate over one, two, three policy areas (i.e. complete 
collaboration), or none (i.e. arm’s length relationship).
15 The EIRR reports extensively on all the issues connected to trade unions and industrial relations 
in Europe and was launched in 1974. The measure therefore starts in 1974 and finishes in 
2003 .The journal increased the scope o f  its coverage over time, and so the data for the first 3-5 
years on certain countries, including Finland, Spain, Portugal and Greece, are missing.
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Figure 2.1 - Party/Union Alliance in 15 European Countries 1974-2003.
Bars display yearly values; the curve displays three-year moving averages. It should 
be kept in mind that non-social democratic governments are not included in the 
sample on which the party/union alliance is measured. Countries include the EU15 
barring Luxemburg and include Norway. Source: coded by the author, see Statistical 
Appendix for details.
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Figure 2.2 -  Social Democratic Governments in Europe.
The bars show the share of governments held by social democratic parties in the 
same 15 European countries as Figure 2.1. In other words, this graph shows the 
variation in the sample to which Figure 2.1 refers. See note 16 and the Statistical 
Annex for details.
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2.2 Discussing My Dataset and the Existing Literature
Figure 2.1 is a graph summarising the result o f the measurement exercise. 
It displays the trends in the intensity of the party/union alliance in Europe as a 
yearly mean of all my country scores (the figure shows both yearly averages and a 
smoothed curve that helps to highlight trends). Figure 2.2 shows, for illustration 
and transparency purposes, the share of European countries that, for any given 
year, was governed by social democratic parties.16 Indeed, it must be remembered 
that in any given country, when the social democratic party is in opposition, the 
country is taken out of the sample concurring to the party/union alliance indicator. 
Clearly, the number of European countries governed by social democratic parties 
varies each year, and so the sample to which my measure refers is not constant. 
The lower graph indicates the share of European countries that was governed by 
social democrats, therefore forming the universe of the observation reported in the 
upper graph. Consider the following example. In 1995, 55% of European 
countries were governed by social democratic parties (Figure 2 .2).17 These 
governments, on average, pursued a remarkable 72% of their socio-economic 
policies in open collaboration with their sister trade union confederations (Figure 
2 . 1).
A visual inspection of the two graphs does not suggest any correlation 
between the two variables. Policy results of party/union interactions appear not to 
be linked to waves of higher or lower social democratic electoral success. This is
16 I have coded this variable o f  “social democratic-ness” o f  governments by giving a score o f  1 to a 
country with a one-party social democratic government, 0.66 if  the social democratic government 
is the senior ally in a coalition government, 0.33 score if  is a junior ally, or zero if  is in opposition 
(see Statistical Annex for details).
17 It might appear a bit awkward to use a share instead o f a discrete value, given that there are only 
15 countries in the sample. However, it should be taken into account that my measure o f  “social 
democratic-ness” weights one-party governments and various types o f coalition government 
differently (see previous footnote). Therefore, this type o f European overview identifies more 
precisely the relative weight that social democrats exerted in the governments o f European 
countries.
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confirmed by the low correlation score (17%) between the two datasets. Moreover, 
these results are not consistent with the bulk of the literature on the subject, which 
predicts detachment rather than policy collaboration. According to my data, the 
number of policy collaborations decreases at the beginning of the 1980s. Indeed, 
until 1980 social democratic governments collaborated with their closest trade 
unions confederation in 90% of potential instances. The graph suggests that this 
percentage decreased at the beginning of the 1980s, and then oscillated around a 
mean of 72% between 1980 and 2003.
These trends seem to confirm some insights on the party/union alliance 
that I have reviewed through the background reconstruction of the previous 
chapter, and also to suggest that the existing explanations of recent trends in 
party/union interactions are not satisfactory. Until 1980, the social democratic 
paradigm still holds in those countries governed by social democratic parties. In 
1975, for example, social democrats were in power in Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlans, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. Not surprisingly, in that 
year, my variable on the party/union alliance as the share of socio-economic 
policies agreed by the two actors reaches 94%. Only in one country (Denmark) 
and in one single policy area (macroeconomic management), was no collaboration 
recorded in 1975. Even though systematically collected information from before 
1974 is not available, it is reasonable to assume that similar results could be 
obtained.
Moving forward into the 1980s, while the effect of the social and policy 
foundations of the party/union alliance was weakening, the share of policy 
collaboration duly decreased. However, its decline was not nearly as strong as one 
would expect taking into account the mainstream wisdom on the party/union
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divorce. Indeed, between 1980 and 2003, party/union interactions have produced 
.tangible policy results, on average, in 72% of the possible instances, with peaks as 
high as 81% in 1984 and 1989, and 85% in 1996. Against these data it is safe to 
say that, when understood in terms of policy outcomes, the party/union alliance in 
the last twenty years of the 20th century in Europe was still a relevant political 
phenomenon.
This result directly contradicts all the literature that predicts a profound 
de-linkage between social democratic parties and trade unions, as well as the 
literature contending a general convergence towards neo-liberal, hence pluralist, 
modes of interests intermediation propelled by the forces of globalisation (Crouch 
and Streeck 1997). The intensity of the party/union alliance, that is, the share of 
socio-economic policies developed with the agreement of the two bodies, does 
indeed show a pronounced volatility between 1980 and 2003. The peak of 1996 
(85% of shared socio-economic policy results) is paired with troughs in 1986 
(62%) and 2003 (61%). However, the average score remains high (72%), and I do 
not have evidence to exclude that, before the 1980s, policy results of party/union 
interactions would have as well displayed a certain degree of volatility.
Previous Conclusions Reconsidered
A quote from James Piazza typifies the interpretation of the party/union 
relationship expounded by a large part of the existing literature:
Social democratic parties have com e to regard unions as, at best, 
anachronistic and increasingly politically irrelevant actors amid a host o f  
n ew  potential allies or, at worst, political liabilities. (Piazza 2001: 4 1 8 )
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Given the sustained intensity of the party/union alliance in term of policy 
results throughout the 1980s and 1990s this position is hardly tenable. The entire 
argument proposed by Piazza and other authors (Femer and Hyman 1992b; 
Kitschelt 1994; Martin and Ross 1999; Howell 2001) is centred on the assumption 
that the party/union alliance found its ultimate rationale in traditional social 
democratic policies, including high public spending, nationalisations, and so on.18 
However, my data show that even after 1980, during a period characterised by 
low-inflation and monetarist mantras, when Keynesianism appeared no longer to 
be viable, social democratic parties and trade unions showed a lively alliance, and 
socio-economic policies were established through collaboration between these 
two actors in the great majority of possible instances.
Social democratic parties clearly do not consider the trade unions to be 
politically irrelevant, unless one imagines that governmental parties would bother 
to collaborate with irrelevant bodies on policy issues. This in turn means that 
analysis (or, more often, complaint) claiming that, from the trade unions’ 
perspective, unions have been left in political isolation, should be carefully 
reconsidered in the light of the large-N evidence. Scholars in the industrial 
relations field, and the European political economy field, have supported the view 
that the political clout of unions has been constantly reduced under the combined 
effects of globalisation, decentralisation of collective bargaining, and the
18 This assumption is made explicit both by Piazza and Kitschelt. The former draws his “de­
linking” conclusion by making correlations between globalisation and the demise o f  Keynesianism 
within social democratic parties (“Centre-left parties are not as closely committed to symbiotic 
friendship with the unions and adherence to generous social spending, nationalized industry or 
centralized bargaining.” (Piazza 2001: 426)). The latter refers to the contention that social 
democratic parties must cut their organisational links with trade unions if  they are to win elections. 
In fact, the party/union alliance, in the form either o f formal links or o f  substantial leadership 
overlap, will “privilege traditionalists in the party”. These will not be focusing on the quest for 
market efficiency, or on the challenge o f  what he calls “left-libertarian policies,” leading social 
democrats to electoral disaster ((1994: 225)).
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abandonment of traditional left stances by social democratic parties (Femer and 
Hyman 1992b; Martin and Ross 1999; Howell 2001). To the contrary, however, 
my data show that unions still held a substantial political influence between 1980 
and 2003, as they collaborated -  hence agreed -  on 72% of the socio-economic 
policies undertaken by social democratic governments.
These counterintuitive results confirm the validity of the overall research 
question of this thesis. Given that the social and policy foundations that were 
supporting the alliance during the post-war decades no longer held, what was 
driving the party/union relationship during the 1980s and 1990s? What motivates 
collaboration or non-collaboration between the two actors, and what policy results 
are duly derived from different types of interactions?
In the next section I will develop the examination of my dataset. I will 
address a number of intuitive questions arising from observation of the aggregate 
data. How do we explain yearly variation? In other words, why is there more 
policy collaboration in some years than in others -  does this reflect variation over 
time within countries. What kind of policies are the unions agreeing upon when 
coordinating with social democratic governments? Is union 
collaboration/defection in policy-making linked to differentials in available 
payoffs to the working class in terms of increased welfare benefits, rights, or 
incomes?
Two Potential Explanations Are Excluded By Country Data
The summary of my measure of the party/union alliance, as share of 
socio-economic policies undertaken through open collaboration between the two 
actors, has shown that even during a low-inflation hard-currency era, parties and 
unions have continuously cooperated in policy making. Together with its
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surprisingly high average value in terms of number of policy results, the 
party/union alliance between also showed a remarkable degree of volatility 
between 1980 and 2003. Figure 2.3 shows the measure of interest in each of the 
countries under observation, thereby unpacking the European average.19
A cursory inspection of the different graphs shows that, perhaps with the 
exception of Austria, the score of each European country displays a higher or 
lower degree of variation over time. This means that the extent to which social 
democratic governments and trade union confederations are able to coordinate 
over policy making varies over time, and this is mirrored by the number of policy 
areas in which they are able to reach agreements. This variation occurs in 
countries like Spain, Greece or Portugal, where the governance periods all fall 
after 1980, and traditional social democratic strongholds such as Sweden and 
Norway.
19 In each country, each vertical bar corresponds to a year during which social democratic parties 
were in government, irrespective o f  whether they were in a single-party government or a coalition. 
In they-axis is the exponential o f my coded variable. I use this transformation because otherwise it 
would have not been possible to distinguish in a graph between years with a zero score for the 
alliance (which can have four different values: 0, 0.33,0.66 and 1), and years o f  non-social 
democratic governance. For example, in Italy between 1980 and 1983, in Ireland in 1983, 1984 
and 1986, and in Portugal in 1985 the party/union relationship produced no policy outcome, as the 
bar shows a value o f 1. This means that in neither o f the three policy areas has there been a policy 
pursued through collaboration between the party and the unions. Conversely, in every year except 
1988 in Austria, in Belgium between 1998 and 2003, and in the UK before 1979, all the three 
policy areas were decided upon through an explicit collaboration between the social democratic 
government and the trade union confederation.
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Figure 2.3 -  Party/Union Alliance in 15 European Countries, 1974-2003.
Bars all refer to years of social democratic governance and are exponentials of annual values 
of the party/union alliance, i.e. e x where x  is the share of socio-economic policies furthered 
through collaboration between the government and the trade unions confederation; x  e (0; 
0.33; 0.66; 1). The dotted line is the level of zero policies, therefore the “end of the alliance”. 
Source: coded by the author, see Statistical Appendix for details.
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One important conclusion can already be drawn from this analysis: the 
variations in overall policy results of party/union interactions at the European 
level are a combination of variations across countries and within countries over 
time. The countries that one would expect to be characterised by stronger 
party/union alliances -  such as the Scandinavian countries -  are not immune from 
periods of distant relationships. Similarly, one finds strong collaborations in 
certain years in countries like Italy, Ireland, or Greece, which do not fall at all in 
the conventional social democratic family of European capitalism (Esping- 
Andersen 1990).
Excluding Standard Institutionalist Explanations
The observation of party/union collaboration patterns at country level 
leads me to exclude that institutionalist political economic approaches are 
sufficient to deliver a satisfactory answer to my research question. Institutionalist 
approaches to political economic problems date back to the 1960s (Shonfield 
1965), but the most influential schools developed towards the end of the 1970s 
and have evolved towards more sophisticated articulations ever since (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). With different foci, all these theorists would attach great 
explanatory power to the institutional configuration of each country, so that each 
subsequent layer of theoretical work would be able to rank countries according to 
the institutional constellation under observation. In the neo-corporatist version, for 
example, countries would be ranked from the most corporatist -  those with an 
encompassing and disciplined trade union movement, combined with long-lived 
social democratic governments -  to the more liberal -  those including a pluralist 
system of interest intermediation, weak trade unions and a weaker political Left
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(the most neat formulations are found in Lehmbruch 1979: 150; and Lehmbruch 
and Schmitter 1982: 5-6).
The most recent version of an institutionalist political economic 
approach to contemporary capitalism was completed by a group of scholars under 
the heading “Varieties of Capitalism” (VOC) (Hall and Soskice 2001). In a 
departure from previous theories, this approach is actor-based, and focuses on the 
firm as the most important actor in the capitalist economy. The VOC theory 
contends that countries build their economic comparative advantage on a given set 
of micro institutions, which leads their economies to either a coordinated or a 
liberal type of market capitalism. In Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) actors 
take decisions and coordinate their actions through “competitive market 
arrangements” (Hall and Soskice 2001: 8). In Coordinated Market Economies 
(CMEs), actors instead rely more heavily on non-market relations, including 
relational contracting, network monitoring, “and more reliance on collaborative as 
opposed to competitive relationships”(idem: 8).
Against the backdrop of both these institutionalist theories, one might 
expect to find little variation in the patterns of party/union policy collaboration at 
country level. In a VOC-approach perspective, both CMEs and LMEs have a 
tendency to build their comparative advantage on their own distinct set of 
institutions. Until an institutional change occurs, it is rational for the actors to 
maximise the virtues of their existing setting, sustaining similar patterns of 
decision-making and (a fortiori) policy making over time. Consider for example 
party/union collaboration on the management of the labour market (subheading 
“Labour Law and Employment Regulation” in section 2.1 in this chapter). 
According to the VOC approach, the regulation/deregulation of various labour
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market institutions is one of the features that varies systematically between CMEs 
and LMEs, and that should therefore be sustained consistently in .different 
countries.
A similar reasoning path that departs from the traditional corporatist 
approach could be followed. Trade unions and social democratic parties have and 
incentive to lock themselves in power through sustained collaboration, aimed to 
favour the social bloc of workers makes up trade unions and supports left wing 
coalitions.
However, these explanations, both in the VOC version and in the neo- 
corporatist version, cannot sufficiently account for the degree of variation in 
party/union interaction, both across and within countries over time. Figure 2.3 
shows that variation occurs within each country, and in both directions: from 
weak alliance (i.e. few policy results) to strong alliance, and vice versa (e.g. in 
Italy and in Britain respectively); but also from strong alliance to weak alliance 
and back to strong again (e.g. in Sweden). The variation is particularly 
pronounced in countries as different as Norway and Spain. Institutions are known 
to be resilient over time, because it can be costly and politically difficult to change 
them (Iversen 1999). It is therefore not plausible to attribute difference in 
party/union interaction patterns to the overall institutional settings of different 
countries.
Apparently contradicting this argument, in Austria, perhaps the most 
ideal-typical corporatist country according to standard metrics (Lehmbruch 1979), 
party/union collaboration is very strong throughout the period under observation. 
Moreover, in Norway, Finland, and Denmark -  of the strongly corporatist group -  
the policy results of party/union interaction are never zero, according to my
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measure. However, the same applies to Greece and France, which do not 
correspond to the corporatist model. Additionally, .countries with a relatively 
coordinated market economy like Sweden, Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands display periods in which the socialist governors did not include (or 
did not manage to include) trade unions in their socio-economic policy making. It 
seems, therefore, that the overall variations apparent in Figure 2.1 cannot be 
attributed to different institutional structures of the national capitalist regimes.
Excluding Standard Explanations — Continued
Another strand of the literature, which still somehow belongs to the 
institutionalist branch, might suggest an alternative explanation for variation in 
party/union policy results, based on the substance of social democratic economic 
policies. In a nutshell this argument would contend that unions and parties would 
coordinate over policy making when the latter adopted expansive, as opposed to 
restrictive, economic policies, even under a monetarist macroeconomic 
framework. In this case, union compliance with the moderation of wage increases 
would foster competitiveness and attract investments (Garrett 1998). Parties 
would therefore have an incentive to pay off unions’ compliance with public 
spending that, since the 1980s, became predominantly oriented towards the supply 
side and aims to fostering employment levels (Boix 1998). Where this is not 
possible, either because unions have an institutional impediment to coordination 
(Astudillo-Ruiz 2001), or because the social democrats implement a restrictive 
political economic course, then the party/union alliance cannot be sustained. If 
this hypothesis is confirmed, the “de-linking” argument, according to which the 
party/union divorce depends on a change in the course of the social democratic 
political economy, could still be at least partially valid. In other words,
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coordination between parties and unions would still be linked to expansionist 
political economic stances, even if the composition of the expenditure has 
changed since the post-war period, and even if it is grounded on the adherence to 
low-inflation targets. Conversely, the alliance will end when social democrats 
implement restrictive economic policies.
Unfortunately, this hypothesis linking party/union collaboration 
(detachment) to expansive (restrictive) political economy is disproved by a closer 
look at my country data, and in particular, by the combined observation of Italy 
and the UK.
The case of Italy shows that expansive policies perse  are not a necessary 
condition for policy collaboration between social democratic governments and 
trade unions. Italy is one of the countries where the patterns of collaboration 
between centre-left governments and trade unions grew stronger during the 1990s, 
when the Italian governments adopted unprecedented austerity measures, in spite 
of little or no tradition in this respect (Regini 1984). This is reflected in the data 
shown in Figure 2.3. Scores indicating no collaboration during 1980-1983 rose up 
to total collaboration between the centre-left government and the trade unions in 
the period 1995-2000. However, the party/union alliance did not bring about the 
kind of policies one might have expected, namely increased spending and 
improved welfare conditions for workers. In the 1990s, the policy outcomes of the 
strong party/union alliance in Italy were: wage moderation with stagnant incomes, 
retrenchment of the welfare state, and liberalisation o f the labour market (Regini 
1999; Myles and Pierson 2000: 323-326; Biagioli 2003; Baccaro and Simoni 
2004a).
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If the Italian case suggests that spending policies are not a necessary 
condition for party/union collaboration, the case of the UK suggests, from the 
opposite angle, that neither are they a sufficient condition. In Britain, the 
relationship between the Labour government led by Tony Blair and the TUC was 
almost bare of policy results in spite of a long tradition of party/union 
collaboration during previous Labour governments (Crouch 2001; Glyn and 
Wood 2001). My data in fact show that the total collaboration registered between 
1974 and 1978 was not repeated in the period after 1997. However, contrary to 
expectation, the Labour governments expanded the welfare state and public 
spending, improved rights for workers and unions, and meanwhile -  in the 
absence of any centralised income policy -  wages grew in Britain at a much 
higher pace than in previous decades (Wood 2001; Heery, Kelly and Waddington 
2002).
In sum, in the UK the “end of the alliance” is paired with a mild 
expansion of the welfare state, increased rights for workers and rising incomes. In 
Italy, a very productive party/union alliance in terms of policy outcomes has 
delivered to workers a retrenchment of the welfare state, liberalised labour 
markets, and stagnant incomes. This set of empirical evidence brings me to reject 
that an expansionary (or restrictive) governmental political economic stance can 
be a strong explanatory factor able to justify convincingly party/union 
collaborations (or failed collaboration). In a later stage of this work (Chapter 5), 
the Italian and British cases will be analysed thoroughly as a qualitative test of my 
theory. In fact, as I have just underlined, they lie at opposite poles o f my dataset, 
and therefore provide two critical tests for the theory that I will develop in 
Chapters 3 and 4.
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In this section I have benchmarked the conclusions of the existing 
literature with my own set of empirical observations on the party/union alliance. I 
have underlined that conventional theories contending (or even assuming) 
widespread detachment between social democrats and organised labour do not 
hold, as -  on average in Europe -  the former still devise most of their socio­
economic strategies in accordance with trade unions. Additionally, given the 
amount of variation across and, more importantly, within, countries, 
institutionalist theories, such as the conventional neo-corporatist scholarship and 
the more recent “Varieties of Capitalism” approach, fall short of providing a 
convincing explanation.
In the next section I will put forward an alternative hypothesis that will 
be tested in the rest of this study. This will still be institutionalist in nature, but it 
will focus on institutions as processes of decision making. Compared to 
institutional structures, decision making procedures are more easily changeable. 
Additionally, my hypothesis will bring politics, including electoral incentives and 
coalition-building processes, back into the substance of party/union interactions.
2.3 My Hypothesis: Democracy and Concertation Leading to 
a Renewed Alliance
I hypothesise that the changing patterns in party/union relationships in 
western European countries during the 1980s and 1990s were primarily caused by 
the decision-making rules of organised labour. This hypothesis has a conventional 
component insofar as I am arguing that institutional settings of organised labour 
remain the key “institutional pre-requisites” for “political exchange” (Pizzomo 
1978; Goldthorpe 1984). However, it departs from traditional accounts because: 
(1) it focuses on institutions as decision-making procedures adopted by trade
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unions, and not on the structure of trade unions; and (2) it contends that, during 
the 1980s and 1990s, social democratic parties still had core electoral reasons to 
embark upon policy negotiation with organised labour.
The Logic Leading to the Hypothesis
The data I have collected show that, during the 1980s and 1990s, social 
democratic parties continued to negotiate the majority of their socio-economic 
policies with trade union confederations. In the previous section I observed that 
expansive (or restrictive) political economic stances taken social democratic 
governments are not good predictors of collaborative (or non-collaborative) 
party/union interactions. On the contrary, a number of case studies on Spain have 
shown that despite the manifest willingness of the government to collaborate with 
trade unions, such cooperation proved impossible for reasons linked to the 
structure of the labour movement (Boix 1998; Astudillo Ruiz 2001). In particular, 
the absence of the traditional requisites for corporatism, i.e. encompassing, 
concentrated and centralised trade unions, was held responsible for the 
party/union “de-linkage” under the socialist government from 1984 to 1995. In 
other words, union members were not concentrated in a single confederation, not 
sufficiently coordinated by strong leaders, and the public sector unions played a 
significant role within the confederation (Boix 1998; Astudillo Ruiz 2001). Public 
sector unions are indeed less inclined to cooperative behaviours because they are 
not exposed to international competition (Garrett and Way 1999).
Studies on Italy and Ireland, however, have proven that despite lacking 
the same “institutional prerequisites” as in Spain (including low monopoly of 
worker representation and high impact of public sector unions), the trade unions 
embarked on enduring social partnerships with the governments during the late
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1980s and 1990s (Baccaro 2003; Baccaro and Simoni 2004b). The concentration 
of members in a few organisations, the encompassment of many occupational 
sectors in the membership, and the standard metric of centralisation, that is, the 
authority of leaders over affiliates and members, were low in Italy and Ireland, as 
well as in Spain. However, in the former two countries, centralisation of decision 
making was not reached through hierarchical means, but through democratic 
methods (Baccaro 2001; 2002a; 2002b). The adoption of democratic decision­
making procedures in these countries proved crucial to ensuring the compliance of 
rank-and-file in peak agreements on socio-economic issues, and also contributed 
to shaping their features (Baccaro and Locke 1996).
In addition to these recent findings, an inspiring work by Peter Lange 
carried out in the early 1980s, and based on six European countries, has shown 
that representative democracy can be effective as a means of centralisation for 
trade unions, which is traditionally considered one of the structural features 
crucial to the ability of labour confederation to negotiate effectively (Lange 1984; 
Lehmbruch 1984). Against this set of evidence and theoretical support, I 
hypothesise that the level of confederation democracy, that is, democratic 
decision-making procedures that cut across different occupational sectors, is a key 
institutional variable able to explain union behaviour. Therefore, the adoption (or 
failed adoption) of democratic rules could explain variations in the patterns of the 
party/union alliance.
Using this logic, I surmise that the reasons that push trade unions to 
negotiate in the political arena with government and business have not changed 
significantly since the description given by Alessandro Pizzomo (1978). Through 
policy collaboration they can gain more power, which, in turn, will be translated
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into greater gains for their members. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
international and domestic economic constraints limited the availability of short­
term payoffs for the rank-and-file (Pierson 1996; Mares 2006a). In such 
conditions, during peak bargaining, trade unions find themselves defending 
existing institutions rather than claiming for more. As a consequence, unions’ 
collective action problems are more serious than ever. Information gaps between 
leaders and members are likely to emerge, generating wage and policy drifts at the 
local level. Drawing from Pizzomo’s theoretical insight, my hypothesis is that the 
key instrument leaders adopted in order to reach compliance was persuasion by 
democratic means. Instead, non-democratic union confederations would 
experience greater fractionalisation and policy drifts at the local level, and would 
not be able to negotiate successfully with the social democratic government, if 
invited to contribute policy making.
My Hypothesis from the Party Side
Having explained the logic driving my overall hypothesis, and its focus 
on the unions, I must now clarify how this fits with the other side of the equation, 
i.e. the social democratic party. My data show a high degree of party involvement 
in policy making with unions, and my hypothesis is that these data suggest that 
social democratic parties continue to have a preference for involving trade unions 
in policy making. I hypothesise that the changed socio-economic framework that 
developed in European countries during the 1980s and 1990s, has changed but not 
dissolved the social democratic interest in collaboration with organised labour. I 
finally hypothesise that this preference is contingent on labour cohesiveness: if  
factionalism prevails, the party will then proceed to unilateral policy making.
This hypothesis is grounded on the following electoral argument. Social 
democrats have always built their electoral majorities on cross-class alliances. 
However, they have constantly faced the problem of non-stretchable policies: i.e., 
the more they departed from socialist stances to win consensus from other social 
groups, the more support they would lose from the working class (Przeworski 
1985). In a two-dimensional political space this dilemma proved unsolvable, and 
social democrats were considered doomed to poor electoral performances 
(Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Instead, the scenario that has emerged since the 
1980s is more favourable. As soon as non-materialistic concerns were able to 
mobilise votes, the socialists could attempt to gear their policies more creatively, 
and win voters on different topics (Kitschelt 1994). However, a similar dilemma 
remained. Indeed, social groups that are sensitive to non-materialistic libertarian 
issues are more liberal both in their approach to personal values, and in their 
approach to the market, than the traditional working class (Kitschelt 1994: 30-37).
I hypothesise that social democrats reverted to trade unions to address 
this dilemma by systematically involving them in policy making. In fact, the 
agreement of trade unions over reforms of the labour market and the welfare state, 
aimed at appealing to new sectors of the electorate (and deemed necessary to 
increase market efficiency and growth under low-inflation regimes) would have 
guaranteed the consensus of a sizeable portion of workers, and therefore their 
continuing support for the party.
I hypothesise that the social democrats are willing to secure limited 
payoffs to unions as organisations (that is, to union leaders) and to their rank-and- 
file, but in order to do so, they must be sure that the agreements of unions are also 
the agreements of the rank-and-file. Only a cohesive labour movement is able to
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give this type of guarantee. If, instead, the union confederation is fragmented, the 
party will attempt to balance its dilemmas unilaterally.
In summary, I hypothesise that since 1980 the party/union alliance can 
end in two different equilibria. If labour adopts democratic decision-making 
methods that cut across occupational sectors, the two actors will engage in 
negotiation and collaborate in socio-economic steering. If the confederation is not 
democratic, hence fragmented, both actors will prefer to abstain from policy 
collaboration, ending in a very weak and non-productive relationship.
How This Hypothesis Departs from Previous Theories
This argument adds to both previous understandings of social democratic 
parties and trade unions in the late 20th century. I will sketch them here, and then 
discuss them at greater length in the concluding chapter.
Starting from social democracy, my argument stresses elements of 
continuity over change. Paradoxically, this has been made possible by the large 
amount of good research devoted to the transformation of social democratic 
parties. Indeed, my hypothesis acknowledges that the changes observable in 
patterns of party/union alliance since 1980 depended on changes in the social 
democratic strategy. The parties had to adapt to the new constraints they faced 
both in the economy and in the society. In a unidimensional political space, they 
moved towards the market side of the continuum. However, the policy expedient 
that they adopted to solve their dilemma, i.e. how far to move right, logically 
included a deeper involvement in policy making for their most traditional ally. Jn 
this way, social democrats attempted to devise new policy measures that could fit 
the new socio-economic context, while keeping a large part of their constituency 
steady. This interpretation stresses continuity because it shows that in times of
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great difficulty, as the 1980s and 1990s certainly were, the social democrats 
sought increased help from organised labour, although in a totally different way if 
compared to previous decades. If  confirmed by empirical data and by analytically 
sound modelling, this conclusion would reinforce the view according to which 
“Left” and “Right” are still relevant categories to an understanding of Western 
politics. Indeed, the systematic involvement of unions in policy making, and 
therefore the systematic granting of (small) payoffs for their compliance, would 
have the effect of maintaining the differentiation between the social bloc 
supporting the Left and the social bloc supporting the Right, even if the room for 
manoeuvre of national politicians on the national economy is much reduced.
With regard to trade unions, my theory departs from previous theories 
about the type of institutions that are considered the best means through which to 
solve their internal problems of collective actions. The previous literature on trade 
unions was grounded on the concept of neo-corporatism. The notion of 
“corporatism” implies that advanced capitalist economies have to give up a certain 
degree of democracy and voluntarism in the economic arena if they are to thrive 
economically and sustain balanced growth. In the neo-corporatist paradigm, the 
two features that allow encompassing confederations to overtake collective action 
problems are concentration -  i.e. a membership that is not excessively 
fractionated -  and centralisation through hierarchical control -  i.e. where the 
decision-making power firmly is vested in the hands o f confederation leadership 
while members and affiliates have very little capacity to influence union policies 
(Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1979; 1982; Streeck 1982; Goldthorpe 1984).
My hypothesis reverses this approach, not by denying the function of 
institutions, i.e. cohesion and coordination of labour, but in identifying the means
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by which centralisation can be reached. I argue that democratic means are more 
able than hierarchy to ensure labour unity. In a seminal article, Peter Lange (1984) 
showed that both democratic and non-democratic unions could be associated with 
moderating attitudes during the 1970s. If my hypothesis is confirmed by empirical 
testing, Lange’s conclusions would need to be amended in the sense that 
hierarchical unions were able to moderate in spite of the absence of democracy. In 
a number of instances, a buoyant economic cycle feeding the expansion o f the 
welfare state, and very concentrated membership, could have balanced the 
absence of an appropriate, democratic, means of concentration.
How My Theory Could Be Proven Wrong
This thesis applies a standard research design based on the identification 
o f a dependent variable (i.e. the party/union alliance as detailed in this chapter) 
and independent variables able to explain it. Approximating at best to the methods 
of the hard sciences, this study attempts to comply to the criterion of falsifiability 
(Popper 2002). Therefore, also following Peter Hall (1990: 598), this final sub­
section will highlight the empirical findings that would prove my hypothesis 
wrong, while the rest of this thesis will be devoted to proving it right.
The core of my hypothesis states that variations in the intensity of the 
party/union alliance in 1980s and 1990s Europe were attributable to the 
organisational differences of trade union confederations. More precisely, it 
proposes that confederations co-ordinate with social democratic governments if 
they embed democratic decision-making mechanisms. Therefore, if trade unions 
did not maintain the organisational differences that could account for different 
behaviours, then my theory would be wrong. Additionally, my hypothesis would 
be wrong if traditional corporatist structures (i.e. concentration and hierarchical
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control) are the ones that account for different behaviours, rather than democratic 
decision-making mechanisms. Finally, if democratic internal rules in fact favour 
more militant attitudes, and therefore result in fragmenting instead of unifying the 
policy stances of the union movement, then my hypothesis would not hold.
Additionally, if in the majority of cases social democratic governments 
decide autonomously on socio-economic policies and merely consulting the 
interested parties, then my hypothesis would be wrong. If these actors simply 
enact their constitutional powers without systematically seeking to share 
responsibility with social partners, then the party/union relationship must have 
driving factors other than trade unions’ internal rules.
Finally, if through a large-N analysis the hypothesis is able to explain the 
cross-country variation, it still may be wrong with regard to the within country 
variation. Indeed, a number of influential studies underline that social democratic 
parties and trade unions are deeply entrenched in national cultures and traditions 
(Featherstone 1988; Marliere 1999; Hyman 2001). Therefore, if  national histories, 
cultural heritage, and industrial relations traditions are able to determine the type 
of party/union relationship, independently from institutional variables and 
common electoral constraints, then my hypothesis would be seriously questioned.
Conclusions
Systematic data collection on policies developed through a collaboration 
between social democratic governments and trade unions shows that the 
party/union alliance has been renegotiated in many countries, and therefore is not 
over. Albeit with some variation over time and across country, under social 
democratic governments in Europe between 1980 and 2003, a remarkable 72% of
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the socio-economic policies were processed through an open collaboration 
between the two partners.
The existing literature fails to give a convincing explanation of the 
reasons leading either to renegotiated alliances, or to the so-called “de-linkage” 
between parties and unions. Both occurrences bear no clear relationship to social 
democratic policies as they developed after 1980. Indeed, both expansive and 
restrictive policies can be associated both with “de-linkages” and renegotiated 
alliances. To make sense of this composite scenario, I have proposed an 
alternative explanation drawn from recent country studies on Spain, Italy and 
Ireland, from seminal theorisations on the role of interest groups in policy making, 
and from classic studies on electoral socialism. The measure of the indicator of 
the party/union alliance and the formulation of a working hypothesis were the first 
two steps taken towards answering the research question posed in Chapter 1, 
which is worth recalling. Given that the social and policy foundations that have 
supported party/union alliance during the post-war decades no longer hold, what 
were the driving factors of the party/union relationship during the 1980s and 
1990s?
The answer I propose is two-sided, accounting for the two actors 
involved in the relationship. I have hypothesised that trade unions will collaborate 
with their social democratic partner each time they can act as negotiators for 
labour. In order to do so, the unions need democratic decision-making rules at the 
level of the confederation. When democratic rules are lacking, the trade unions 
will then defect from policy collaboration. Following my argument, social 
democratic parties have changed, but not abandoned, their preference for 
collaboration with labour over policy making. Peak negotiations will help social
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democratic parties to solve their overlapping policy and electoral dilemmas, and 
result in higher consensus. However, this preference for concertation is 
conditional on the existence of a unified, and therefore democratic, trade union 
movement. If  this line of reasoning is correct, confederations’ rules (democratic or 
not democratic) should be able to explain variations in the party/union alliance in 
Europe.
The next two chapters will focus on the trade unions and social 
democratic parties respectively, so that each side of my equation can be analysed 
thoroughly. I will start with the unions, whose institutional variation has been, and 
continues to be, considered essential to an understanding of contemporary 
capitalism.
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Chapter 3
A New Understanding of Unions’ Behaviour: 
Corporatism Turned on its Head
In spite o f  the deep-seated craving for love, almost 
everything else is considered to be more important than 
love: success, prestige, money, power ... Could it be that 
only those things are considered worthy o f being learned ..., 
and that love, which “only” profits the soul ... is a luxury 
we have no right to spend much energy on? However this 
may be ..., I shall first discuss the theory o f  love ... and 
secondly I shall discuss the practice o f  love -  little as can 
be said  about practice in this, as in any other field.
Erich Fromm, The Art o f  Loving
The mainstream theory on unions’ behaviour is centred around the
concept of corporatism. It contends that unions must be corporative, i.e. not fully
00democratic, in order to adopt co-operative behaviours (as opposed to militant 
behaviours). In twenty years’ worth of studies, corporatist unions have been 
considered the only type suitable for long-lasting alliances with social democratic 
parties. This is because their structure would allow for durable political exchanges 
in both Keynesian and hard-currency macroeconomic frameworks (Goldthorpe 
1984; Garrett 1998).
20 The descriptor “corporatism” belongs originally to medieval and fascist compulsory craft 
associations.
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This understanding can be tracked back to Olson’s Logic of Collective 
Action and its fifth implication:
“Encompassing organizations have some incentive to make the society 
in which they operate more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute 
income to their members with as little excess burden as possible, and to 
cease such redistribution unless the amount redistributed is substantial 
in relation to the social cost o f the redistribution.”(01son 1982: 53, my 
emphasis).
Olson’s argument is very simple. If an interest group organises a 
sizeable portion of the society, it will bear directly any cost that it imposes on the 
society. Therefore, if the leaders of encompassing groups act rationally, they will 
take societal concerns into account while setting their strategies. However, 
Olson’s formulation is ambiguous. It states that these organisations have some 
incentive to contribute to the thriving of their societies. When does this incentive 
operate? What conditions are needed? What institutions or internal arrangements 
are required?
The purpose of this chapter is to answer these questions with reference 
to trade union confederations, which are the most typical example of such 
organisations. Indeed, in many countries, workers are organised across different 
sectors so that the membership of a large confederation makes up a significant 
share of the total population of workers. In order to highlight the institutional 
settings that favour union collaboration on policy making with social democratic 
governments, this chapter will amend the literature on neo-corporatism.
The neo-corporatist literature argues that socially optimal outcomes will 
be reached by those encompassing unions that enjoy a high degree of monopoly
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over workers’ representation (concentration) and which have a highly hierarchical 
internal structure (centralisation). This chapter will show that the latter condition 
is proved not correct by empirical findings. The evidence shows that democratic 
decision-making procedures at the confederation level are more likely to lead to 
co-operative solutions than militant behaviour, as scholars of liberal corporatism 
would predict. This conclusion justifies the title of this chapter -  “corporatism 
turned on its head” -  since the very label “corporatism” might need 
reconsideration, when used to refer to cooperative trade union confederations.
This analysis addresses one side of my research question on the 
party/union alliance, whereas the next chapter will focus- on social democratic 
governments and their attitude to concerted policy-making. The next section of 
this chapter will briefly review the literature on neo-corporatism. It will highlight 
the weak empirical basis of the argument supporting hierarchy as a tool of union 
centralisation. It will hypothesise that democracy is better suited to overcoming 
collective action problems and to lead to socially optimal outcomes.
Sections two and three will introduce fresh empirical evidence to the 
analysis. An indicator of confederation democracy will be proposed and measured. 
Then, through panel data regression analysis the impact of democracy on labour 
costs will be assessed. Regression analysis will confirm the new insights of my 
theory: unions adopting democratic rules are more able to exert wage restraints, 
while hierarchy has no impact on labour costs.
The final section will discuss the results and link this theory to the rest of 
the thesis. Democratic unions are better suited than non-democratic unions to 
collaboration with social democratic governments because the lack o f democracy 
leads to fragmentation. If organised labour is fragmented, the centralisation of
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decision making and compliance with governments are much more difficult to 
achieve.
The next chapter will then address the issue of party/union collaboration 
from the party side, completing the empirical analysis of the large-N.
3.1 Unions Institutional Features and their Impact on 
Economic Outcomes
What structural conditions are needed for unions to act collectively and 
overtake the internal problems of collective action? Since the 1960s, this question 
has been at the core of the research in liberal corporatism.21
The general objective of this literature was to explain how and why 
many capitalist societies -  mostly European -  steered their economies with the 
involvement of the collective bodies of the political economy, such as unions and 
business organisations. This policy method strongly contrasted with the pluralist 
system that was dominant in the United States, and was associated with similar 
economic performances but different socio-economic outcomes (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Streeck and Kenworthy Forthcoming).
In the so-called “corporatist” countries organised labour was less 
militant. This resulted in a lower level of strikes and a slower pace of wage 
increases. However, labour was better off in the long run. In fact, when 
encompassing trade unions were able to moderate wage claims, they would gain a 
very mild Phillips curve in exchange, i.e. a sustained regime with simultaneous 
low inflation and low unemployment (Cameron 1984: 156-157). But under which
211 will be using the descriptors “neo-corporatism” and “liberal corporatism” interchangeably, in 
line with most o f  the literature on the topic.
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conditions were corporatist agreements reached and sustained over time? Why 
was labour involved in policy making, and willing to restrain wages in some 
countries, while in others it would engage in hard disputes with capital and the 
state?
Large, encompassing trade unions had some incentive to operate for the 
good of the society. However, their sheer size was not the only factor accountable 
for moderate behaviour leading to societal gains: a number of countries with large 
trade unions, like Italy, Britain and Finland, performed comparatively worse in the 
1960s and 1970s. As a consequence, different institutional settings of the trade 
union movements were held responsible for different performances, and 
corporatist countries were differentiated from non-corporatist ones (Lehmbruch 
1979: 150; Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982: 5-6).
Olson (1982), Pizzomo (1978), and Lehnbruch (1979), among 
others, have identified two features that unions must incorporate in order to avoid 
collective action problems and to act effectively as the negotiating agents for 
labour: (1) Union members must be concentrated, i.e. there must be a high degree 
of representational monopoly in a few large bodies, and possibly a single 
confederation. This on the one hand increases the encompassment of the 
confederations, which are likely to include workers from a greater variety of 
sectors. On the other hand, it minimises the risk that during negotiations 
competing unions will increase their militancy in order to win support from the 
rank-and-file. (2) Unions must be centralised, i.e. decisions taken at the “centre” 
of the organisation, i.e. by union leaders, must be complied with by the whole 
body. In Pizzomo’s words, unions must be able to convince
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“[their] members that their own ‘true’ interests are better served if  
they moderate their claims;” or else, the “union organisation [must be] 
strong enough to resist” pressures from its members (Pizzomo 1978: 
284).
This insistent reference by the scholars of neo-corporatism to 
institutional and structural features is linked to the very nature o f trade unions as 
voluntary associations. The unions’ leadership is in charge of representing a large 
and varied body of members: the relationship between peaks and rank-and-file is 
key to all potential problems of collective action. During negotiations in the 
labour market or in the “political market” trade unions’ leaders exchange
99moderation for power (Pizzomo 1978). In both these contexts, the leaders 
choose to under-exploit their short term market power, in order to reap higher 
benefits (in terms of sustained unemployment or higher welfare entitlements) in 
the long run. However, weighting long run advantages against short ran sacrifices 
can generate interpretation gaps between peaks and members. These in turn are 
the source of major collective action problems because they can trigger internal 
distributive conflicts, and ultimately undermine the leader’s capacity to act as a 
negotiating agent for labour.
However, Pizzomo’s early definition of centralisation remains quite 
ambiguous in empirical terms. In fact, it refers to the task that must be performed 
by unions that want to act collectively, while saying nothing about the method 
unions (should) apply. Indeed, “some centralisation of decision making” can be
22 The exact content o f the two types o f  negotiations is different, but the mechanics o f  the 
interactions are very similar. In the labour market negotiations occur over wages and the unions’ 
main threat is the strike. In the political arena trade unions aim to secure for themselves power and 
influence over public policies, which they exchange for consensus (Pizzomo 1978).
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achieved through both democratic and hierarchical means, as underlined by Peter 
Lange (1984: 10).
Yet, the “authoritarian solution,” as all too often in history, seemed the 
simplest, and analytically more plausible. A number of case studies, related in 
particular to Austria and Germany, led to the conclusion that centralisation is 
better achieved when peak levels are vested with strong power over members and 
affiliates, so that these are left with low autonomy and little say in the decisions 
taken by their leaders (Lehmbruch 1979).
The logic underpinning this argument contends that in the absence o f a 
negative selective incentive, the affiliate union would prefer to defect from wage 
moderation and reap the highest possible short-term benefit, while free-riding the 
long term collective gains. This would trigger a vicious circle and ultimately 
undermine leaders’ capacity to coordinate union policies, ending in sub-optimal 
collective outcomes (Lehmbruch 1979).23
Within a couple of decades, this led to the generally accepted conviction 
in the literature that:
“The more encompassing the trade union movement, the greater 
the concentration among unions, and the more centralised the 
authority o f the peak associations, the more likely [...] that the 
collectively optimal cooperative solution be obtained” (Golden, 
Wallerstein and Lange 1999: 195; see also: Traxler, Blaschke and 
Kittel 2001:66-70).
23 Indeed, this interpretation is very close to Olson’s view. Even if  Olson never explicitly mentions 
the importance o f  coercion with regard to wage moderation, he considers coercion to be the main 
selective incentive used by unions to overcome internal collective action problems, e.g. when it 
comes to the collection o f  dues (Olson 1982: 19-35).
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The importance of encompassment and concentration as institutional 
“pre-requisites” for corporatism has never been severely challenged. However, a 
number of empirical works and recent occurrences of “corporatism in unlikely 
countries” have cast doubts on the proposition that centralisation of decision­
making needs to be achieved by hierarchical means. The next paragraph will 
highlight this clearly present but only partially acknowledged weakness in the 
corporatist theory.
The Hierarchical Route to Centralisation: Does It Work?
Any review of the literature casting doubt on the importance of hierarchy 
in achieving centralisation, must begin with the seminal article by Peter Lange 
(1984). He underlines that centralisation of decision making is theoretically at 
odds with democracy only if the latter is intended as participatory democracy, i.e. 
the continuous involvement of members in decision making. Centralisation, 
indeed, by definition “implies a reduction in the number of those actually 
involved in any direct way in the making of decisions” (Lange 1984: 10). If, 
however, one refers to the concept of representative democracy, whereby 
members are not continuously involved in decision making but delegate some 
prerogatives to democratically elected leaders, “centralization and democracy 
would appear to be analytically [...] distinct concepts” (idem). Under this premise, 
democracy and centralisation are not in opposition and can, theoretically and 
empirically, coexist.
Lange proceeds to measure union democracy as coincident with the 
Hirschman’s concepts of Exit and Voice, with reference to five European 
countries: Britain, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. He finds that 
there is no systematic relationship between wage moderation and democracy,
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meaning that the successful implementation or failure of collective wage 
agreements is not dependent on internal decision-making rules. It must be 
emphasised, however, that the choice of the metric (i.e. democracy = exit + voice) 
is key to reaching this conclusion.
Further scepticism on the importance of hierarchy comes from Golden’s 
(1993) quantitative analysis of unions’ internal mechanisms. In common with 
many before her (Cameron 1984; Bruno and Sachs 1985; Calmfors and Driffill 
1988), Golden assumes that wage moderation is conducive to better 
unemployment/inflation ratios and therefore uses these two variables in turn as 
proxies for unions that are able to exert wage moderation, that is, to act 
successfully as negotiating actors for labour. She finds that monopoly, i.e. 
member concentration in a small number of confederations, is more important 
than centralisation -  understood as hierarchy and coercion -  in order to achieve 
better economic outcomes. Her coefficients of a measure of centralisation are 
almost never significant (Golden 1993: 452).
Golden’s interpretation of this result is linked to the concept of 
voluntarism. Collective and individual affiliation to unions is voluntary; therefore 
even the authority that peak levels can exert over members and affiliates is 
ultimately dependent on their acquiescence. As a consequence, she argues, the 
actual powers vested in peak levels -  i.e. the hierarchical means -  would not make 
a big difference to the ability of trade unions to exert wage moderation. Instead, 
the leaders’ ability to mediate between conflicting interests within the 
confederation could be more important (Golden 1993: 451).
These two articles show that systematically collected information, 
processed through qualitative (Lange) and quantitative (Golden) methods, does
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not confirm the importance of hierarchy in securing cooperative union behaviour. 
In addition, recent events in European countries suggest that democracy might be 
more able to explain the success or failure of tripartism than hierarchy.
In Italy and Ireland during the 1980s and 1990s, trade unions repeatedly 
participated in policy making on welfare and labour issues, and significantly 
moderated wage claims. In Italy, this occurred during centre-left cabinets, in 
Ireland under both conservative and centre-left cabinets. However, these 
agreements were not based on a coercive decision of leaders over affiliates and 
members, but on democratic ratification of agreements through ballots among 
workers and democratic scrutiny of leaders’ action (Baccaro 2002b; 2002a; 2003; 
Baccaro and Simoni 2004b).
Even more interestingly, Italy and Ireland are known in the literature as 
non-corporatist countries. In other words, their systems of industrial relations lack 
the features of encompassment, centralisation and concentration that are deemed 
necessary for corporatist decision-making patterns (Regini 1984; Hardiman 1988: 
3). However, the studies on these two countries suggest that these institutional 
deficiencies were overcome by the systematic use of democratic decision-making 
mechanisms, in particular when divisive policy issues were at stake (Baccaro 
2002b; 2002a; 2003; Baccaro and Simoni 2004b)24.
Hypothesis: Is Democracy an Alternative to Hierarchy?
Following these insights, it is reasonable to hypothesise that internal 
democratic mechanisms can be a powerful means o f ensuring centralisation; that
24 As reviewed in the previous chapter, the lack o f  “institutional preconditions” was held 
responsible for the failure o f party /union coordination in Spain in the 1980s (Boix 1998: 131-137; 
Astudillo Ruiz 2001). Given that a similar institutional setting was not impeding corporatist 
agreements in Italy and Ireland, those conclusions should be carefully reconsidered.
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is, ensuring that decisions taken at the centre of the organisation are complied 
with by the whole body. In other words, my hypothesis does not deny the need for 
unions to be centralised, but it supports the view that democracy is better able 
than hierarchy to reach stable and durable centralisation.
This hypothesis is based on prima facie evidence, and on analysis of the 
existing literature. However, other literature dealing with the mechanics of the 
democratic process offers supporting arguments to my logic. In his classical text 
Democracy in America, Tocqueville observed that the authority of law is much 
stronger under democratic regimes. “When [democracy] declares itself the 
imagination of those who are most inclined to contest it is overawed by its 
authority” (De Tocqueville 2004: 287). Tocqueville identified two main sources 
of the strength of democratically determined regulation. First, the minority that 
has not agreed on the law knows that it has a chance to become the majority. 
Therefore “it is interested in professing that respect for the decrees of the 
legislator which it may soon have occasion to claim for its own”(idem). Second, a 
citizen living within a democratic system knows that the law emanates from his 
own authority and “regards it as a contract to which he is himself a party” (De 
Tocqueville 2004: 288).
By analogy, I can refer this logic to trade union confederations as 
associations of wage-eamers promoting their members’ working and living 
conditions (Webb and Webb 1898). Discussion, deliberation, and voting can bring 
together unions’ members and cadres around a shared policy platform, so as to 
minimise the probability of policy (and wage) drift at local level. Participation of 
members and affiliates on sensitive policy issues might reinforce the stability of 
the final decision, rather than promoting policy and wage drift, even if a
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substantial minority does not agree on the policy outcome. Case studies at the 
level of the single union (whereas I focus on the confederation as an 
approximation of the whole of organised labour) confirm these insights (Undy and 
Martin 1984: 164-167).
Additionally, the periodic democratic scrutiny of leaders -  who can be 
re-elected or not depending on majority assessment of their performance -  
reinforces their legitimacy and the stability of the organisation as a whole (Dahl 
1998).25 Leaders who are exposed to the judgment of their members are more 
likely to enjoy respect and trust than oligarchs or autarchic chiefs (Schumpeter 
1962).
To summarise, in this section I have analysed existing theories of union 
behaviour. These contended that encompassment, concentration and centralisation 
are the institutional features that lead trade unions to contribute to socially optimal 
outcomes through co-operative behaviour. Careful analysis of existing literature 
and recent political accounts, however, has suggested that hierarchy might not be 
the best way of achieving centralisation. In particular there is little, if any, cross­
country empirical evidence that confirms the theoretical prediction according to 
which hierarchical rules make cooperative unions. On the contrary, democratic 
rules at confederation level have been proven very effective in favouring union 
compliance in a number of relevant instances, which might be brought to a 
theoretical status. It should be stressed that I am not proposing a normative 
approach, but rather a positive approach. This means that, prior to any policy 
prescription, I am interested in understanding the impact that democracy as a
25 For a strong analogy on the force o f electoral rules in stabilising new democracies, see 
Huntington (1991:267-269).
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process of internal decision-making has on the ability of trade unions to adopt co­
operative behaviours, as opposed to militant behaviours.
To this aim, which is key in testing the hypothesis developed in Chapter 
2 ,1 will now propose a measure of union confederation democracy, and will then 
construct a quantitative model of union behaviour.
3.2 Measuring Democracy
In the previous paragraph I stressed that representative democracy at the 
level of the confederation is theoretically and empirically compatible with unions’ 
centralisation. Moreover, I have hypothesised that representative democracy can 
be a route to trade unions’ centralisation, because it minimises the probability of 
policy drifts at local level.
If  my hypothesis is right, trade unions that are more (less) democratic at 
the level of the confederation should be more (less) inclined towards co-operative 
behaviours. However, by what method can I measure representative democracy in 
trade union confederations?
To the best of my knowledge, the only attempt to measure union 
democracy was made by Lange (1984), quoted above. His measure was based on 
the work of Albert Hirschman (1970) that identified the features that organisations 
or firms must incorporate in order to be responsive to their members or consumers. 
In this view, responsive organisations or firms (unions, in Lange’s approach) offer 
opportunities of exit and voice to their members (Lange 1984: 14).
Instead, I have based the construction of my indicator, on the work of 
Robert Dahl (1989; 1998). This is because I am interested in investigating the 
impact that democratic rules at the confederation level have on the behaviour of 
trade unions. Dahl offers a very abstract and concise definition of democracy,
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which can be applied to different types of institutions. Hirschman’s approach, on 
the contrary, refers only to the kind of institutions that ensure responsiveness, i.e. 
correspondence between members’ opinions and organisations’ policies. However, 
responsive institutions could be non-democratic, and under certain conditions 
democratic institutions could be non-responsive26 I argue therefore that 
Hirschman’s model is not the best to use if one wants to build an indicator of 
union democracy, because it would lead instead, by construction, to an indicator
97of responsiveness.
Democracy rather, is a “process, unique in its kind, in order to take 
binding collective decisions” (Dahl 1989: 9). In a democratic association “all 
members have to be considered equally able to participate to the decision making 
process leading to the strategies that the association will adopt” (Dahl 1998: 41).
In brief, Dahl’s approach focuses on democracy as a process. The higher 
or lower responsiveness of the outcome to the will of the membership is a matter 
of the specific institutions that are established (Dahl 1989: third and fourth part). 
Instead, democracy is simply based on the principle of equality between the 
members of the association (Dahl 1989: 44-78).
Dahl identifies five “criteria for a democratic process” that should be 
satisfied in order to ensure that the governance of an association is based on the 
“need that every member has the same right of participation in the decisions on 
the strategies”. These criteria are: (1) effective participation; (2) voting equality;
26 Two examples will suffice: according to the American constitution, the President can be elected 
by a minority o f the popular vote. In this case, the Presidency, which is a democratic institution, is 
not necessarily responsive to the will o f the majority o f its citizens. Similarly, no multinational 
corporation is managed democratically, even if  it is able to respond promptly to its consumer’ 
preferences.
27 Against this analysis, Lange’s (1984) conclusions are increasingly plausible. He finds that his 
measure o f  democracy as responsiveness is compatible with both wage restraint and wage 
militancy (Lange 1984: 65). Indeed, outside o f a strictly Marxist approach, one could conceive that 
preferences of unions’ members vary across countries.
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(3) enlightened understanding; (4) control of the agenda; (5) inclusion of all adult 
members in collective decisions (1998: 37-40). (A more detailed explanation will 
be given in the next paragraph, when they are applied to trade union 
confederations.) These criteria are applicable to any association and therefore are 
particularly useful for my purpose. I will benchmark a number of institutional 
features of trade union confederations against them. Each confederation will be 
given a score of between 0 and 1, depending on the degree to which it satisfies 
Dahl’s criteria on democracy.
My Indicator of Union Democracy
In order to reach a measurable and reasonably simple indicator, I have 
focused on two institutional dimensions of trade unions: (1) the accountability of 
confederation peak levels (AP); and (2) the ratification process of collective 
agreements at the national level (CR). These two dimensions are equally weighted 
in the actual index, which ranges from 1 (corresponding to the satisfaction of all 
Dahl’s criteria for democracy) to 0 (when none of Dahl’s criteria is satisfied).
The bar graph displayed in Figure 3.1 shows the result o f the 
measurement of the overall objective index of confederation democracy 
(CONFDEM). I have measured it through interviews with trade unions officials 
and national experts on industrial relations, backed up by secondary sources. The 
final measure refers to 16 OECD countries over thirty years: 1974-2003 .
28 In countries where more than one confederation exists, I have weighted each score against the 
membership o f  each confederation (data on membership comes from Golden, Lange and 
Wallerstein 2002, see Statistical Appendix for the complete list o f  sources and coding rules).
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Components o f Union Confederation Democracy
AP and CR are two equally-weighted dimensions that depend on the 
following characteristics of trade union confederations’ decision-making 
processes.
The score of the first dimension (AP) depends on two (equally-weighted) 
sub-components. AP is highest when the peak leadership is elected for a fixed- 
term mandate and the delegates to the national congress are elected by the 
membership. AP is zero when peak levels are appointed without a fixed term of 
office, and when the delegates at national congress are appointed by union boards 
affiliated to the confederation. Mixed configurations do exist, and they result in 
intermediate scores.
The score of the latter dimension (CR) is highest when collective 
agreements, in particular the most politically divisive ones, are decided upon 
through secret ballot among members (or, a fortiori, workers). An intermediate 
case is when unions’ leaders only consult workers over collective agreements, 
ether asking for show-of-hands vote, or asking for opinions in open assemblies. 
CR is null when the leadership never consults members over collective 
agreements. I will now briefly explain why these dimensions -  and their scores — 
are able to capture the degree to which unions’ internal rules comply with Dahl’s 
criteria for democracy.
Accountability o f  Peak Levels: Criteria 2 and 4
Criterion number 2 (voting equality) states that the votes of the members 
of an association must be equally weighted (Dahl 1998: 37). If the delegates to the 
national congress (which usually elects the national leadership) are not elected by 
the membership but appointed by the boards of affiliates, criterion number 2 is not
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satisfied. In this case, within the confederation, the votes of the leaders of the 
affiliate unions are more important than the votes of ordinary members.
If peak levels are elected for a fixed-term mandate, this means that they 
can be voted out, and criterion number 4 (control of agenda) is satisfied. This 
states that members should have a say on the association’s agenda, so that 
strategies can be changed (Dahl 1998: 38). If members cannot vote out the 
leadership they are not in command of the agenda (including decisions on when to 
hold elections of leadership), which remains under the full control of the 
leadership itself.
Ratification o f  Collective Agreements: Criteria 1, 3, and 5
Criterion number 1 deals with “effective participation”, that is, “before a 
policy is adopted by the association, all the members must have equal and 
effective opportunities for making their views known to the other members as to 
what the policy should be” (Dahl 1998: 37). In the unions’ realm, this occurs at 
the highest rate when collective agreements are ratified by the whole body of 
members through a secret ballot. This allows for free expression of different 
opinions and for the membership to make a direct impact on the association’s 
strategy.
Additionally, when this procedure of ratification is adopted, it could be 
inferred that criterion number 3, on “enlightened understanding”, is also satisfied. 
This states that “each member must have equal and effective opportunities for 
learning about the relevant alternative policies and their likely consequences” 
(Dahl 1998: 38). Moments of discussion and persuasion that precede (secret) 
voting procedures (Stratton 1989; Baccaro 2002b) can be considered to satisfy 
this condition.
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The criteria of effective participation and enlightened understanding are 
satisfied to a lesser degree when members are consulted on the .agreements, or 
when less stringent voting procedures (such as show-of-hands) are adopted.
When it comes to union confederations, criterion number 5, on the 
inclusion of all adults members in collective decisions can be considered 
incorporated (and correspondingly satisfied or not satisfied) in the first four 
criteria. Indeed, criterion number 5 states that “All, or at any rate most, adult 
permanent residents should have the full rights of citizens that are implied by the 
first four criteria” (Dahl 1998: 39).29
Table 3.1 summarises the correspondence between Dahl’s criteria for 
democracy and the dimensions of my (objective) indicator of confederation 
democracy (CONFDEM)30. It is worth emphasising that this exercise of index- 
building has two main caveats. First, by trying to capture comparable formal 
procedures, it ignores country-specific characteristics of the labour movements, 
which are considered to be very important for the understanding of trade unionism 
by an influential stream of the literature (Hyman 2001). Second, by referring to 
purely formal procedures, my index ignores the substance of deliberative and 
electoral processes within the union confederations.
29 Dahl’s criterion is derived from the need to exclude fully democratic regimes that withhold 
electoral rights from women or lower income cohorts. However, given that my study is concerned 
with union confederations found in advanced democracies, this criterion is partially redundant.
30 It is perhaps useful to underline that this correspondence is a simplification and an 
approximation. The criteria, as applied in the construction o f my indicator, are highly formal and 
are able to capture to a small degree the substance o f the democratic process. Additionally, trade 
unions’ institutional features are highly specific to the individual confederation, and to the 
ideology within which the internal rules were bred. Indeed, few people I have interviewed with the 
aim o f measuring my index have cast doubts on the overall possibility o f  constructing a 
comparative indicator on trade unions confederation’s rules. In their opinion, national 
idiosyncrasies would be too strong and render comparative large-N research on the topic 
impossible. Against this critique, I consider that the simplification I have adopted is the best suited 
for comparing levels o f democracy precisely because it refers to few formal and comparable 
features, discarding other thicker variables.
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Table 3.1 -  Coding Union Confederation Democracy
Dahl’s Criteria for Democracy Dimensions of Union Confederation 
Democracy
1. Effective Participation Secret vote (or consultation) of 
membership on national collective 
agreements
2. Vote Equality Delegates to national congress elected by 
membership
3. Enlightened Understanding Secret vote (or consultation) of 
membership on national collective 
agreements
4. Control of the Agenda Peak levels elected for a fixed-term 
mandate
5. Inclusion of all adult members in 
collective decisions
Embedded in each of the previous four 
dimensions
For example, it is likely that informal procedures of membership 
consultation, via intermediate cadres, are in place even if formal rights are absent. 
Therefore, my index could be overly pessimistic when it comes to the actual 
assessment of the level of confederation democracy. A more sophisticated 
indicator would have implied a lengthy qualitative analysis of trade union rules 
and procedures in all the OECD countries, which goes beyond the scope and aims 
of this thesis. By focusing instead on formal aspects, I can reach, with limited 
effort, a simple and replicable index.
The bar graph displayed in Figure 3.1 shows a summary of my measure, 
through the mean values of the index’s score in two sub-periods: 1974-1988 and 
1989-2003. Union democracy is time variant only in 7 countries out of 16, which 
is consistent with general theories on the “sluggishness” of institutions and their 
resilience to change (North 1990). Additionally, this is consistent with the large 
number of time-invariant indicators of unions’ institutions (Kenworthy 2003). 
Considering the mean values for two sub-periods (1974-1988 and 1989-2003), 
CONFDEM has increased in Ireland, Italy, France, United Kingdom, Spain and
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Sweden, while it has decreased in Finland. In all the other countries, CONFDEM 
has remained constant. In .the next paragraph I will begin to analyse this indicator, 
using correlation analysis to assess its impact on unions’ ability to exert wage 
restraint.
Figure 3.1 -  Union Confederation Democracy Index in 16 OECD Countries 
(1974-2003).
The bar graphs represent average measurements in two sub-periods.
Assessing the Impact of Democracy on Labour Costs
The measurement o f unions’ institutional features -  including 
concentration, hierarchy and wage bargaining settings -  has a long tradition in the 
literature (for a complete overview o f existing indicators see: Kenworthy 2003). 
The general aim o f the indicators is to investigate the impact that different kinds 
o f institutions have on key economic outcomes. Most o f the literature has 
undertaken this research agenda using unemployment and inflation as the salient 
dependent variables (Bruno and Sachs 1985; Golden 1993; Garrett 1998; Garrett 
and Way 1999; Iversen 1999; Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel 2001; Traxler 2003).
I
AU SAirT BEL CAN DK FIN FRA GBR RE fTA NOR NTH SPA SW E UK US
1974-1988 3 1989-2003
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Instead, following Nunziata (2001) and Traxler (2003), the variable that 
I expect to be dependent on different organisational features of the trade unions is 
labour cost. According to the mainstream view, first put forward by Cameron 
(1984), trade unions contribute to full employment, low inflation, regimes by 
ensuring slower wage increases and thereby controlling real labour costs. In other 
words, the effect that unions and other institutions of the labour market can have 
on unemployment and inflation is channelled through their impact on labour costs. 
Additionally, recent literature has demonstrated that inflation and unemployment 
are influenced by many other factors, particularly institutional interactions 
(Iversen 1999; Franzese 2001).
In order to assess the impact of unions’ institutions, Nunziata (2001) and 
Traxler (2003) have used standard measures, such as real unit labour cost as the 
ratio between wages and total employed, weighted on productivity. Instead, I use 
a measure of wage militancy (WM) proposed by Blanchard in different papers 
(Blanchard 2000: 300-304; Blanchard and Philippon 2003: 24).31 WM is the 
difference between the actual change in real wages, and the change that should 
have occurred had wages grown according to labour productivity growth as 
determined only by technological improvement. Therefore, for each year, a 
negative value of WM represents an increase in wage moderation; that is, a 
reduction in real labour costs.
Compared to more traditional measures of real labour costs, WM has 
two relevant qualities. First, its value is not affected by capital accumulation. As 
such, if  the unions have any impact at all on overall wage levels, this should be
31 Blanchard et al. labelled their variable “wage moderation”. I suggest instead that “wage 
militancy” is more appropriate for my purposes. In fact, increasing wage moderation indicates 
decreasing labour costs, leading to semantic confusion. I rather say that when wage militancy 
increases, labour costs increase as well.
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more apparent in WM than in other measures of real labour cost. Second, WM is 
computed under the assumption that wages represent the actual contribution of 
labour to output growth. This latter assumption is highly restrictive and the 
measure therefore underestimates the actual reduction in labour costs, any 
conclusion that might be reached is therefore more robust.
Table 3.2 shows a correlation matrix where average values of 
CONFDEM are correlated with average yearly change in labour costs. Here I use 
two specifications: WM and a more traditional measure o f Real Unit Labour Cost 
(RULC) as provided by the European Commission statistical unit (European 
Commission 2006g). My hypothesis finds a first confirmation. In fact, both 
measures of labour cost are (negatively) correlated with confederation democracy, 
meaning that the more democratic on average a union confederation was between 
1974 and 2003, the slower the increase in real labour costs was on a year-to-year 
basis. However, WM correlation scores to confederation democracy are higher 
than RULC correlation scores, which is consistent with the fact that the latter 
measure is dependent also on capital accumulation, on which unions have little 
impact. The two measures of real labour cost are obviously strictly correlated 
(0.84).
Figure 3.2 is a scatter plot of yearly average change in WM against 
average confederation democracy between 1974 and 2003 in my selected 
countries. Belgium, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, the UK seem to be outliers of 
the overall distribution. Figure 3.3 shows that when the outliers are removed from 
the scatter plot the correlation still holds.
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C O N FD E M AWM ARULC
C O N FD E M 1.0000
AW M -0.6076** 1.0000
ARULC -0.5598** 0.8466* 1.0000
(obs=16; **significant at 0.05; significant at 0.01)
Table 3.2 -  Correlation Matrix: Confederation Democracy and Labour Costs.
The 16 observations are the 16 OECD countries. AWM and ARULC are average yearly changes in 
Wage Militancy and Real Labour Cost. Sources: RULC: European Commission (2006g); WM and 
CONDEM see Statistical Appendix.
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Figure 3.2 -  Wage Militancy and Confederation Democracy with linear fit (1974-2003)
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Figure 3.3 -  Wage Militancy and Confederation Democracy without outliers (1974-2003)
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This correlation analysis corroborates my hypothesis. However, more 
sophisticated multivariate analysis is needed in order to asses the relative 
importance of CONFDEM vis a vis other institutional features of unions and their 
industrial relations milieu. This will be done in the next section.
3.3 A Quantitative Model of Union Behaviour
The previous analysis showed a relatively high degree of correlation 
between confederation democracy and wage moderation, which suggests that my 
hypothesis might be well-founded. However, other institutional features of the 
trade unions as well as wage bargaining settings are known to affect wage 
militancy. Multivariate analysis is the appropriate tool with which to assess their 
relative importance.
By adopting regression analysis, I follow previous endeavours of other 
authors interested in the impact that different types of political institutions have on 
economic variables (Golden 1993; Nunziata 2001; Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel 
2001; Traxler 2003; Baccaro and Rei 2005; Baker et al. 2005). Against this 
backdrop, I employ the technique of panel data regression analysis.
My baseline equation is the following:
WH = P*
j «
Where wit is real labour cost (measured as WM), in country i at time t; xs 
are j  institutional variables referring to trade unions’ structure; zs are n 
macroeconomic controls; and e,,/ is the stochastic residual.
I l l
The Variables and the Choice of the Model
The vector of six variables relating to the organisational structure of 
trade unions, all ranging from 0 to 1, is as follows:
~ y iCONFDEMir + y 2UDl! y y J J D 1,., + y t CONC,, + ysWBCOOR,, + y6CONTtJ
j
CONFDEM is my measure of confederation democracy. I expect 
CONFDEM to be negatively associated with WM, i.e. the more democratic the 
confederation, the smaller the increase in labour costs. The less democratic the 
confederation, the more militant labour will be.
UD is union density. This is the traditional proxy used by the literature 
for encompassment. Expanding on the work of previous authors (Nunziata 2001; 
Baccaro and Rei 2005), 1 add into the equation its squared value (UD2) because, 
following Olson (1982), I expect a non-linear relationship between wage 
moderation and union density. Up to a certain size, the unions will be large 
enough to affect overall labour costs, but not large enough to be encompassing, i.e. 
approximating the whole of the worker population. Therefore I expect UD to be 
positively correlated to WM, and UD-squared to be negatively correlated to WM.
CONC is a measure of inter-confederation concentration; that is, the 
distribution of members across national-level confederations. I expect CONC to 
be negatively correlated to WM. This is consistent with traditional neo-corporatist 
theories and previous findings according to which a union’s ability to adopt 
moderate stances is a function of the monopoly of confederations over members 
representation (Golden 1993).
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WBCOOR is the level of coordination of wage bargaining, which I 
expect to be negatively correlated to WM; that is, the more coordinated the wage 
bargaining, the less scope there is for wage militancy (Soskice 1990).
Finally, CONT is a measure of the authority of confederation peak levels 
over affiliates, ranging from 0 to 1. This index seeks to approximate the level of 
hierarchy that exists within a trade union confederation, focusing on the power 
that confederation peaks have over affiliate unions, including power of 
appointment, veto over wage agreements, veto over strikes, and control of strike 
funds. Some of the existing literature would expect this to be negatively correlated 
to WM too (Garrett and Way 1999: 414-415) but, as discussed earlier in 
paragraph 3.1, doubts have already been raised as to its overall importance.
The vector of three macroeconomic controls is the following:
= a iAGPD,J-< +^2GR,., + <?JOTS,,_i
j
Where AGPD is the (lagged) annual change in real GDP, UR the 
standardised unemployment rate, TOTS is the (lagged) terms of trade shocks, 
measured as changes in terms of trade. All the independent variables are 
standardised to vary between 0 and 1.
The Choice o f the Model
A recent strand of literature has been devoted to the identification of the 
best estimation model for use in dealing with panel data in political science, when 
variables representing institutions or events (e.g. elections) are used (Beck and 
Katz 1995; Kittel 1999; Beck and Katz 2001). In fact, the application of
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quantitative methods has been increasingly popular in the political sciences in the 
last decade, sometimes yielding dubious or outright wrong results (Kittel and 
Winner 2005).
Against the backdrop of these articles, I have reached by testing down an 
OLS (ordinary least squares) with PCSEs (panel-corrected standard errors) 
estimation model as the most accurate. The results are displayed in columns 3 to 6 
of Table 3.3.
My panel included 16 OECD countries32. Following Traxler et al. (2001: 
25-27; 2003: 11), I set up my models as a panel of nine-period average 
measurements: 1974-1976 1977-1979; 1980-1982; 1983-1985; 1986-1988; 1989- 
1991; 1992-1994; 1995-1997; 1998-2000. This is because annual variation in 
wages -  i.e. my dependent variable -  can hardly be attributable to institutions, 
which vary much less. Traxler (2003, note 9) adds that the three-year choice 
represents a compromise between the shorter duration of collective contracts and 
the longer duration of the business cycle, which both affect wage trends.
I start with a standard FGLS (Feasible Generalised Least Squared)
estimation (columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.3). The FGLS is the standard method for
estimating panel data regressions. A STATA routine Hausman test run on my
variables has highlighted the appropriateness of FE(ts) (Fixed-Effect, or within)
estimators over RE (Random-Effect) estimators. However, as emphasised by
Beck and Katz (2001), the fixed-effect estimator is not efficient when independent
variables are time-invariant (or bivariate). In my case, CONFDEM, CONC and
32 Australia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. Data sources: WM: own 
calculation from European Commission, Ameco database (2004) on the basis o f  Blanchard and 
Philippon (2003: 24); UD and TOTS: dataset from IMF (2001) kindly provided by Dr. Xavier 
Debrun; CONC: Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (2002); WBCOOR: Kenworthy (2003: 41); 
RGPDCH and UR come from Ameco database (2004); CONT: Kenworthy (2003: 53) from 
Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (2002). This latter variable is not available for Spain and Ireland. 
Full details can be found in the Statistical Annex.
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WBCOOR are time-invariant in the majority of countries and would be perfectly 
collinear with country-dummies. Therefore, following both Beck and Katz (2001) 
and Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel (2001: 27-28), I exclude country-dummies and 
include time-dummies, eventually estimating a FE(t) model.
As was foreseeable, the model violates the basic assumption of the GLS 
model, as the stochastic error term (e) is not serially uncorrelated and the variables 
seem not to be strictly exogenous, as transpires from standard tests performed on 
the estimations (rows 17 and 18). However, the residuals are not autocorrelated 
(row 19) and therefore, following Beck and Katz (1995) and Kittel and Winner 
(2005: 270), I can safely estimate an OLS model with PCSEs, which is much less 
optimistic than the FGLS and drops the violated assumptions.
Results
Columns 3 to 7 of Table 3.3 display the results of my estimations. 
Overall, they corroborate my hypothesis. The fit of the models is satisfying: r- 
squared ranges from 0.50 to 0.69. The coefficient of my variable of confederation 
democracy is always strongly significant and negative. This means that the more 
democratic a trade union confederation is, the more closely associated the wage 
increases will be with increases in labour productivity, as opposed to overtaking 
them.
This clear impact of democracy is paired with the insignificance of the 
CONT variable, i.e. a measure of confederation hierarchy calculated by Lane 
Kenworthy (2000) based on Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (2002). The 
coefficient is negative, as neo-corporatists would predict, but it is extremely small 
and far from significant in all the estimations.
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Table 3.3 -  Regressions Results. Dependent Variable: Wage Militancy
E s t i m a t o r 1 .FGLS 2. FLGS 3. PCSE 4. PCSE 5.PCSE 6.PCSE 7.PCES
1 CONFDEM -0.0215 -0.0185 -0.0215 -0.0185 -0.0228 -0.0231 -0.0224
(-3.47)* (-3.17)* (-3.98)* (-3.02)* (-4.73)* (-4.27)* M.91)*
2 UD 0.1927 0.0736 0.1927 0.0736 0.1933 0.1006 0.0927
(3.5)* (1.6)*** (3.74)* (1.37) (4.15)* (2.27)* (3.35)*
3 UD2 -0.1803 -0.0654 -0.1803 -0.0654 -0.1795 -0.0913 -0.1178"
(-3.33)* (-1.45) (-4.18)* (-1.4) (-4.32)* (-2.27)* (-3.72)*
4 CONC -0.0174 -0.0137 -0.0174 -0.0137 -0.0174 -0.0177 -0.0166
(-2.18)* (-1.98)* (-2.29)* (-1.89)** (-2.22)* (-2.89)* (-2.15)*
5 WBCOOR -0.0317 -0.0278 -0.0317 -0.0278 -0.0308 -0.0293 -0.0311
(-3.15)* (-3.84)* (-3.04)* (-3.22)* (-3.00)* (-3.78)* (-2.96)*
6 CONT -0.0059 -0.0059 -0.0062 -0.0063
(-0.69) (-0.64) (-0.65) (-0.65)
7 G D P C H ^ 0.3292 0.2477 0.3292 0.2477 0.4383 0.3784 0.4328
(4.4)* (4.43)* (3.35)* (2.84)* (6.44)* (6.17)* (6.3)*
8 UR -0.3347 -0.1705 -0.3347 -0.1705 -0.3292 -0.2231 -0.3289
(-2.77)* (-3.06)* (-2.84)* (-1.93)** (-2.74)* (-3.32)* (-2.68)*
9 TOTS [ l ' v 0.1002 0.0914 0.1002 0.0914 0.1124 0.1132 0.1118
(2.75)* (2.62)* (2.13)* (1.95)* (2.38)* (2.57)* (2.37)*
10 Constant 0.0040 0.0163 0.0040 0.0163 -0.0031 0.0116 0.0098
(0.24) (1.45) (0.27) (0.84) (-0.23) (0.79) (0.67)
11 Observations 98 139 98 139 98 139 139
12 No. o f countries 14 16 14 16 14 16 16
13 F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
14 R-squared 0.6882 0.5892 0.6882 0.5892 0.634 0.5007 0.635
15 Adj. R-squared 0.6311 0.5353
16 Wald-Test on the 
time-dummies
chi2(6)= 
117.03 P. 
= 0.0092
chi2(8) = 
29.92 P. 
= 0.0002
chi2(6)= 
15536.37 
P.= 
0.0092
chi2(8)= 
370.51 P. 
= 0.0000
no time 
dummies
no time 
dummies
17 Wald test for
Groupwise
Heteroskedasticity
chi2 (14) 
= 158.90 
P.>chi2 = 
0.0000
chi2 (14) 
= 153.45 
P>chi2 = 
0.0000
18 Test for Spatial 
Correlation
chi2(91)
=103.877
P.=
0.1681
chi2(120)
163.144
P.=
0.0054
19 LM Test for 
Autocorrelation in the 
Residuals
chi2(l)= 
0.8572 P. 
= 0.7697
chi2(l) = 
0.7464 P. 
= 0.3876
* significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%', Kpss tests fo r  stationarity
confirmed that the dependent variable is stationary. The test has been performed on all the time 
series in each section; STATA routine diagnostic fo r  collinearity showed a mild level o f  
collinearity entirely dependent on the cqrrelation between UD and UD2. Column 7 computes the
regression when UD2 is instrumented with UD4 which eliminates all collinearity. The results 
appear stable; # UD4;
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It should be emphasised that the two measures o f hierarchy and 
democracy are not mutually exclusive..This means that a given trade union 
confederation could be democratic according to my measure (i.e. leaders are 
accountable to membership and collective agreements are voted upon), while also 
being hierarchical according to Kenworthy’s indicator.
This is because my measure of democracy reflects the influence that 
membership has over peak levels and their decisions, while the confederation 
authority index reflects the power of peak levels over affiliates. For example, 
according to Kenworthy’s measure, Canada, Finland, France and Germany score 
0 in the CONT variable, meaning peak levels have no power over affiliates. My 
measure of confederation democracy for the same countries ranges from 0.11 
(France in 1976) to 1 (Canada, all years), meaning that the level of confederation 
democracy in these different countries is very different.
The role of encompassment (UD and UD-squared in the table) is also 
confirmed by my results. The relationship between union density and wage 
moderation is parabolic, thus confirming the Olsonian view that opened this 
chapter. A very large trade union confederation is likely to internalise the 
consequences that its political stances have on the society at large, whereas large 
unions that are not sufficiently encompassing tend to exploit their market power at 
the expense of the rest of society.
Similarly, the higher the inter-confederation concentration, the more 
moderate wage dynamics will be. In other words, the fewer union confederations 
there are in a given country, the more moderate the wage increases vis a vis 
productivity increases will be. This simply confirms Golden’s (1993) conclusions
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on the importance of having monopoly of representation to avoid factionalism and 
wage drifts.
The level of wage bargaining coordination is a feature of the industrial 
relations system as a whole. The measure I use is a composite objective one. The 
negative sign of the coefficient confirms Sockice’s (1990) interpretation, 
according to which institutional means can be as effective as market means in 
controlling wage pressures.
The coefficients of the three macroeconomic controls are consistent 
throughout my table. The (lagged) measure of real GDP growth is associated with 
high wage dynamics, while high unemployment rates act as a moderator for wage 
dynamics. More interesting is the positive sign of the TOTS (term of trade shocks) 
coefficients: it seems that when it comes to the effect that TOTS have on wage 
dynamics, the (positive) effect on income via the current account balance is 
stronger than the (negative) effect on competitiveness.
In general terms, my model confirms my hypothesis on the importance 
of democratic decision-making processes within union confederations. 
Additionally, with the exception of the importance attributed to hierarchy, my 
model is consistent with the most of the existing literature on corporatism, which 
increases its plausibility. In the next, concluding, section, I will highlight the 
specific place that confederation democracy can occupy in the theory of union 
behaviour, and how this is linked to the overall research framework of this thesis.
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3.4 Democracy as a Condition for Cohesion
In line with the existing literature (Golden 1993; Garrett 1998; Nunziata 
2001; Traxler 2003), my quantitative model of union behaviour has confirmed 
that institutional features o f trade unions have an impact on economic variables, 
particularly wage dynamics. This is because the structure and decision-making 
process within organised labour affects its capacity to adopt cooperative 
behaviours and gain economic benefits accordingly (Pizzomo 1978; Lehmbruch 
and Schmitter 1982; Goldthorpe 1984).
The specific contribution of my model resides in a relevant correction it 
proposes to the traditional corporatist literature. The very label of this literature 
suggests that, in order to reach socially optimal outcomes (i.e. sustainable wage 
increases), unions should abandon democracy and adopt a certain degree of 
despotism. Compulsory corporations are indeed institutions likened more to 
medieval and fascist regimes than to advanced European economies.
My model shows, on the contrary, that democratic internal rules at the 
confederation level, rather than hierarchy, enable trade unions to tame wage 
pushfulness. In order to achieve stable growth, wage increases should not exceed 
productivity increases, so as not to hinder cost dynamics (Blanchard and 
Philippon 2003: 22-23). This outcome is more likely to be reached in countries 
where trade union confederations are organised along democratic criteria, which 
include a leadership accountable to the membership, and the use of discussion and 
voting among members to ratify collective agreements. The contrast between this 
conclusion on the importance of internal democracy and the old corporatist 
approach justifies the title of this chapter, that is, “corporatism turned on its head”.
119
It is worth at this point recalling the main research question posed by this 
thesis: what drove the party/union alliance in the 1980s and the in 1990s? When 
defined as patterns of collaboration in socio-economic policy-making, the 
party/union alliance since the 1980s shows unexpected resilience, as over 70% of 
policies are agreed together by the two actors, even under unfavourable overall 
conditions. From the union perspective, I have hypothesised that democratic 
internal rules at the confederation level were key in explaining policy 
collaboration, because they favoured cohesion under a limited set of available 
payoffs for rank-and-file compliance.
The objective index of confederation democracy (CONFDEM) that I 
have measured, based on Dahl’s criteria for democracy, showed considerable 
variation across country, and some variation over time within country (Figure 3.1). 
Organised labour across Europe differs with respect to its degree of internal 
democracy. In turn, this variation has an impact on the ability of labour to exert 
wage restraint, and therefore confirms my hypothesis. Countries with low levels 
of CONFDEM are more likely to experience wage militancy from organised 
labour: democracy favours cooperative behaviours.
But why is this so? Why are democratic trade unions better able than 
non-democratic trade unions to overcome internal collective action problems and 
collaborate over policy making and control wage increases?
Democracy Leads to Cohesion and its Absence to Fragmentation
Why is democracy better suited than hierarchy to reaching centralisation, 
that is, a state where decisions taken at the “centre” of the organisation, i.e. by 
unions leaders are complied with by the whole body of members (Pizzomo 1978: 
284)?
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The answer to this question can be derived from a closer look at the 
results of my regression analysis (Table 3.3). Here, my measure of confederation 
democracy is always negatively correlated to wage militancy, and highly 
significant. At the same time, the measure of hierarchy (CONT) proposed by 
Kenworthy (2003) and derived from Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (2002) has a 
minuscule coefficient, and, most importantly, is always far from being significant. 
These combined results suggest that confederation democracy and hierarchical 
means are not two poles of the same distribution, but two analytically and 
empirically distinct features. In other words, my regression shows that different 
levels of wage militancy cannot be accounted for by the level of union 
confederation leaders’ coercion powers. At the same time, it suggests that a lack 
of confederation democracy cannot be associated with a state of despotism. My 
results suggest that hierarchy has no effect on wage dynamics (hence it does not 
favour wage militancy or wage moderation). Instead, it is the absence of 
democracy that favours wage militancy.
To understand better, then, the effect of democracy (and its absence) on
union confederation policies it is necessary to return to the definition upon which
my measure was based. This reasoning will highlight that considering democracy
in opposition to hierarchy, as much of the literature on corporatism seems to do,
can be misleading. I have based the measure of confederation democracy
(CONFDEM) on Dahl’s conception, according to which democracy refers to the
process with which decisions are taken (Dahl 1989: 9). This, under my framework,
includes the selection and appointment of leaders and the ratification of collective
agreements. Hierarchy within union confederations instead pertains to the control
33 The technical explanation o f this result, i.e. the explanation linked to the nature o f the two 
indexes and how are they constructed, is given in the previous section under the subheading 
“Results”.
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that peak levels can exert over members and affiliates (Golden, Wallerstein and 
Lange 1999; Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel 2001: 67-70). Therefore, they are two 
analytically distinct concepts that can empirically coexist.
In theoretical terms (Dahl 1989; 1998), democracy can be considered as 
opposed to two different methods of decision making; authoritarian methods (via 
hierarchical means), and anarchic ones (i.e. refusing a single lead). In the unions’ 
realm, hierarchy is incompatible with internal democracy only if the leaders are 
appointed by a force outside the unions themselves. This case is irrelevant within 
the empirical sample of western European countries, where unions are voluntary 
associations, and instead refers only to authoritarian regimes.34
Therefore, the only decision-making process opposed to democracy that
is compatible with the empirical setting of unions in western European countries
is anarchy. In Dahl’s theorisation, the anarchic approach rejects democracy
because it rejects the state and its power of coercion. “The philosophical rationale
of anarchy as opposed to democracy insists on the absence of coercion” (Dahl
1989: 55). The very origin of the word is an arche, meaning “without a guide”, or
“without a lead”. As a consequence, when referring to trade unions confederations,
the absence of democracy can be likened to the absence of unified leadership.
Democratic decision-making processes have the effect of increasing the credibility
and strength of leaders, and they unify a very diverse body of workers around the
policy platform that gains the majority of the consensus. Therefore, the absence of
democracy at the confederation level causes the fragmentation of organised labour.
Consider a completely despotic union confederation, within which union leaders
are recruited by an unaccountable bureaucracy, and which never consults
34 Dahl labels this kind o f non-democratic decision-making process as the “government o f the 
guardians” whose theoretical tradition can be tracked back to Plato’s Republic (Dahl 1989: 77- 
122).
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members over the main decisions. If the leadership tries to broker an agreement 
entailing little side compensation for the rank-and-file, but still includes short term 
sacrifices, this will trigger wage and policy drift at local level.
This interpretation is consistent with my regression results and narrows 
the difference between the effect that structures and decision-making processes 
have on union behaviour. Concentration of members in fewer unions favours 
cooperation because it unifies workers around a single leadership, rather than 
dispersing them across multiple organisations. High accountability of the centre of 
the organisation and the democratic ratification of central decisions (that is, 
centralisation as democracy) will avoid factionalism and promote unity around 
leaders and policy platforms. This reasoning suggests that a simpler way of 
identifying cooperative unions is through the concept of cohesiveness, as a result 
of the combined effect of concentration of members and centralisation as 
democracy, the absence of which would lead the labour movement to 
fragmentation.
However, why has the theoretical conviction on the importance of 
hierarchy proved to be so popular over time (Lehmbruch 1979; Traxler, Blaschke 
and Kittel 2001), and why have country studies on the role of democracy emerged 
only recently (Baccaro 2002a; 2003)?
Union Democracy and Political Exchange During Welfare State
Retrenchment
A possible answer to the question posed at the end of the previous 
section derives from the economic scenario that developed in the 1980s and 1990s. 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, during the 1960s and 1970s collaboration between 
social democratic governments and trade unions was based on the “political
f 123
exchange”, which was sustained by conspicuous payoffs in terms of slow but 
steady wage growth, higher welfare entitlements including pensions, health 
insurances, etc., and better working conditions, including less working hours, 
longer paid holidays, and so on (Przeworski 1985; Notermans 2000: Ch. 3; Mares 
2006a).
However, the economic scenario of the last two decades of the twentieth 
century was profoundly different from the previous decades. From the late 1970s, 
anti-inflationary policies took over as the mainstream political economic drive. 
Additionally, many European countries faced severe budget deficits, and welfare 
state retrenchment, as opposed to welfare state expansion, became the norm. 
(Scharpf 1991; Pierson 2001). Under these conditions, it is arguable that, in order 
to achieve cohesiveness of workers, decision-making processes (i.e. centralisation 
through democracy) acquired an increased importance relative to organisational 
structures (i.e. concentration of membership).
In other words, during the 1960s and 1970s, if unions’ membership was 
concentrated enough to avoid drifts and competition between unions, the payoffs 
that unions gained through their negotiations with the state were enough to ensure 
compliance (Mares 2006a). In the new scenario that emerged in the late 1970s, the 
absence of substantial payoffs, such as increased welfare entitlements or increased 
transfers, made it harder for unions to enter the bargaining game (Scharpf 1991; 
Ross and Martin 1999a; Crouch 2000b).
In the 1980s and 1990s, trade unions were not negotiating in order to 
improve the overall short term well-being of workers, but to minimise its decline, 
in the hope that the concerted reforms would have beneficial effects on economic 
growth and unemployment in the medium term (Rhodes 1996; Traxler 1997;
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Rhodes 2001). At the same time, leaders would negotiate to preserve the role of 
the unions in the labour market and in the policy arena. This would preserve their 
bargaining power, and in the future might gain higher benefits and entitlements 
for workers. In brief, this looks like the most severe textbook example of the 
conditions that favour an interpretation gap between members and leaders on 
evaluating short-term sacrifices for the rank-and-file and short-term power for 
union leaders, against long-term gains for everyone (Pizzomo 1978: 285). In this 
context it is very hard to imagine how the leaders of voluntary associations could 
have imposed on their members the acceptance of any compromise. Rather, the 
democratic involvement of the body of workers was needed to ensure that 
sacrifices would be voluntarily accepted, and this included processes of discussion, 
persuasion, and voting.
Conclusions
This chapter opened with a quote from Olson (1982) on his Logic of 
Collective Action. It contended that encompassing organisations have some 
interest in aiming for socially optimal outcomes, as they would bear directly any 
cost they imposed on the society. My analysis and my data suggest that 
democratic decision-making rules within encompassing organisations favour this 
process.
More specifically, this chapter has addressed one side of my research 
question: why were certain unions more inclined than others to negotiate with 
social democratic governments during the 1980s and 1990s? What institutional 
factors tame unions’ militancy, favour co-operative behaviours, and therefore 
allow for sustained alliance with social democratic parties during deflationist 
times? My empirical analysis has confirmed the hypothesis I put forward in
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Chapter 2; namely that confederation democracy promotes cohesiveness of labour 
under a single leadership, and around collective decisions. A democratic decision­
making process plays the same role as a concentrated labour structure, i.e. it 
reduces fragmentation in encompassing unions, thereby reducing the chance that 
rent-seeking and militant behaviour emerges.
In Chapter 2, the patterns of party/union alliance in European countries 
showed considerable variation both across countries and over time within 
individual countries. From the unions’ side, variation in their approach to 
negotiated policies can be explained with reference to their internal modes of 
operation. Democratic unions are the better suited to engaging in concerted policy 
with social democratic governments. This applies in particular in the period that 
followed the collapse of the “Keynesian consensus”. Under an overall restrictive 
economic framework, and in the absence of substantial payoffs for rank-and-file 
members, democratic means, including persuasion, deliberation, and voting, 
acquired increased importance in ensuring the viability of concerted modes of 
policy-making.
I have already warned of the limits of my index of confederation 
democracy, which pair with the limits of large-N analysis (Coppedge 1999). In 
order to obtain a measure that could be comparable across countries, I had to 
focus on formal rules of decision making. In Chapter 5, the qualitative case study 
of party/union relationship in Italy during the late 1990s will allow for a more 
nuanced understanding of the role of confederation democracy. The relative 
importance of institutions as processes over institutions as structures will then be 
even clearer.
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Before reaching this point, however, in the next chapter I will address 
the party side of my equation. Given that, as we have seen in previous chapters, 
there is little theoretical ground to justify a renewed alliance with unions, why did 
many social democratic governments embark upon collaboration with organised 
labour during the 1980s and 1990s?
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Chapter 4
The Convergence on Concertation 
of Social Democratic Parties: 
The Two Equilibria of the Party/Union Alliance
Yesterday I got so scared / 1 shivered like a child 
Yesterday away from you / It froze me deep inside 
Come back come back /Don't walk away 
Come back come back /  Come back today 
Come back come back / Why can't you see 
Come back come back / Come back to me
And I know I was wrong / When I said it was true 
That it couldn't be me and be her / Inbetween without you
Without you
The Cure, Inbetween Days
Leon Blum, who in 1936 became the first socialist prime minister of 
France, said: “A better [income] distribution...would revive production at the 
same time that it would satisfy justice.”35 In 1991, Allan Larsson, the Swedish 
social democratic prime minister, answered with the following: “[A permanent 
reduction in inflation] must take priority over all other ambitions and demands.” 
The trajectory of social democratic economic policy during the last century is 
typified through this imaginary dialogue. Contemporary social democracy seems 
to have travelled a long way from its departure point of revolutionary Marxist 
doctrines.
35 Quoted in Przeworski (1985: 209).
36 Quoted in Notermans (2000: 196).
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After spending a long time as the political agents o f  the industrial 
working class, social democrats have now lost most o f their mass membership, 
and have enlarged the social boundaries o f their electorate (Mair and van Biezen 
2001). A modem catch-all party, as the social democrats have become in the 
majority o f European countries,37 should treat trade unions in the same way as any 
other interest group. Additionally, inflation is guarded by central banks, and the 
industrial working class is shrinking and often politically seduced by the extreme 
populist right. Against this background, why -  as shown in Chapter 2 through the 
systematic coding o f textual information (reported again in Figure 4.1) -  did 
social democratic governments continue to pursue the majority o f  their socio­
economic policies in open collaboration with sister trade union confederations 
between 1974 and 2003?
b<q -
T T T T T
1975 1980 1985 1990 199 5 2000
Year
Yearly averages -----------  Three-years moving averages
Figure 4.1 -  Party/Union Alliance in 15 European Countries 1974-2003.
Bars display the share of socio-economic policies that social democratic 
governments pursued with the collaboration of their sister trade union confederation; 
the curve displays a three-year moving average. Countries include the EU15 except 
Luxembourg, and include Norway. Source: coded by the author, see Statistical 
Appendix for details.
37 Perhaps with the exception of Ireland (Mair 1992).
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The first half of this chapter will address this question. It will start by 
reviewing how the literature has analysed the new social democratic strategies that 
emerged in the wake of the changes to economic and electoral constraints that 
began to take place in the early 1980s. It will then introduce new material to the 
analysis. A close scrutiny of social democratic governments over twenty-five 
years shows that, while increasingly endorsing the new hard-currency 
macroeconomic regime and implementing market-friendly policy packages on 
welfare and labour issues, they have converged on the policy method of 
concertation, that is, the formal involvement of labour and business in socio­
economic steering. According to my data, from the early 1980s the social 
democratic governments have attempted to broker social pacts on welfare and 
labour issues increasingly over time. I interpret these data basing on Herbert 
Kitschelt’s (1994) model of political preference formation. I will argue that 
concertation is the political expedient social democrats adopted in order to solve 
their overlapping policy and electoral dilemmas. If labour is cohesive and not 
fragmented, negotiation with unions eases the task of reaching distributive 
compromises between different portions of the social democratic electorate.
The second half of this chapter will place these conclusions alongside 
the incentives and institutional constraints faced by trade unions, so as to bring 
together the two sides of my equation. I will use a game theoretical model to 
stylise a theory of the party/union relationship under low-inflation hard-currency 
regimes. The party/union relationship can be conceptualised as a special type of 
cooperation problem where (under perfect information) two equilibria are possible, 
contingent on the level of cohesiveness of organised labour. If labour is cohesive, 
i.e. adopting democratic decision-making rules to solve internal conflicts (see
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Chapter 3, section 4), the equilibrium of the game is cooperation. If, instead, 
labour is fragmented, defection will prevail, with parties proceeding in unilateral 
policy-making while unions underscore their political autonomy. The 
formalisation of the game will allow for greater theoretical insights and will 
particularly help to highlight the relative importance of intervening variables other 
than the cohesiveness of organised labour in the party/union interaction. These 
include union density, the extent of the party’s departure from the traditional 
social democratic economic policies, and the overall decomposition of the labour 
market.
The game theoretical model concludes the large-N section of this thesis, 
and concludes the construction of my theory. The next chapter will focus instead 
on analysis at the country level in order to test the theory against “thick” evidence. 
This will allow me to identify and highlight the causal links between the trade 
unions’ organisational structure, the policy process designed to implement the 
new social democratic strategy, and the different policy outcomes caused by 
sustained party/union alliances and mutual defections.
4.1 The New Social Democratic Political Economic Strategy 
and the New Relationship with Organised Labour
In Chapter 1, I put forward what I called two analytically distinct 
foundations to conceptualise the relationship between social democratic parties 
and organised labour pre-1980. (1) From a political economic viewpoint, wage 
restraints were the necessary complement to the social democratic strategy that 
aimed to enlarge the role of the state in the economy. Wage restraint would 
prevent spiralling inflation and, at the same time, itself represented a reform of 
capitalism insofar as it limited the increased power of labour in the context of full
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employment combined with collective bargaining (Glyn 1998: 3). (2) From an 
electoral perspective, the industrial working class constituted the bulk of the social 
democratic membership and electorate, and was organised in the workplace by 
trade unions (Przeworski and Sprague 1986).
This set of incentives for a close relationship with organised labour 
changed quite rapidly with the increasing internationalisation of the economy and 
the declining salience of class politics. I will now review the main traits o f the 
“new” social democratic political economy, and how it has been developing in 
Europe since the 1980s, i.e. under a different set of economic and electoral 
constraints. This will allow me to understand if, and if so how, their changed set 
of incentives translated into a uniform approach to trade unions.
The Social Democratic Convergence
Between 1980 and 2000, social democratic and socialist parties across 
European countries experienced a remarkable process of political and ideological 
convergence (Sassoon 1997; Glyn 1998; Przeworski 2001). At different times in 
different countries (see section 1.1), social democratic parties abandoned the set of 
demand-side policies that had characterised their “Golden Age”38 and gradually 
endorsed inflation as their first policy target, thus sacrificing other priorities like 
full employment, the expansion of welfare state, and the power struggle of labour 
over capital (Sassoon 1999: 29; Glyn 2001a).
Most of the literature underlines that the acceptance of economic 
orthodoxy was largely the result of a new set of political economic constraints that 
had begun to emerge in the mid 1970s. International capital flows increased 
rapidly, prompted by liberalisations, and the Bundesbank led a process aimed at
38 The period between the end o f WWII and the mid 1970s.
132
imposing a new hard-currency monetary regime over Western countries. Under 
the quasi-fixed exchange regime that took the place of the Gold Standard, 
comparatively higher inflation rates led to high imbalances in the balance of 
payments, higher interest rates (often followed by speculative attacks on the 
national currency, see: Favier and Martin-Roland 1990: 513), and reduced 
international competitiveness. Under these conditions, social democratic 
governments endorsed inflation as the primary target of economic policy, 
allowing unemployment to rise and granting independency to central banks 
(Notermans 2000: 160-122).
“As capital markets became internationalized and the international level 
o f interest rates was raised, the terms o f trade between capital, labor, and 
government shifted in favour o f the capital side. For that reason any 
attempt to maintain or restore full employment in the private sector in the 
early 1980s had to be paid for by a massive redistribution in favour o f  
capital incomes.” (Scharpf 1991: 248)
Room for manoeuvre in national politics was increasingly curtailed by a 
number of other political economic constraints, which included: (1) the 
establishment of the Maastricht criteria for entry into the European Monetary 
Union (Notermans 2001); (2) an endogenous financial crisis in national welfare 
systems, caused by rising unemployment and the ageing populations (Pierson 
2001); (3) the strong pressure arising from international institutions towards 
European governments to push them to deregulate the labour markets in order to 
reduce unemployment level. According to the conventional wisdom spread in the 
1980s and 1990s by neo-classical economics, European unemployment was the 
result of excessive labour market rigidity that was sustained and nurtured by
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powerful trade unions, which were therefore seen as detrimental to their own 
societies (OECD 1994; IMF 2001).
Against this background, social democrats were induced to change their 
economic strategies. Charles Boix (1998: 40-46) proposed a model for the “new” 
social democratic policy, under the assumption that the determinants of growth 
reside on the supply-side of the economy, which is consistent with the previous 
analysis. The basis of the new social democratic strategies was the belief that 
economic policy should not undermine market mechanisms, and that economic 
growth sustained by private initiative is the primary road to a reduction in 
unemployment.
Based on these assumptions, Boix identifies a trade-off between 
unemployment and inequality that socialists have to face once in office: 
everything else being equal, the lower the unemployment, the higher the level of 
inequality. Therefore, the social democratic strategy will be focused on public 
investment in active labour market policies and training measures. These will 
reduce the stringency of the trade-off because higher qualifications (on average) 
will result in lower income inequality. Additionally, these measures will improve 
employment performances. Low unemployment will allow socialists to keep 
unemployment benefits at a relatively high level, again with favourable effects on 
overall inequality.39
Organised labour has no role in this model. Once pivotal to the social 
democratic economic strategy, trade unions have vanished from the picture. 
Indeed, this new political economic stance does not need voluntary wage 
restraints, just a strong electoral majority (Boix 1998: 35).
39 Conservative governments will instead rely on market mechanisms to maximise savings and 
investment rates, thus reducing unemployment through economic growth. Increased inequality is 
assumed not to worry conservative politicians too much (Boix 1998: 46-49).
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Major cross-country reviews of social democratic policies since the 
1980s support Boix’s analysis. The European economic context of the 1980s and 
1990s was not favourable for social democratic governments. Productivity was 
slowing down and growth was stagnant. These conditions could not sustain 
further expansions of the welfare state or more redistribution. Beginning with the 
U-turn of French socialists, who in 1981 abandoned their original program of 
pursuing “Keynesianism in one country”, all socialists ended up abandoning 
nationalisation initiatives or other plans to control private firms, and began to 
allow unemployment to rise in order to control heated wage dynamics (Hall 1987; 
Ross 1987; Glyn 1998: 2).
Social democratic parties endorsed the hard-currency macroeconomic 
regime that was being imposed by independent central banks across the continent, 
and, in the words of an historian, this was only the most apparent shift within the 
“most dramatic programmatic reappraisal in the entire history of the [socialist] 
movement” (Sassoon 1997: 692). From a political economy perspective, “[t]he 
long-term historical evolution of ‘social democracy’ proceeded from revolution to 
reformism to remedialism” (Przeworski 2001: 316).40 Przeworski’s analysis 
underlines that the social democratic struggle to reform capitalism was gradually 
abandoned, leading socialist governors in the 1980s and 1990s to embrace 
mainstream neo-liberal convictions on the social virtues of the free market. As a 
consequence, they downplayed policies geared to promote equality as mere 
“remedies” against the worse forms of social imbalances resulting by the action of 
market forces.
40 The author bitterly concludes: “The question remains is whether it will end in 
resignation.”(idem).
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Indeed, social democrats did not further expand the welfare state, often 
implementing outright retrenchment. The extent of labour market liberalisations 
and of actual retrenchment carried out by socialists depended, country by country, 
on a number of factors including: (1) the state of public finances; (2) the trade 
unions’ policies; and (3) the policy framework within which the social democrats 
found themselves in power. From the 1980s onwards, however, there were no 
major deviations from the main policy course: social democrats embarked on 
comprehensive liberalisations in the product market, the service sector, and the 
labour market, unless these had already been completed by previous, conservative, 
governments. In this latter case, social democrats did not reverse liberalising 
policies, but endorsed them as the basis on which to found their economic 
programs (Gamble and Wright 1999; Esping Andersen and Regini 2000; Glyn 
2001b).41
This new political economic context has been summarised into a class- 
based theory of de-linkage between organised labour and electoral socialism 
(Howell 2001; Piazza 2001). The new social democratic political economy, 
focused on price stability and market liberalisation, afforded little space for trade 
unions to play a role in economic management. The end of class politics is 
therefore linked to the choice made by social democratic parties to accept the new 
set of economic constraints. This choice increased their social distance from 
unions’ membership, which in turn further reinforced the apparent de-linkage 
between the two bodies.
However, this “de-linking” theory contrasts with two sets of empirical 
findings including scholarly work on the effect of partisanship on economic
41 An exception is the rather episodic example o f  the legally enforced reduction o f  weekly working 
hours to 35 imposed by the socialist government in France in 1998 (Cette 2000).
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outcomes, and my own set of data on the policy results of party/union interactions 
(Figure 4.1). Indeed, in spite of the acceptance of economic orthodoxy, substantial 
differences remain between social democratic economic policy and the 
conservative one, including different socio-economic consequences. Empirical 
evidence shows that social democratic parties still base their policies on public 
spending to a much greater degree than their conservatives counterparts (Cusack 
1997; 2001).42 In turn, under certain institutional settings, social democratic 
policies can still create favourable economic outcomes and a more equitable 
income distribution, compared with conservative policies (Garrett 1998; Iversen 
1999). In other words, these analyses maintain the possibility that unions might 
play a role in the definition of the “new” social democratic policies, even though 
the role might be very different if compared to earlier decades. In fact, trade union 
membership should still prefer the social democratic policy approach to the 
conservative one, especially under an overall neo-liberal macroeconomic 
framework.
The problem is that from the perspective of social democrats, political 
economic incentives for close relationships with trade unions seem to have ended. 
This leaves unexplained the fact that, during the 1980s and 1990s, social 
democrats pursued the majority of their socio-economic policies in open 
collaboration with their sister trade union confederations.
This puzzle is deepened by the fact that, from an electoral perspective, 
contemporary social democrats seemed to have an actual disincentive to further 
their relationship with organised labour. The next section will review these
42 However, the magnitude o f the socialist/conservative differentia] in spending levels is less in 
comparison with earlier decades, and social democratic public spending is now primarily oriented 
towards the supply-side o f the economy (i.e. the reinforcement o f human capital) rather than the 
demand-side (Boix 1998; Jayasuriya 2000).
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conclusions, and how they have been reached in the most comprehensive study of 
electoral socialism carried out in recent years.
The Electoral Scenario
In a nutshell, Herbert Kitschelt (1994) argues that, in the changed social 
scenario that emerged in the post-industrial economy, the social democrats’ fate 
lay in their ability to appeal new segments of the electorate that were more 
sensitive to libertarian post-materialistic issues, and more sensitive to the needs of 
an internationalised market economy. According to Kitschelt, internal party 
politics, including the formation of a strong and autonomous leadership, are 
crucial to the success of this policy drift. Social democrats needed to engage a 
flexible strategy, and be able to change policy programmes quickly in order to 
maximise votes vis-a-vis left-libcrtarian as well as conservative competitors. Only 
by doing this could social democrats achieve electoral majorities in the context 
that had developed since the 1980s.
Under this framework, social democratic parties needed to detach 
themselves from trade unions, in order to increase their room for manoeuvre. 
Indeed, “strong linkages to labour unions privilege traditionalists in the party 
leadership who are unwilling to take on either the challenge of market efficiency 
or the challenge of left-libertarian politics” (Kitschelt 1994: 225, emphasis in the 
text). Kitschelt’s conclusion is based on an empirical sample of nine European 
countries between 1973 and 1990, which he then raises to a normative status. 
Indeed, in his conclusions, he predicts that only parties able to detach from unions 
will gain office in Western democracies.
However, these conclusions are not compatible with my own dataset. 
Figure 4.1 shows that during the 1980s and 1990s, the majority of socio-economic
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policies were furthered by social democratic governments in collaboration with 
their sister trade union confederations. It is theoretically possible that socialists do 
not learn from past mistakes, and that party/union agreements were consistently 
followed by electoral defeats. It is however highly implausible that parties 
repeatedly made, over twenty years, the same type of strategic error.
In summary, changes in the macroeconomic framework have curtailed 
the political economic incentives once held by social democrats to further their 
collaboration with trade unions. Similarly, changes in the social structure and in 
labour market composition seem actually to have produced a disincentive, on the 
party side, for a sustained alliance with labour. In order to reconcile the existing 
literature with my empirical observations I will now investigate my own data 
more closely.
Going Back to the Empirics: The Rise of Concertation
It is worth recalling that the index of the party/union alliance displayed 
in Figure 4.1 indicates the share of socio-economic policies that social democratic 
governments pursued with the formal or informal collaboration of their sister 
trade union confederations. “Collaboration” refers to a strong interaction in the 
policy-making phase that aims to further a policy upon which the trade unions 
openly agree. Socio-economic policies include macroeconomic policies, spending 
policies linked to various types of social insurance, and labour law and 
employment regulation policies (see Chapter 2 for the full discussion on the 
index).
Although it declined from the 1970s onwards, during the 1980s and 
1990s the number of party/union collaborations resulting in policy decisions 
remained very high: on average 72% of social democratic socio-economic policies
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were agreed with trade union confederations, with peaks as high as 81% in 1984 
_ and 1989 and 85% in 1996.43 In the previous chapter I argued that variations in 
the policy results of the party/union interactions can be attributable to differences 
in the cohesiveness of trade union confederations. Confederations organised along 
democratic rules are more likely to be willing to coordinate and negotiate with 
social democratic parties because they are less fragmented than non-democratic 
confederations. But why do parties want to coordinate with unions in the first 
place? Why do they not proceed with unilateral policy making?
In order to highlight trends in the party/union alliance, Figure 4.2
unpacks the party/union policy collaborations, differentiating between formal 
(white bars) and informal (dark grey bars) collaborations, which are conflated in 
the overall measure displayed in Figure 4.1. Interestingly, formal collaborations 
increase over time vis-a-vis informal collaborations. Between 1974 and 1978, 
62% of all the policies agreed together by socialist governments and trade union 
confederations included a formal agreement between the two bodies. Between 
1980 and 1989 this percentage increased to 75%, and in the period 1990-2003 it 
reached 84%.
This means that while the overall magnitude of the alliance was 
decreasing and the policy results were more volatile, the instances of sustained 
collaboration between the party and the unions increasingly assumed more formal 
characteristics, configuring examples of policy concertation.
Policy concertation indicates a process of co-determination of public 
policies in which labour, business, or both actors, are called to give their
individual inputs and then agree on the final result through a formal understanding.
43 These figures are not visible in Figure 4.1 because it displays three-year moving averages in 
order to highlight trends.
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This method affects the mechanics o f decision making because it requires the 
government to share its prerogatives with collective bodies o f the the political 
economy. Additionally, concertation has an impact on policy contents because the 
output simultaneously satisfies all o f the actors involved, irrespective o f whether 
they are in a weak or a strong bargaining position. If an actor agrees on the result, 
it can be inferred that it prefers that policy to no agreement at all (Compston 2002: 
32).
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Figure 4.2 -  Details on the Party/union Alliance in 15 European Countries.
This figure shows the share of informal versus formal party/union collaboration against 
the total collaboration in socio economic policy making. Five-year averages between 
1974 and 2003 are displayed.
The rise o f concertation in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s has been 
acknowledged by a growing stream o f the literature (Fajertag and Pochet 1997; 
Ebbinghaus and Hassel 1999; Fajertag and Pochet 2000; Baccaro 2003; Hassel 
2003b). In general terms, the so-called “social pacts” consisted “o f new market- 
conforming policy mixes” that tried to construct complex compromises between 
the needs o f the markets and the principles o f equity (Rhodes 2001: 166).
Party/Union Alliance in Detail
1974-1978 1979-1983 1984-1988 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003
I I Informal Collaborations ■ ■ ■  Formal Collaborations
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However, before examining this literature, in order to address the 
question of why social democrats might want to process policies through 
concertation, I need to differentiate between the policy-making phase and the 
policy results. In other words, I need to insulate in the analysis the moment that 
precedes the concertation process. In so doing, I can differentiate between the 
preferred strategy of the social democratic government and the actual outcome, on 
which a variety of factors impinge, first of all the trade unions’ attitudes.
This will be done in the next section, where I will investigate partisan 
approaches to concertation. I will show that concertation became the preferred 
policy method of social democratic governments for socio-economic steering, and 
will conclude by qualifying Kitschelt’s conclusions, based on his own model o f 
political preference formation. Only if unions are fragmented (hence, not 
democratic according to the conclusions reached in Chapter 3), will social 
democrats not pursue close relationships with them. I will show that if unions are 
instead cohesive, parties have strong electoral incentives to promote policy 
collaboration.
4.2 Explaining Concertation: Social Democratic Parties 
Addressing Their Dilemmas
In order to shed light on the attitude of social democratic governments 
towards organised labour in the policy-making process, I have designed an 
indicator of governments’ willingness to share their policy prerogatives with 
“social partners”, i.e. capital and labour. This indicator will record the method of 
processing socio-economic issues favoured by a government before the
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preferences of trade unions are taken into account.44 Consequently the indicator 
does not show how (or if) the policy was actually approved, but simply focuses on 
the initial intention of the government.
This indicator was created for the same three policy areas of reference of 
the party/union alliance (macroeconomic policy, welfare policy and labour policy 
-  see Chapter 2), as well as for the same 15 European countries and the same 
period (1974-2003). Similarly, the measures were based on information contained 
in the European Industrial Relations Review (all issues between 1974 and 2003). 
Scores of this index are displayed in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, after controlling for the 
partisan composition of the government.
An Index of Government Willingness to Concertation
For each country, year, and policy area, the willingness index takes a 
value of 1 when: (a) there is textual evidence that the government publicly invites 
the social partners to negotiate a national agreements to set wage increases, to 
design/reform social security policies or welfare state institutions, or to 
design/reform labour laws and employment regulations; or (b) the social partners 
are allowed to design or implement autonomously, i.e. via bipartite agreements, 
any of the aforementioned policies. In both cases, the government is effectively 
revealing its will to share its policy-making prerogatives with, or delegate them to, 
private organisations in the political economy (see Statistical Appendix for the 
complete codebook). If, instead, there is textual evidence that a government 
designs and/or implements policies without the formal involvement of social 
partners, and without having attempted a concerted reform, the willingness score
44 These variables were coded within a wider research project carried out in collaboration with the 
International Institute for Labour Studies, within the International Labour Collaboration. 
Preliminary results were presented in Baccaro and Simoni 2005b.
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is 0. It must be emphasised that this is distinct from the index of the party/union 
alliance in that, where a government could rely on the informal consensus of trade 
unions when designing policies and still receive a 0 score, since the emphasis here 
is on the formal involvement rather than informal influence.
I need to make two further clarifications before discussing this indicator.
(1) The indicator does not record whether or not the concertation attempt was 
successful. Many attempted negotiations (or attempted delegations) have failed. 
This indicator gives empirical evidence of the preferred attitude of governments 
towards social partners before the latter revealed their policy preferences in a 
negotiation game. (2) In the discussion that follows, macroeconomic policies 
(including income policies) are excluded from the analysis and from the measure 
of the index, which will instead focus on welfare and labour policies. There are 
two reasons for this.
First, there is a methodological issue relevant to the overall research 
question of this thesis. In the previous chapter, a measure of wage moderation was 
used to identify unions that are able (therefore potentially willing) to negotiate 
with social democratic governments in policy making. If I use a similar measure 
(i.e. willingness to pursue nationally-coordinated wage increases) as an indicator 
of social democratic willingness to coordinate with unions, it results in an 
empirical tautology. The second reason is linked to the meaning of concerted 
macroeconomic policies, which are essentially income policies that are nationally 
agreed via tripartite or bipartite agreements. However, David Soskice (1990) has 
demonstrated that nationwide wage coordination can be achieved through 
informal mechanisms embedded in national industrial relations systems.
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Therefore in a number of countries, such as Germany, concerted income policies 
might be totally redundant.
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Figure 4.3 -  Policy-making Approaches of Social Democratic G overnm ents.
The lines (three-year moving average measurement) show the share of attempts made 
to pursue concerted policies by social democratic governments on all socio-economic 
issues. The black line includes welfare policies and labour policies, and the dotted line 
also includes income policies.
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Figure 4.4 -  Policy-making Approaches of Non-Social Democratic G overnm ents.
The lines (three-year moving average measurement) show the share of attempts made 
to pursue concerted policies by non-social democratic governments, on all socio­
economic issues. The black line includes welfare and labour policies, while the dotted 
line also includes income policies. The peak recorded between 1998 and 2001 must be 
interpreted carefully as the country sample is very small in those years (3 or 4 
countries).
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Social Democratic Convergence on Concertation
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 plot three-year moving average measurements of my 
index, after controlling for the partisan composition of the government. Two main 
conclusions are reached: first, that social democratic governments progressively 
shifted towards concertation as their preferred method of processing socio­
economic policies during the 1980s and 1990s; second, that again during the 
1980s and 1990s, partisanship was a good predictor of governmental will to 
include social partners in the design of welfare and labour policies.
In 1976, social democratic governments were willing to further only 
approximately one third of welfare and labour policies through the formal 
involvement of social partners (the exact score is 0.36). This share increased over 
time, so that, in 1994, the centre-left governments in charge, being one-party 
governments as well as coalition governments attempted to address aft their policy 
concerns in welfare and labour matters with the formal involvement of business 
and labour.45
Similar conclusions cannot be reached for conservative cabinets. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, the share of concerted policies attempted by non-social 
democratic governments does not show much variation. Non-social democratic 
governments were willing to process welfare and labour policies through 
concertation in roughly half of cases, on average. This figure shows a peak 
towards the end of the 1990s, but this should be interpreted with care. This high 
score in average concertation attempts recorded by non-social democratic 
governments in the late 1990s is more of a statistical accident than a political 
phenomenon because the country sample is very limited. Indeed, the end of the
45 The 1994 peak does not transpire in Figure 4.3 because it displays three-year moving average 
measurements in order to highlight overall trends.
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1990s was an unprecedented period of electoral success for European social 
democrats. Between 1998 and 2001, only between three and four European 
countries were governed by non-social democratic governments. Among these 
were Norway and Ireland, where at the end of the 1990s the concertation system 
was deeply embedded in the political culture and in the industrial relations system 
(Dolvik and Stokke 1998; Gunnigle, McMahon and Fitzgerald 1999). Norway is 
part of the wider family of Nordic countries with traditionally concerted industrial 
relations, and in Ireland, a peak tripartite agreement has disciplined wage 
increases and determined the guidelines for macroeconomic management every 
three years since 1987, i.e. since the beginning of the economic boom.46
These data give an empirical explanation of why, given the different 
constraints faced by social democrats since the late 1970s, the party/union 
collaboration over policy-making did not collapse. The processes of 
industrialisation and globalisation had undermined the policy and electoral 
foundations of the traditional party/union alliance. In spite of this, and in spite o f a 
renewed set of electoral strategies and policy programmes, social democrats’ 
preferred policy-making method for socio-economic steering became policy 
concertation in the course of the 1980s and the 1990s. Informal policy 
collaborations with trade unions declined but, contrary to expectations, the social 
democrats promoted a more stringent type of collaboration.
This empirical finding twists slightly the question that was asked at the
beginning of this chapter. Party/union collaboration over policy making has
46 The concertation attempts by non-social democratic governments are lower, and not trendy, 
when compared to the social democratic ones. However they are not irrelevant, as include roughly 
half o f  them on a yearly base. This observation might confirm early theorisations on the resilience 
o f  concerted policy-making over time, suggesting that a differentiation between “non-corporatist” 
and “corporatist” countries, that is, countries where policies are more likely to be developed 
through tripartite agreements, could still hold (Lehmbruch 1979: 150). This is however a different 
research path from the one o f  this thesis, which focuses on social democratic politics.
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endured because social democrats have converged on concertation. However, how 
can this convergence be explained and interpreted?
Concertation: Why Social Democratic Governments Want It
In recent years, a new stream of literature, fuelled by the unexpected 
emergence of “social pacts” (a neologism, and in fact a synonym, of policy 
concertation) in the 1980s and 1990s, has been devoted to analysis of the 
phenomenon of concertation. It has addressed only indirectly the question of why 
governments want to involve social actors in their policy decisions (Fajertag and 
Pochet 1997; 2000; Hassel 2001; Rhodes 2001; Regini 2003).
This literature offers four main types of explanation of the phenomenon 
in question. (1) First, concertation can help governments to address problems that 
might otherwise be impossible to tackle. Under certain institutional settings, trade 
unions might be veto players and hold considerable clout over welfare or labour 
matters, in particular the reform of pension schemes, where budgets suffer the 
impact of ageing populations. (Bonoli 2001; Natali and Rhodes 2004). (2) Second, 
trade unions can provide governments with important information they embed on 
the most effective way to reform institutions of the labour market and the welfare 
state. Likewise, unions can effectively represent the preferences of those people 
who will be directly affected by the policies, particularly because the reforms 
implemented during the 1980s and 1990s included the retrenchment of the welfare 
state and flexibilisation of labour markets (Culpepper 2002). (3) Third, labour 
market liberalisations, widely implemented during the 1980s and 1990s, were 
advocated or imposed by a number of international organisations (OECD 1994; 
IMF 2001). These reforms affected crucial institutions of European societies and 
therefore posed a potential threat to the social fabric that had been built up since
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the end o f WWII. Through the systematic involvement of organised labour the 
government could attempt to find an acceptable compromise between the reasons 
of the market and the reasons of societal stability (Crouch 2000b; Regini 2003). (4) 
Fourth, the run up to the EMU pushed governments into establishing new wage- 
setting institutions through “social pacts” in order to “stabilize nominal exchange 
rates [...] and meet the core convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty” 
(Hancke and Rhodes 2004: 197).
The main problem with these explanations is that they do not offer a 
specific answer to the question of why social democrats intensified the 
involvement of trade unions in the policy-making process during the 1980s and 
1990s. They configure a set of reasons that could be applied to any government 
irrespective of its partisan composition. Instead, the social democratic 
convergence on concertation, which is clear from my data, requires a specific 
theoretical interpretation linked to the policy and electoral incentives o f European 
socialists. Given that Social democrats no longer have political economic reasons 
to nurture a close relationship with trade unions, in the next section I will suggest 
that the electoral field can suggest an understanding of their behaviour.
I will look at my data through the lens of Kitschelt’s spatial model of 
party competition. Interestingly, Kitschelt’s model of political preference 
formation will prove a powerful aid to reaching different conclusions on the 
party/union relationship than his own.
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The Social Democratic Dilemmas
- “The transformation o f capitalism since World War II, the rise o f  the 
Keynesian welfare state, together with the transformation o f  the economic 
structure that expanded the proportion o f  labor market participants who 
are highly educated, work with clients, and are female has shifted the 
main axis o f voter distribution from a simple alternative between socialist 
(left) and capitalist (right) to a more complex configuration opposing left- 
libertarian and right-authoritarian alternatives.” (Kitschelt 1994: 30-31)
This is, in a nutshell, the argument upon which Kitschelt builds his 
theory on the “new” social democratic dilemmas, as developed across European 
countries since the late 1970s. This argument leads him to conclude that social 
democrats need to detach themselves from unions if they are to win office.
Figure 4.5 gives a spatial representation of this theory. In the post-war 
decades, voters were distributed evenly across the socialist-capitalist (left-right) 
divide. Therefore, the most logical positioning of the party was around its median 
voter, on the centre-left side of the spectrum, while it kept neutral on issues linked 
to libertarian/authoritarian ideologies (the position SD1 in the graph).
Socio-economic changes altered the distribution of voters. This shift 
reflected the increased importance of market mechanisms in contemporary 
societies, and the different composition of the labour force. Kitschelt assumes that 
preference formation of individuals is linked to their type of occupation, and 
therefore the traditional class divide, between owners and non-owners, has lost 
salience. The new distribution of voters is skewed towards the market-side of the 
continuum, and tilted so that the less market-oriented voters are also more 
libertarian. As a consequence, if they want to obtain political majorities, the social 
democrats have to re-position themselves and move towards a new policy 
configuration that is increasingly liberal and market-oriented (SD2 or SD3). In
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doing so, “social democrats are confronted with the difficult task of combining 
coalitions among bits and pieces of the working class with various occupational 
segments o f the white collar constituencies” (Kitschelt 1994: 33). Therefore, 
according to Kitschelt’s conclusions, parties need to become detached from 
unions, so as to increase their strategic flexibility.
However, this conclusion rests on the assumption that unions are 
unwilling to endorse market-oriented programs or more liberal stances in general 
(Kitschelt 1994: 225). If, instead, this issue is left to empirical verification, the 
conclusion can change.
Kitschelt’s Conclusions Qualified
The starting point for a different course of analytical reasoning is the 
observation that the (potentially) unionised working class does not cluster evenly 
in the new voter distribution, but spreads depending on the occupational sector of 
activity. Public sector employees (PSE), sheltered from market forces, will be 
placed on the socialist-libertarian side. The traditional industrial working class (W) 
is instead likely to be placed somewhere in the third quadrant, because it supports 
the traditional welfare state while at the same time its social milieu does not bring 
it to endorse new libertarian issues. At the same time, the growing pool of highly 
educated workers in international competitive sectors (CS) is likely to support a 
reduction of the public sector, while endorsing a more liberal society.
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Figure 4.5 -  The Changed Distribution of Political Preferences in the 1980s and 1990s.
Source: Kitschelt (1994: 32)
The overlapping electoral and policy dilemmas of social democratic 
parties are therefore extremely clear. If social democrats simply abandon the 
traditional Keynesian welfare state while endorsing left-libertarian post- 
materialistic issues, they are likely to lose the vote o f the traditional worker (W), 
potentially to a populist authoritarian party. If, instead, they simply defend 
existing welfare structures, they might not capture the vote o f  modem and 
dynamic sectors (CS). Under these conditions, appeals to class politics tend to
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divide the working class, and they are no longer a feasible strategy for social 
democratic parties. They have instead to manage a variety of conflicting interests 
and to fine-tune their policies so as to maximise votes and the chance to gain 
executive office.
As Kitschelt emphasises, the exact distribution of voters changes 
country-by-country, and over time within individual countries: it is therefore 
reasonable to assume that social democrats do not know its precise shape. Under 
these conditions, policy collaboration with trade unions can be seen in a different 
light.
If (1) trade unions encompass a wide variety of sectors, including 
traditional workers in sheltered sectors, public sector workers, and workers 
belonging to the exposed service sectors; and if (2) the confederation is cohesive 
and able to discipline and solve distribution conflicts among its own members and 
affiliates; then the involvement of unions in the policy-making process helps 
social democrats to position themselves in the new political space.
Indeed, in many European countries, trade union confederations organise 
workers across different sectors. This is confirmed, indirectly, by a growing 
stream of the literature that analyses conflicts within organised labour between 
workers in sectors that are sheltered from or exposed to international competition 
(Crouch 1988; Garrett and Way 1999; Franzese 2001). If  conflicts can be solved 
within organised labour, the agreement of cohesive encompassing unions over the 
social democratic policy drift (towards either SD2 or SD3 in the figure) can 
increase the overall consensus mustered by the social democratic government: the 
policy shift will be geared so as to win the consensus of trade unions. This ensures 
that they will gain more votes overall than they lose from their traditional
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constituencies. Additionally, if  social democrats are able to negotiate their socio­
economic policies with trusted representatives of a variety of sectors, they will 
find strategy-setting much easier as at least a portion of the distributive 
compromise will have to be solved within trade unions, during the negotiating 
phase.
Therefore, if the trade union movement is cohesive, social democrats 
have a strong incentive to grant it some policy concession, so as to secure its 
endorsement of their economic policies. In turn, under an unfavourable overall 
scenario, trade unions will be given a chance to influence the policy outcome and 
minimize the negative consequences for their members, and themselves as 
organisations.
If instead unions are fragmented, policy concertation will not be a viable 
policy tool for social democrats. If the confederation cannot effectively and 
credibly represent all the affiliate unions and all the members, the negotiations 
will include a myriad of disconnected issues that must be discussed with each 
portion o f the labour movement. As a consequence, the policy concessions that 
the party would need to make to them in order to gain their compliance would be 
too high, bringing it to the scenario depicted by Kitschelt, i.e. the alienation of the 
non-union workers in the modem service sectors. Additionally, if the 
confederation has no means by which to solve internal distributive conflicts 
among members and affiliates, the negotiations in the concertation phase are 
likely to break down and trigger social unrest. Fragmented organised labour, 
therefore, encourages social democrats to detach themselves from unions and,to 
pursue their policies unilaterally.47
47 There could in theory be a case where trade unions stick to “old” Keynesian policies: in this case 
the socialists would need to detach from unions as well, since this would bring them to the
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Reverting to Old Allies During Difficult Times
Based on fresh empirical material, on the review of social democratic 
political economy, and applying existing theories of party competition, I have 
given an interpretation of the social democratic approach towards organised 
labour in the new context that developed after 1980.
Social democratic parties faced an overlapping electoral and policy 
dilemmas. They had to implement a “new” political economic strategy based on 
economic orthodoxy, on the virtues of private initiative, and centred on a low- 
inflation regime. Measures promoting employment and equality focussed on the 
improvement of social capital, i.e. on training measures and active labour-market 
policies. This strategy is market-oriented; it entails disengagement from 
traditional forms of the welfare state, and acceptance of new post-materialistic 
libertarian issues.
The new policies must be able to satisfy simultaneously a variety of 
different preferences. In fact, political preferences are linked to occupation type, 
and post-industrial labour composition is very diverse. Therefore, contemporary 
social democratic political economy has to rest on a sequence of distributional 
compromises on both materialistic and ideological issues.
In this scenario, social democrats have returned to their traditional ally, 
the trade union confederation, not because they share ultimate goals or purposes, 
but because cohesive trade unions can help social democrats to identify the best 
compromise; that is, the point at which the maximum number of votes could be
scenario depicted by Kitschelt: i.e. strategic paralysis, the disaffection o f  the market-oriented 
portion o f the electorate, and, eventually, electoral disaster. This seems indeed to have been the 
case in the early phase o f party/union interactions during the period under observation (roughly 
1980-2000). This case was characterised by the fact that unions had not internalised the new policy 
programs o f social democrats, and it will be analysed in the next section, as an instable 
configuration o f party/union interactions.
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gained through market-appealing liberal policies, while minimizing the loss from 
traditional working class constituencies.
Encompassing trade unions embed in their own body a number of the 
conflicts social democrats need to address when trying to build a supporting social 
coalition. The concertation process, including negotiations on distributive issues, 
shifts the process of conflict resolution from the policy arena to the trade union 
body itself. In the next section I will frame these conclusions within a game- 
theoretical model that will allow me to stylize and specify more transparently the 
different set of incentives, gains, and, therefore, preferences, of both sides of the 
party/union equation.
4.3 Two Equilibria for One Alliance: A Game-Theoretical 
Interpretation of the Party/Union Relationship Under Low-lnflation 
Regimes
At this point of the analysis I have all the pieces with which to put 
together a theoretical answer to the research question of this thesis, i.e. what is 
driving the party/union alliance in the 1980s and the 1990s? I will use a game- 
theoretical tool to bring together the conclusions reached in the previous chapters. 
First, I will describe the game tree in its extensive form, and then I will formalise 
the game in order to highlight the relative contribution of the different variables. I 
will show that when union cohesiveness is stalling, and the social democratic 
party has moved far away from its traditional set of socio-economic policies -  
which is consistent with events in most European countries -  party/union 
collaboration will happen only if labour is very cohesive. Additionally, given that 
in the previous chapter I have shown that cohesiveness depends on democracy and
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member concentration, these two are the key variables that can account for 
different patterns of party/union interactions.
In liberal democracies, elected governments can freely decide whether or 
not they wish to include trade unions (as any other collective actor) in the policy­
making process. As such, the game starts with a move by the social democratic 
party.
Actors’ Preferences and Assumption of Low-Inflation Regime
For the sake of simplicity, my modelling exercise refers to the 
interaction between a one-party social democratic government and a trade union 
confederation holding monopoly over workers’ representation. The key 
assumption of my game is that the macroeconomic framework is characterised by 
a hard-currency regime where low inflation is targeted by independent central 
banks, consistent with the situation of most Western European countries since the 
early 1980s.
Previous attempts to use game-theoretical modelling of party/union 
relations have based the structure of preferences of the two actors on the preferred 
political economic stance and its interaction with the preferred course of wage 
policies (Scharpf 1991; Boix 1998). In these previous analyses the combination of 
expansive (restrictive) policies with wage restraints (militancy) was key in 
determining whether socialists and unions would be able to co-operate. I argue 
instead that in the changed macroeconomic scenario, wage increases have lost 
salience in determining the party/union relationship, and .once they are taken out 
of the picture, the economic policy stance cannot explain party/union interactions 
by itself as, everything else being equal, both parties and unions prefer expansive 
policies to restrictive ones (Scharpf 1991; Boix 1998).
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Since the 1980s, monetary policy considerably restricted the room for 
manoeuvre of political actors, and also changed the preference structure of trade 
unions. Inflation is controlled by independent central bankers through a careful 
discipline of money supply (Notermans 2000). Under a low-inflation regime, both 
trade unions and social democratic parties prefer wage moderation to wage 
aggressiveness because inflationary wage increases are paid by an immediate rise 
in unemployment levels (Garrett 1998; Hemerijck and Schludi 2000; Hassel 
2003a). This does not mean, clearly, that unions are always able to exert wage 
restraint. However, this assumption finds indirect confirmation in trends in 
European labour costs: real unit labour costs in the EU15 decreased by 12.5% 
between 1980 and 2000, while they had increased by 3.4% between 1960 and 
1980 (European Commission 2004).48
Under this macroeconomic framework, as clarified earlier in Section 4.1, 
a social democratic government does not need the collaboration of trade unions to 
reach its preferred fiscal equilibrium. Therefore, the decisions of the party are 
solely dependent on its desire to remain in office. This assumption on party 
preferences is common in the game-theoretical literature analysing the behaviour 
of governments (see for example: Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999: 793). 
Conversely, the objective of the trade union leaders who interact with 
governmental officials is twofold, as it traditionally is in the analysis of organised 
labour. On the one hand, union leaders are motivated by the desire to improve the 
working and living conditions of their members, while on the other they want to 
increase the power of their organisation (which, in turn, will be instrumental in the 
first aim: Webb and Webb 1898; Pizzomo 1978; Rothstein 1992).
48 Series “Real Labour Costs, Total Economy”, countries “EU15 including Germany”, AMECO 
database o f the European Commission.
158
Structure o f the Game
Given my assumptions, I model the party/union relationship as a typical 
problem of cooperation: in doing so I follow the form of the previous examples 
(Scharpf 1991; Boix 1998). There are different types of cooperation game in 
issues of political economy: the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is perhaps the most 
famous one (Morrow 1994: 78-79). However, real world situations rarely satisfy 
the assumption of isolation that sustains the equilibrium in the PD. Most of the 
time actors interact, leam from this interaction, and construct their preference on 
the basis of the expected behaviour of the others: this clearly corresponds to the 
case I am concerned with (Sen 1977; 1985: 351; Ostrom 1998: 10-11; Biggs 2001: 
9).49 This game models party/union interaction for policy-making purposes. 
Indeed, parties and unions interact before and after governance periods, as well as 
repeatedly during governance periods. The relations between them generate an 
amount of information on each other, which generates trust, distrust, mutual 
expectations and ultimately will determine their relationship.
Against this backdrop, I model the party/union interaction over policy­
making as an iterated game in which both actors leam from the previous round. 
There is a finite, but large, number of periods (t = 0,1,..., n) during the tenure o f a 
social democratic government. The party starts by moving in the even-numbered 
periods, and the unions react in the odd-numbered period. In each even-numbered 
period (/ = 0 ,2, . . . ,« - l )  the party has to implement a policy in the field of socio­
economics, which includes fiscal policies, welfare (spending) policies, and labour
49 When the assumption o f  isolation is relaxed, problems o f cooperation take different forms, 
which include ‘Battle o f  the Sexes’ games, or ‘Assurance’ games in which different, or multiple 
equilibra can be reached, depending on the information shared by the players, the level o f  trust 
between them, or the expectation on the other’s behaviour. “If you play Always Defect, so will I; 
but if  you play [Cooperate], so will I” (Sen 1967; McLean 1986: 383).
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policies. The party cannot fail to start the game because the consensus it enjoys is 
a function of the policy it delivers, and the probability that it remains in office is 
directly correlated to the consensus it musters.
(1) In period t = 0, i.e. just after winning an election, the party 
has to decide whether to include trade unions in the formation of the 
policy, thereby starting a negotiation phase (i.e. cooperate), or not to 
include the trade unions in the formation of the policy, thereby proceeding 
unilaterally (i.e. defect). Therefore the unions’ participation in the game is 
contingent on the decision that the party takes. If the party decides to 
defect, the party would enact unilaterally (during t = 1) the policy it 
proposed in the electoral manifesto (pm). In this case, assuming that the 
electorate has voted the party into office on the basis of correct 
information about the manifesto, the party will keep its consensus steady: 
its utility gains, therefore, are nil (consensus is neither lost nor gained). In t 
= 2, when a new policy has to be initiated, the party will have to decide 
again whether to co-operate or defect.
(2) If in t = 0 the party decides to cooperate, the game moves to 
the next period, and the unions play. Given the new distribution of voters 
(analysed earlier in section 4.2) the party is willing to concede only small 
concessions to secure unions’ compliance and moderation, because 
otherwise it would lose many votes from non-union cohorts, and its 
balance of votes would be negative. If the concessions are enough for the 
unions to cooperate, the policy is implemented through the coordination of
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the two actors: if instead the unions defect, no policy is implemented. In 
theiirst case both actors achieve positive gains. The party enacts its policy 
with only marginal changes in the form of concessions for unions; plus, it 
gains the open consensus of a large mass organisation. The unions have 
retained their role in the labour market and the policy arena, and have 
additionally secured some policy concessions. If, instead, the unions defect, 
the negotiations break down and no policy is implemented. The party’s 
utility gains are negative, as no policy is implemented.50 The unions’ 
utility gains, conversely, are nil as no policy concession is secured, but 
they retain credibility in the workplace as uncompromising defenders of 
the interests of the workforce, thereby incurring no cost either.
(3) In t = 2 the party has to start another round, and it will 
decide its move according to the previous results. Before examining the 
second round, however, it is necessary to make explicit the factors upon 
which the game is determined.
On What Basis Do Party and Unions Decide?
The decision tree of this game is shown in Figure 4.6. How do parties 
and unions take their decisions? The best way to answer this question, as often 
happens in game-theoretical analysis, is by starting from the end of the game, i.e. 
from the decision taken by the unions.
50 The same negative utility is the consequence o f an excess o f concessions to unions if  they are 
not able to comply with small concessions. An excessive amount o f concession can be seen as a 
defection from the original policy manifesto, and the party would lose consensus from the 
electorate at large for failing to deliver the promised policy.
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Facing a choice between cooperation and non-cooperation, rational 
unions under perfect information should opt for the first route. In this case, indeed, 
payoffs are maximised, because even under an unfavourable macroeconomic 
scenario the unions can reap policy concessions and affirm their role in the policy 
arena. Additionally, at the bargaining table, union leaders are likely to seek 
concessions in terms of their statutory role in the labour market and welfare state 
management, so as to further entrench their relevance as organisations. However, 
given that the party is willing to concede only small payoffs, and that its overall 
economic stance prioritises inflation over unemployment, the unions must be able 
to fill a larger information gap between members and leadership than the one 
encountered under a Keynesian macroeconomic framework (I discussed this 
problem faced by unions at length in sections 3.1 and 3.4). In Chapter 3 I 
demonstrated that concentration of membership and confederation democracy (i.e. 
cutting across occupational sectors) are the key internal features that allow 
encompassing (i.e. organising workers across different sectors) union 
confederations to moderate their claims. However, if encompassment (as proxied 
by union density) is stalling or decreasing, the more the social democratic 
economic stances have departed from their traditional positions, the more 
cohesive the trade unions need to be if they want to be able to negotiate 
successfully with the government.
Consequently, only if unions are very cohesive (i.e. concentrated and 
democratic across occupational sectors) will they be able to cooperate with social 
democratic governments and achieve the maximum payoff. If, instead, they are 
fragmented, the negotiation phase will trigger distributional conflicts within them. 
Lacking democratic procedures, confederations will experience considerable
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policy drift at local level, the emergence o f competing unions (Regini 1984), and 
the ultimate failure o f co-operation with social democratic governments. The 
governments see this case as the worst possible outcome, as they lose consensus 
from unions and the electorate at large, for failing to implementing their electoral 
pledges.
The Social Democratic Government 
has to implement a policy  
in a socio-econom ic field
COOPERATES
The Govermment embarks on 
negotiations with the 
Trade Union Confederation
DEFECTS 
(Outcome A)
The Government implements the 
policy unilaterally.
A U(P) =  0; A U (U ) = 0
I
Unions COOPERATE 
(Outcome B)
Policy is approved through 
concertation.
AU(P) = 1; AU(U) =  1
Ik. J .
Unions DEFECT 
(Outcome C)
Unions defect from negotiations and 
no policy is implemented 
AU(P)= -1; AU(U)= 0
V________________________ Z
Figure 4.6 -  Decision Tree of Party/Union Interactions.
AU(P, U) represent the utility gains o f the party and the union respectively. In the case o f  party defection (A) 
utility gains for unions are marked as zero because this is the equilibrium in the dilemma faced by unions 
when confronting a defecting social democratic governments (see text and note number 51).
Moving up a level in the game, I can now examine the initial choice 
faced by the social democratic government. The party can pursue a risk-averse 
strategy and defect from cooperation. Defection entails it pursuing its own policy 
manifesto, and nil utility gains. It should be noted that, given the party has already 
won elections, if  utility gains are nil, ceteris paribus, it still enjoys a relative 
majority within society. However, if  the party believes that it faces an
163
encompassing and cohesive union confederation, it has an incentive to seek its 
point of maximum utility, thereby including the confederation in negotiations. If a 
policy is implemented and open consensus is obtained by a large body of 
organised labour, the government will improve overall consensus, and therefore 
overall utility (the theory behind this argument was discussed in section 4.2). Only 
cohesive unions, indeed, will comply to harsh compromises in which the party 
will concede only marginal changes to a policy program grounded on market 
efficiency and supply-side and means-tested welfare state measures. At this point 
I can analyse the second round of the iterated game.
(4) In t = 2 the game starts again on a new set of socio­
economic policies, and the party will adjust its strategy according to the 
first round. If negotiations were successful, it will be convinced even more 
strongly that unions are cohesive and it will continue to cooperate. If  
negotiations were unsuccessful, the government will instead defect from 
cooperation. If the government has already defected in t = 0, it cannot 
change its mind on the basis of the information it has gained during the 
game, because no game was really played. As a consequence, it is unlikely 
to change course of action (unless it became willing -  or needed -  to take 
the risk of union defection). As a consequence, the “party 
cooperation/union defection” situation (outcome C in the tree) is unstable, 
whereas outcome (A) and outcome (B) are the two equilibria of the game, 
which are reached when organised labour is fragmented or cohesive (i.e. 
concentrated and democratic) respectively.
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Preliminary Conclusions
Figure 4.7 shows the complete utility matrix of party/union interactions 
under a low-inflation regime. This is displayed for illustrative purposes as the 
equilibrium that is reached depends on the sequence of decisions displayed in 
Figure 4.6. The matrix structure is similar to the “Assurance Game” (Sen 1967), 
or the “Stag Hunt” game, a famous problem of interaction analysed by David 
Hume and J.J. Rousseau (Skyrms 2001). These games simplify the problems 
connected to the emergence of the “Social Contract”. The two actors would gain 
maximum utility from cooperation, but cooperation depends on the level of trust 
between them (Sen 1985; McLean 1986: 38; Biggs 2001). As proved by Brian 
Skyrms (2001), when the number of players is small, it is very hard to change the 
equilibrium from non-cooperative to cooperative. Indeed, if  the unions are kept 
out of the game by a decision taken by the government in t = 0, they have no way 
of proving themselves cohesive in the game, as they are out of the game.
The representation of the party/union interaction in a game format has 
helped to highlight a paradox inherent in the conclusions I reached, through 
analytical reasoning and empirical testing, in the previous sections of this study. 
The equilibrium of this game, which represents the fate of the party/union 
relationship, is dependent on the extent to which organised labour is 
encompassing and cohesive, i.e. the fate is dependent on only one of the two 
players. However, the party (i.e. the other player) will make the first move 
according to its own perception of the degree to which the union is encompassing 
and cohesive. The overall equilibrium is therefore dependent on the choice (utility 
function) of the player who does not “determine” the game. Indeed, in the 
changed macroeconomic framework that has developed since the late 1970s,
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unions no longer retain crucial influence over the macroeconomic equilibrium, as 
a low-inflation regime prevails across industrialised countries and inflation is 
determined through the discipline of money supply. As a consequence, if the 
unions are evicted from the policy arena in the first place, they are trapped in a 
defection equilibrium over which they have no influence.
Consider now how the unions can react in t = 1 (or any other odd- 
numbered t) if the government has defected in the first place (outcome A). In this 
case, the unions’ utility gains from the interaction with the government are nil, as 
no interaction occurs.51 If unions enjoy perfect information on the policy program, 
they will adjust to the party detachment by stressing their role within the labour 
market as independent actors in the political economy. Under these conditions, if 
unions are willing to affirm a wider role in the policy arena at national level, they 
have no alternative but to engage on non-economic issues and to embark on non- 
materialistic policy campaigns, such as anti-war campaigns, anti-racism 
campaigns, and so on. Under a low-inflation regime, when the unions are out of 
the policy-making game they have very few shots to fire in the economic 
management field. This contributes explaining why, during the 1990s, trade 
unions increased their role in social movements, affirming themselves as the main 
organisation of “civil society” (Hyman 2001).
I will now proceed to formalise this game, so as to highlight the relative 
importance of the factors shaping the equilibrium of the game, and the conditions 
that must be satisfied in order for the equilibrium to change.
51 In the case o f imperfect information, the unions might be negatively surprised by the policy 
course undertaken by the social democratic party, and might try to force government to collaborate 
through social mobilisation. However, the structure o f the game does not allow them any real clout 
over the party’s decision, and so the unions will pay the organisational costs associated with 
mobilisation without gaining any policy concession, and their utility gains will be negative. In this 
case, during the next turn the party is likely to repeat its decision and defect again. The unions will 
then have acquired sufficient information to adjust to detachment, i.e. to the outcome (A).
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Trade Union Confederation
g Cooperates
Eshi
>O
U
S  Defects
Preference Ordering SDG TUC
B. Policy through concertation 4 4
C. Failure o f  concertation 1 2
A2. Unilateral policy. Unions adjust. 2 2
A l. Unilateral policy. Unions protest. 2 1
Figure 4.7 -  Party/Union Relations In European Countries Since the 1980s.
Signs and zeros in the matrix indicate utility gains/losses/nil. In the preference ordering, 4 represents 
the most preferred course o f  events and 1 the least preferred course o f  event. Stars identify the two 
equilibria o f  the game.
Cooperates Defects
(protests)______ _______________
B(+, +)* C(-,0)
A 1(0, -) A2(0, 0)*
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4.4 The Formalisation of the Party/Union Game
The Party’s Utility Function
Let the total utility of the party be equal to the number of votes it wins, 
and v be the votes won by the social democratic party before the game starts, as a 
share of total votes. This is, by definition, the sum of a share of unionised workers 
(w) and a share of non-unionised workers (n).
v = v(w,n) = mv+(l -  a)n  (1)
where a is the unionisation rate, or union density, 0 < a  < 1
I assume that the number of votes that the party is able to capture from 
each of the two groups of voters is a function of the vector of policies (p ) 
supplied by the party, as in a classic supply/demand political model.
n = n(p)
W = w(p)
As a consequence, given that my game starts with the party just having 
gained office, the change in the number of votes for the party depends both on the 
policies actually implemented and the policy that each of the two groups expected
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from the party. LetPJ be the policies expected by unionised cohorts, and P„e the
policies expected by non-unionised cohorts.
To simplify the notation, I will now refer to the party policies as p, 
(0  c  p  < oo ), but it should be kept in mind throughout that I am referring to a set 
o f policies rather than a single policy. Increasing values of p  (i.e. moves towards 
the right) denote policy packages that unions dislike, such as welfare state 
retrenchment, flexibilisation of the labour market, etc. Decreasing values of p  (i.e. 
moves towards the left) instead represent policies that the unions appreciate, such 
as the defence of the welfare state, the increase of unions’ role in the management 
of welfare state institutions and the labour market, etc. I assume, consistently with 
theories laid down in the previous sections of this study, that policy preferences 
are formed in the workplace and that they can be unified across occupational 
sectors by cohesive trade unions through democratic decision-making. The non­
unionised workers will tend to like those sets of policies that the unions dislike, as 
they are more liberal both in the personal sphere and in their conception of the 
market by virtue of the type of occupations they have (see Section 4.2).
In other words, I assume a trade-off between the votes of unionised and 
non-unionised workers. However, this trade-off is dependent on a number of 
parameters including the unionisation rate (a) and the cohesiveness of the two 
groups of voters around their own preferred policy course. This latter is the last 
assumption of this formalisation of the side of the party, namely that the price the 
party must pay in terms of policies in order to win more consensus from the two 
groups of voters depends on their respective cohesiveness. Consider now the trade 
union confederation. If the latter is cohesive (because it is democratic and 
concentrated, see Chapter 3, Section 4), this means that it is able to adopt
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moderate stances, that unify its body of members around a given policy package. 
Under these conditions, in order to win a large portion of unions’ votes, small 
policy concessions are enough. If, instead, the union confederation is fragmented 
into a myriad o f different affiliate unions with no democratic rule cutting across 
them, the consensus of each union must be won individually, through subsequent 
sets of policy concessions. For reasons of symmetry, and consistently with the 
theories of political preference formation analysed earlier in section 4 .2 ,1 assume 
that when non-unionised workers are concentrated in fewer occupational 
segments they hold less dispersed policy preferences. As a consequence, small 
changes in policy stances have a strong impact on the votes the government can 
win or lose. If, instead, the structure of the labour market is very differentiated, 
policy preferences among individuals will be differentiated as well, and large 
policy shifts will be required to produce large swings in votes.
52These assumptions are formalised in the two derivatives:
With: 0 < N n,N w<\
521 am assuming here that votes (consensus) o f  the two different groups have a parabolic relation 
to policies, so that the derivative is o f  an odd order. This means that both the union preference for 
traditional welfare policies, hence state intervention in the economy, and the non-union cohorts’ 
preference for state disengagement, find a limit within the boundaries o f  liberal democracy, which 
implies that some room for preferences must be always granted. For example, if  a hypothetic ultra 
pro-union government progressively increases state intervention in the economy to the point where 
private property is endangered, the consensus o f  unions would start to decrease. Similarly, the non­
union consensus on liberal policies finds a limit at the privatisation o f  public goods such as the 
judiciary, police, and, perhaps, hospitals (see for an analogy Kitschelt 1994: 9-12).
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Where p  is the policy actually implemented by the government, p en and 
p ew the policies expected by non-unionised cohorts and unionised cohorts 
respectively, and Nn and A^are parameters of cohesiveness that range between 0
(total dispersion) and 1 (total cohesiveness). The two derivatives have opposite 
signs to account for the trade-off between gaining union versus non-union votes. 
Finally, I am using a third-order function to represent a context wherein the 
consensus o f the social groups is very sensitive to large differences between 
expected and implemented policies, and less sensitive to small differences 
between them. In other words, social groups tolerate some difference between 
electoral pledges and actual policies, but get very upset if  the actual policies are 
very different from the pledges.
The decision that the government officials must take depends directly on 
the first derivative of equation (1) as social democratic parties aim to remain in 
office, thus either preserving or increasing their consensus. The first derivative of 
the (1) represents precisely the variation in the total consensus:
Av = *  = 3v <fc+ 3v = ( _  } ^  _ .y  _  M j i p  -  p ' J  (2)
dp dn dp dw dp ’ "V Fn)
The Unions ’ Utility Function
Let me now switch to the unions’ side of the game. Before the game 
starts, i.e. immediately after the social democratic electoral victory, the unions 
have internalised a given expectation on the vector of socio-economics policies 
that the party will pursue P J . The utility unions attach to it depends on the
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policies incorporated in P J , including the level of transfers to union members, the
social security provisions, and the labour regulations including statutory roles of 
trade unions in the labour market.53 To simplify the notation, I convert the vector 
of policies PJ into the same integer p  I have used in the party equations.
U e =U e(pe)W W \£ W /
It is worth recalling that the overall utility of unions increases as p  
decreases, therefore, if p  is the policy that the government offers to the unions
during a negotiation phase, the unions should agree to cooperate with the 
government each time that p  < /?*. However, it is an established conclusion of
the literature that when the trade unions enter negotiations, information gaps are
likely to emerge between leaders and the rank-and-file, so that additional
institutional features are needed if the unions want to gain utility from policy
concessions and not end in internal distributive conflicts or, worse, see the
emergence of competing unions (Pizzomo 1978; Olson 1982). From the analysis
in Chapter 3 ,1 have established that encompassing union confederations need to
be cohesive in order to moderate their stances and abide to compromises, and that
democratic decision-making rules and a concentrated membership are the
53 The complete utility function o f trade unions is a complex equation that is dependent on at least 
four variables (as formalised by Mares 2006: 41), to which my analysis is in effect adding a fifth 
one. The first four are: the monetary stance o f the central bank ( /? ) ,  the real net wages ( tu ) ,  the 
transfers to union members ( r )  , and the social services available to members ( £ )  . I am adding to 
these the institutional role given to unions by force o f  political decisions (z) as this is known to be
positively correlated to union density (e.g. the management o f unemployment insurance as in the 
Ghent systems; see Rothstein 1992). In its simplest form, the unions’ utility function is therefore
U u = U u , whose analysis is beyond the scope o f this thesis. Therefore, when in
the text I make reference to the derivative o f total utility, it should be kept in mind that it is in fact 
a partial derivative, referring only to the change in utility that depends on the change in policies, 
all the rest being equal.
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institutional requisites for cohesiveness (see Section 3.4). This is formalised by 
the following derivative:
A^ » = ^ -= -k (p  -pi )  +a-tf„)(p-/>")] o)
in which (p - p ”) is  the gap between the compromise actually reached by union 
leaders with the government, and the ideal policy stance of the rank-and-file. p u
can be understood as representing policy stances closer to “old” Keynesian 
policies, including a high level of transfers, high social provisions, and a high 
level of protection from dismissals.54 When the trade union confederation is 
extremely cohesive (hence, democratic and with a concentrated membership), so 
thatA^ =1, its utility gains are equal to the policy concessions that it is able to
gain from negotiations. When instead the confederation is completely fragmented, 
the utility will be negative and completely correlated to the information gap 
between union leaders and rank-and-file, which increases as the policy manifesto 
of the social democratic party shifts towards the right. This can be shown more 
clearly through simple mathematical manipulations55, which turn equation (3) into 
the following expression:
541 assume that the p u parameter is not known by the Social Democratic party.
55 Consider only the argument within the parenthesis:
N w(p -  Pl )+  (1 -  n J p  - p ' ) = n w( p -  / , ; ) +  (1 -  Ar„)[(p -  p ’. ) -  (p- -  Pi )]= 
= N , ( p - p l ) + ( \ - N , ) { p - p l ) - ( \ - N „ ) { p ‘ -p'w)=
= N.( p - p l ) +( p - p l ) - NJ J > -p l)-Q -N« )(p '-p ’.)=
= (p - p : ) -Q -N „ ) ( p ‘ - p ‘. )
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^r=-[(p -.?:)] (4)
Where |p -  p ew| are the policy concessions gained by unions through 
negotiation, and |p u -  p ew| is the difference between the preferred policy stance of
union rank-and-file (“old” Keynesianism) and the policy that the unions expect 
from the social democratic government. In case the unions are expecting the
policy as expressed in the party’s policy manifesto, the expression |p u -  p m |
represents precisely the policy drift from traditional Keynesianism that social 
democratic parties across European countries have enacted (see Section 4.1).
Indeed, equations (4) and (2) can be simplified by setting the condition 
of perfect information over policies, so that the expectations of union cohorts, 
non-union cohorts and the party are the same, i.e. they coincide with the party’s 
electoral manifesto:
Then we have the variations in both the party’s votes and the union’s 
utility set, as follows:
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The Equilibrium of the Game
The equilibrium of the party/union game described in the previous 
section depends on the parameters of equations number (5) and number (6). Let 
me now analyse their implications by going back to the beginning of my game. 
The party has won an election and faces two options. Either it implements its 
policy program unilaterally ( p m) or it decides to cooperate with the unions. In 
this latter case, the party needs to secure some payoff (concessions) for the unions 
in return for their collaboration, so that p c < p m. Given equation (5), the party 
will implement p c only under the condition that:
Av > 0 => [(1 -  a)N n -  aNw\ < 0 => (l -  a)N n < aNw (7)
In other words, if the unionisation rate (a) is stalling, or decreasing, the 
party will have an incentive to cooperate with trade unions only if their 
cohesiveness (Nw) is high. Under this condition, even a small policy concession 
will translate into a high return of votes for social democrats, with a relatively 
small loss of votes from non-unionised cohorts (point p c] in Figure 4.8 -  in order
to simplify the illustration, the two graphs are constructed on the condition that 
half the workers are unionised, a  = 0.5, otherwise the scales of the y  axis would 
not be the same for w and n). If, on the contrary, both unionisation and 
cohesiveness are low, the party is likely to lose votes from involving unions in 
policy making (point p c2 in Figure 4.9).
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This latter case can be better understood through an analysis of the 
derivative of the union’s utility function, i.e. equation (6). The unions will have an 
incentive to conclude negotiations with the government under the condition that:
(p - p " ) < ( \ - N J i p ' - p m) (8)
Keeping in mind that smaller values ofp  (i.e. moves towards the left) are 
by definition preferred by unions, this condition is satisfied the closer the’party 
manifesto is to “old Keynesian policies,” the more cohesive the confederation is, 
and the larger the policy concessions are. In Section 4.1 I reviewed that social 
democratic parties under low-inflation regimes have reappraised their policies, 
and abandoned Keynesianism. For the sake of this game, therefore, we can 
hypothesise that |p u -  p m | is quite large, rendering condition (8) rather difficult to
achieve.56 Therefore, in order for unions to have positive utility gains, either they 
need to be very concentrated, i.e. Nw close to 1, or they need to gain large policy
concessions, i.e. |/? -  p m| must be large. This explains why, given the trade-off
between union votes and non-union votes, the party will only include cohesive 
unions in negotiations. Otherwise, in fact, they would need to push policy 
concessions too far towards the left to win their consensus, and this would result 
in a net vote loss (point p C2 in Figure 4.9).
56 Consider that higher values ofp  are not preferred by unions, and that therefore the equation (8) 
can be re-written as follows: \p — p m\ > (l — N w Jipu — p m\
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Hypothesise now that the party has decided not to cooperate, but to 
defect, as it believes that the trade union confederation is not sufficiently cohesive 
to participate. In this case, the party has two options. Either it simply enacts the 
policy manifesto and it stays in p m, therefore not trying to gain more votes through 
socio-economic policy-making, or it decides to move further to the right, so that
Pd > P  •
In this case, the condition to be satisfied is the opposite of the (7), 
namely that:
Av > 0 => [(l -  a)N n -  a N j\ > 0 => (l -  a)N n > aNw (9)
This is satisfied precisely when unionisation rates are low, and labour is 
fragmented (and party then moves to point p d2). Figures 4.8 and 4.9 illustrate
two different games and the party’s utility functions under the condition that half 
of the working population is unionised, a  = 0.5. In the upper graph the trade 
unions are cohesive, and so the best choice for the party is to move towards p ci. In 
the bottom graph, conversely, the trade unions are fragmented, and the party has 
an incentive to move towards p<i2 -
We can surely assume that the rate of unionisation a is known to party 
politicians, and so can consider it in the game as a given constant. Therefore, the 
equilibrium (cooperation or defection) in the party/union interaction depends 
primarily on the assessment the party makes regarding the level of cohesiveness 
of the unions. In fact, if  the party’s manifesto has moved significantly far from 
traditional Keynesianism, and given the trade off between union votes and non­
union votes, cohesiveness is key for unions’ compliance (equation (8)).
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In the previous chapter, I demonstrated through panel-data regression 
analysis that confederation democracy (<cd) and concentration of membership (co) 
are the key variables that that determine unions’ cohesiveness. We can make this 
link explicit in conditions (7), (8) and (9) by substituting the following:
Nw = Afid + Aco
Where fi0 + /?, =1 are two parameters that weight the relative
importance of democracy and member concentration against total union cohesion. 
Averaging the results obtained by my regression analysis (Table 3.3 in Chapter 3), 
the average values between 1974 and 2000 for my sample of 16 OECD countries 
are = 0.57 and /?, = 0.43 . This means that the level o f confederation
democracy is on average more important than member concentration in 
determining the overall cohesion of organised labour (the relation between 
democracy and cohesion is discussed extensively in Section 3.4). In turn, this 
means that confederation democracy is the most important component of Nw. As a 
consequence, the more democratic a confederation is, the more likely it is that the 
party will be willing to include it in negotiations around socio-economic policy 
making.
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Prt p m P<a
Figure 4.8 -  Party/Union Cooperation On Policy Making.
The graph represents a situation in which by giving concessions to unions, thereby moving away 
from its original manifesto towards pc), the party gains more votes than it loses. It is assumed that 
union density a  = 0.5, so as to highlight the importance of cohesiveness
Figure 4.9 -  Governmental Defection from Cooperation.
The graph represents a situation in which the party has an incentive to detach itself from unions 
and move towards the right of the political spectrum. By moving to pd2, the party will gain more 
votes from the non-union cohorts than it loses from marginal leftist unions It is assumed that union 
density a =  0.5, so as to highlight the importance of cohesiveness.
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Conclusions
This chapter concludes the part of this thesis devoted to the examination 
of the party/union alliance from a large-N perspective. Through the systematic 
scrutiny of social democratic governments between 1974 and 2003, I have 
discovered that while social democratic parties across Europe converged towards 
an endorsement o f the emerging low-inflation macroeconomic regime, they also 
converged on concertation as a policy-making method. In other words, the social 
democratic parties increasingly sought to involve trade unions formally in socio­
economic policy-making. I have interpreted this phenomenon in the light of a 
theory of political preference formation (Kitschelt 1994). In fact, under a low- 
inflation macroeconomic framework, social democrats no longer need the 
compliance of unions to keep inflation low, and therefore only their quest for 
consensus can explain their decision to seek cooperation with the unions. In other 
words, the party is the key actor in re-negotiating the alliance with trade unions, 
but the continuation or the end of the alliance depends on the cohesiveness or 
fragmentation of the trade unions. The game-theoretical model has clarified the 
mechanisms behind this apparent paradox.
The key assumption of the model is the existence of a low-inflation, 
hard-currency macroeconomic framework, guarded by independent central banks. 
Under this condition, the social democratic party does not need the compliance of 
trade unions to control inflation, and therefore its incentives to pursue policy 
collaboration with organised labour are electorally-driven. Indeed, social 
democrats can benefit from unions’ collaboration, since it helps them to solve 
their intertwined policy and electoral dilemmas. Social democrats must win new 
voters through libertarian and market-friendly measures if they are to win
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elections in the modem post-industrial society. However, by doing this they could 
lose the support of their original constituencies, still attached to the Keynesian 
welfare state and less inclined towards libertarian issues. The agreement of unions 
to the social democrats’ new set of policies can therefore be used as an indication 
of the policy stance with which the maximum number of votes can be gained 
through market-appealing reforms, while minimising the loss from traditional 
working class constituencies. In order for this collaboration to happen, however, 
the union movement must be cohesive enough to tolerate to a set of policies that 
do not necessarily represent the best choice for labour. In turn, the cohesiveness of 
the labour movement is dependent on the existence of democratic decision­
making mechanisms at the confederation level. These avoid both the collapse of 
negotiations during the policy-making phase, and the emergence of irresolvable 
conflicts within the union confederation itself.
The party and the unions will achieve different types of gain through 
collaboration. The party will reach distributive compromises between different 
portions of its electorate with the blessing of organised labour. However, in order 
to obtain these, the party needs to grant some concessions to trade unions. 
Assuming that increased demand-side policies, in terms of additional 
universalistic transfers, are ruled out of the political economic strategy, 
concessions must take the form of a softening of the liberalising policies, as well 
as policy concessions to the unions as organisations. From the unions’ perspective, 
given the unfavourable economic and political scenario they have faced since the 
late 1970s, these gains are the substantial reason for embarking on negotiations 
with socialist parties. In other words, internal democracy is a functional 
requirement for the cohesiveness of unions, and therefore also for their
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participation in negotiations. However, these substantial policy gains are the 
ultimate rationale .for their involvement, as has been highlighted by the 
formalisation of the utility functions.
There are four final conclusions that can be derived from the game- 
theoretical analysis. First, under perfect information, the equilibrium of the game 
is decided unilaterally by the party. If the unions are not cohesive, the party will 
defect, and the unions will have to adjust. If, instead, the unions are cohesive, the 
party will collaborate and so will the unions. This helps to explain why, over the 
last two decades trade unions have increasingly sought participation in social 
movements endorsing non-materialistic aims. Under low-inflation 
macroeconomic regimes, once they are out of the policy-making game, they no 
longer have the means to force party politicians into collaboration. For example, 
any retaliatory wage-militant behaviour would cause massive increases in 
unemployment levels, via institutional mechanisms exogenous to the party/union 
interaction. As a consequence unions that are evicted from the policy process will 
try to find a collective political role elsewhere, i.e. among social movements.
Second, the further a social democratic party’s manifesto moves towards 
the right, the harder it is for trade union leaders to gather consensus among their 
members on “social pacts”. This suggests that, for the sake of labour compliance, 
internal means of cohesiveness have become more important over time. In simple 
terms, when the policy outcome of party/union collaboration was very close to the 
preferred policy stance of rank-and-file (including higher welfare provisions, 
higher transfers, etc.), labour cohesiveness was less important for the satisfaction 
of condition (8), i.e. for unions’ compliance to compromises. When the social 
democratic parties started moving towards the right, the salience of cohesiveness
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increased, and, given that democracy and concentration are its key components 
(see. Chapter 3), this might suggest an explanation of the increase of democratic 
practices among trade unions over time (Baccaro 2003).
Third, and quite counter-intuitively, the more fragmented the non­
unionised workforce is, the more interested the party will be in pursuing policy 
collaboration with trade unions. Conditions number (3) and (4) in my 
formalisation show that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the dispersion of the policy 
stances of non-union cohorts (Nn) increases the likelihood that votes will be 
gained through policy concessions to unions. Once highlighted by the 
formalisation, this conclusion appears rather plausible. If non-unionised working 
cohorts do not cluster in different organised interest groups they will not have 
selective incentives to pursue their own collective goods, including their own 
preferred policies. It should be remembered that my whole argument rests on the 
assumption that individual policy preferences are linked to occupation sector and 
occupation type (Section 4.2).57 In a scenario characterised by an extreme 
differentiation of occupational sectors (which applies more to the non-union 
sector than to the unionised sectors) the trade unions remain the only mass 
organisations with a selective incentive to act collectively. As a consequence, 
policy concessions to the unions are unlikely to trigger strong reactions from the 
non-unionised workforce, even if this opposes such concessions. In turn, the party 
will be keener, ceteris paribus, to trade such concessions for increased union 
consensus.
57 The conditions under which non-unionised cohorts can increase or decrease their fragmentation 
are beyond the scope o f this work. However, it is possible to suggest that the de-structuring o f the 
service sector into a myriad o f  different occupational patterns and statuses has increased 
fragmentation. On the contrary, the emergence o f peak business associations, consumers 
associations, and other civil society groups concerned with the efficiency o f  markets and 
advocating libertarian issues reduces fragmentation, thereby reducing the likelihood that social 
democrats will coordinate their policies with trade unions.
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So far, the literature has focused on the negative impact that 
flexibilisation and labour market compositional change has had on trade union 
movements. The main contention of this rather large body of literature is that the 
reduction of places of mass-production, and the emergence of the very 
differentiated service sectors, have contributed to a decline in union membership 
and thus reduced the unions’ political clout (Femer and Hyman 1998; Ross and 
Martin 1999b; Crouch 2000b; Hyman 2001). This latter conclusion should be 
revaluated in the light of my analysis. Indeed, if the unions were able to retain 
good level of density and cohesiveness, the increased fragmentation of the non­
union workforce would have resulted in an increase of their political clout. This 
could contribute to explaining why social democrats increasingly prefer policy 
concertation, as observed earlier in this section (Section 4.2, Figure 4.3), as well 
as the unexpected emergence of “social pacts” in Europe at the end of the 1990s 
(when the process of labour market fragmentation in Europe was at an advanced 
stage (Crouch 1999)).
The fourth, and last, conclusion relates to the party’s strategy. Figures 
4.7 and 4.8 show that, under perfect information, the party has little incentive to 
stick to its original policy manifesto. The reality is clearly not as simple, as the 
graph represents in linear form vectors of policies (P) and of policy preferences 
(votes) (W and N). However, the model shows that if the party is not able to gain 
consensus through co-operation with the unions, it has an incentive to look for 
consensus among non-union cohorts. Given the iteration in the game, this means 
that defecting parties will experience a progressive shift towards the right side of 
the policy spectrum. Conversely, the collaborating party will give marginal 
concessions after marginal concessions to unions so as to cement further the union
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role in policy making. In other words, the difference between the policies adopted 
by parties defecting/collaborating with the unions should increase over time.
The consequences of sustained party/union alliances vis a vis terminated 
alliances will be dealt with in the next chapter, which will be devoted to testing 
this theory against “thicker” evidence. Two critical case studies will be analysed: 
the United Kingdom and Italy under the centre-left governments of the 1990s. 
This will allow me to identify the causal links between the trade unions’ 
organisational structure, the new political economic strategy of the social 
democratic party, and the policy process that is adopted to implement this strategy, 
i.e. sustained party/union alliance (Italy) and mutual defections (UK). 
Additionally, the two critical case studies will identify the policy consequences of 
collaborations and mutual defections, showing that cohesive unions are able to 
shelter their members from the negative impacts of market-friendly policies, and 
retain a key role in the labour market under globalisation.
Italy under the Olive-Tree coalition and the UK under New Labour 
cabinet provide two critical case studies for a number of reasons that I will outline 
at the beginning of the next chapter. In the final chapter, Chapter 6, I will 
highlight the theoretical implications of this study and suggest directions for 
further research.
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Chapter 5
Diverging Trajectories but Similar Endings? 
Concerted Policies in Italy, and the Unilateral 
‘Third Way’ in Britain
It was inevitable: the scent o f bitter almonds always reminded 
him o f  the fate o f  unrequited love.
Gabriel Garcia Marquez, L o v e  i n  t h e  T i m e  o f  C h o l e r a
The party/union relations that developed in Italy and in Britain in the 
1990s provide two critical tests for the theory I have constructed so far in this 
thesis, because of their opposite, and counterintuitive, trajectories. Post-war Italy 
was characterised by a heavily politicised industrial relations system. In the 
aftermath of WWII, tensions between the communist party, the socialist party and 
the Christian democrats resulted in the establishment of three distinct union 
confederations reflecting political alignments (Regalia and Regini 1998). Yet in 
the 1990s, after the communist ideology had lost most of its salience, trade unions 
participated systematically in socio-economic steering, by agreeing to discipline 
wage increases, and by striking numerous deals with centre-left politicians on 
labour and welfare issues (Baccaro 2003). On the contrary, the UK had been the
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cradle of the industrial revolution, of socialist thinking, and of the most 
paradigmatic case of party/union symbiosis developed since the late 19th century 
(Minkin 1992; Ebbinghaus 1995). Yet, froml997 onwards, relations between the 
New Labour government, led by Tony Blair, and the TUC (Trades Union 
Congress) became typical of party/union divorce (Crouch 2001; Howell 2001).
Through detailed accounts of these two divergent trajectories, this 
chapter will show that the fact that the labour movements in the two countries had 
very different levels of cohesion is key in explaining the different fates of 
party/union alliance. The Italian labour confederations adopted democratic means 
in order to unify under a shared policy platform. Voting procedures involving 
workers across different sectors were adopted systematically to endorse even the 
most divisive agreements signed by the union leadership. In this way, the (very 
wide) intra-confederation dissent was channelled within the confederations, and 
the minority groups ended up accepting the results of the referenda. This also 
reinforced the legitimacy of the confederation leadership and so the emerging 
militant unionism was tamed. The TUC, instead, was unable to follow a similar 
path. In the 1990s, the new TUC leadership attempted to craft a new 
confederation policy aimed at securing a wider role as “social partner”. These 
efforts, however, were constantly undermined by the different stances of large 
affiliated unions. The British union confederation remained a relatively loose 
umbrella organisation, with little ability to bind dissenting sectors to a confederal 
majority policy stance. Under these conditions, and given the strong decline of 
union density throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Labour party had little 
incentive to include unions in policy-making.
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These conclusions confirm the theoretical argument constructed so far in 
this thesis, and rest on a detailed reconstruction of the party/union relations in 
each of the two countries. I will frame the narrative in the relevant historical 
background, so as to approach events post-1980, and the details of party/union 
relationships in the late 1990s, in an informed manner. The main sources of 
evidence on the policy process include: secondary sources, newspaper articles, 
primary sources such as party manifestos, trade unions conference proceedings, 
and internal documents, and, to a lesser extent, interviews with key informants.58
Three reasons support my choice to carry out case studies at this stage of 
the project. First, this chapter provides two tests at the country level of the theory 
that I have constructed through Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4. Additionally, 
the cases of Italy and Britain are critical with regard to their position in the 
distribution of the dependent variable of this study, i.e. the party/union alliance as 
a share of policy results of their interaction during social democratic cabinets. 
Tests designed in this way are generally considered more robust. Second, detailed 
reconstruction of policy processes will highlight intervening variables, therefore 
framing my own explanation in a real context, rather than in an abstract game- 
theoretical model. Third, this method will allow me to highlight the differences 
between union and non-union policy platforms implemented by social democratic 
governments. What could unions gain from cooperation during the eminently 
deflationary period of the 1980s and 1990s? In order to answer to this question, in
58 There is a large amount o f informative material readily available to the researcher on these tw o . 
cases. Therefore, I considered intense interviewing somewhat redundant and not necessarily 
conducive to obtaining more objective information than that I could access otherwise. I therefore 
carried out interviews only to clarify particular junctions, single policy events, or details o f which I 
was particularly uncertain. Interviews were also used to confirm my overall interpretation 
(although this does not necessarily transpire from the text). The list o f interviees can be found in 
the Statistical Annex, conflated with the list o f interviees for the “Confederation Democracy” 
variable, (Section (d) in the Annex). Note that four intervees, party politicians, asked their name 
not to be disclosed.
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the last section of this chapter I will compare the policy results of party/union 
interaction in Italy with the (mainly) unilaterally-implemented socio-economic 
record of the Labour government in Britain in the late 1990s. I will show that the 
Italian unions essentially realised two gains through concertation. First, they were 
able to shelter their members from labour market liberalisation, while securing a 
role in the management of the flexibilised workforce. Second, they moved into a 
central place in centre-left politics, from which they might achieve further gains in 
the future. From the working class, or lower income, perspective, no overall 
difference is otherwise perceivable between the policies of the New Labour and 
those enacted by the Olive-Tree coalition.
Case Selection
The choice of Italy and the United Kingdom as the cases to be analysed 
is linked to the distribution of the dependent variable at the centre of this study, i.e. 
the party/union relationship as the share of socio-economic policies undertaken by 
social democratic governments in collaboration with trade union confederations 
(see Chapter 2 for a full discussion of the index).
This study is interested in identifying the factors that allowed (or did not 
allow) a sustained alliance between centre-left governments and trade unions 
during the 1980s and 1990s. As a consequence, while selecting case studies, I 
need to choose from events that occurred in this period. Additionally, I want to 
compare instances in which the alliance was sustained with cases in which it was 
not, so as to highlight differences. Third, in order to control for path-dependency, 
and in order to be able to highlight factors of discontinuity over continuity, I am 
interested in the cases that display the greatest share of change compared to the 
period before the 1980s.
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Following this logic, for each European country I have averaged the 
party/union alliance index in two sub-periods, 1974-1983 and 1984-2003, and 
then calculated the difference between them. The results, reported in Table 5.1., 
show that Italy and the United Kingdom are the countries where the party/union 
alliance has changed the most, although in opposite directions. Until 1983, when 
the socialist party held governmental positions in Italy, only around 25% of socio­
economic policies were undertaken through open collaboration with trade unions. 
In the period 1984-2003, this share rose to nearly 70%. In the UK the picture is 
reversed: until the early 1980s, Labour governments were ideal-typically social 
democratic, as unions were involved in every aspect of socio-economic steering. 
In the second sub-period, only 30% of policies were the product of party/union 
interactions under Labour governments.
Italy and the UK are two good tests for my theory for three additional 
reasons. First, in both countries the centre-left government came into power 
towards the end of the period under observation, rather than the beginning. This is 
important because one might consider that, by the end of the 1990s, the effects of 
de-industrialisation and globalisation had already been felt in the polities and 
economies of Europe. Additionally, background factors -  such as size, population, 
GDP per capita -  are very similar in the two countries, and therefore comparisons 
of the political-economic differences between the two are particularly instructive 
(as shown by the previous endeavours carried out by Regini 1984; and Crouch 
2000a). Finally, unlike most qualitative research designs, in which the choice of 
cases is somewhat arbitrary, here I am able to use quantitative measures of the 
dependent variable (party/union alliance as the share of policy results of their 
interaction) as guidelines in the process of case selection. Indeed, changes in the
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party/union alliance in Italy and the UK lie at the extreme poles of my distribution, 
and this increases the probability that the conclusions I reach can be extended and 
applied to other, less extreme, instances.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first analyses the Italian 
case, the second reconstructs the British case, and the third will offer comparative 
accounts of the policy results of the centre-left governments in the two countries 
in the late 1990s.
P / U  R e l a t i o n s h i p  
Y e a r l y  a v e r a g e  1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 3
P / U  R e l a t i o n s h i p  
Y e a r l y  a v e r a g e  1 9 8 4 - 2 0 0 3 D i f f e r e n c e
Italy 0.25 0.68 0.43
Ireland 0.30 0.61 0.31
Portugal 0.60 0.78 0.18
Greece 0.65 0.74 0.09
Netherlands 0.55 0.58 0.03
Denmark 0.61 0.64 0.03
Finland 0.92 0.95 0.03
Austria 1.00 0.98 -0.03
Belgium 1.00 0.80 -0.20
Norway 1.00 0.79 -0.21
Spain 0.60 0.37 -0.23
Sweden 1.00 0.74 -0.26
France 0.87 0.60 -0.27
Germany 0.63 0.30 -0.33
United Kingdom 1.00 0.30 -0.70
Table 5.1 -  Inter-Temporal Differences in the Party/Union Alliance.
The P/U relationship is measured as the share o f  socio-economic policies that 
social democratic governments undertake with the open collaboration o f trade 
unions (see Chapter 2 and Statistical Appendix for definition and sources).
5.1 The Rise of Democratic Corporatism in Italy59
In Italy, the involvement of trade unions in socio-economic steering 
started in 1992, in the midst of an unprecedented economic and political crisis, 
and it was welcomed with considerable surprise by international observers 
(Schmitter and Grote 1997). Indeed, the labour movement in Italy was known to
591 borrow this definition from Baccaro (2002).
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be insufficiently cohesive, from a political and organisational viewpoint, to 
sustain institutionalised “political exchange” (Regini 1984). This section offers a 
quick overview of the political and industrial relations setting of post-war Italy, 
and recalls - as the main example of failed party/union cooperation - the 
concertation attempt made by the socialist-led coalition government in the mid 
1980s. It will then move into an analysis of the 1990s, when the initiation and 
institutionalisation of concertation took place. Supported by the extensive use of 
democratic instruments of decision making by organised labour, concertation 
became the standard mode of processing socio-economic policy for centre-of-left 
coalition governments in Italy.
A Cold-War Polity
In the post-war decades, relations between the trade unions and the state 
in Italy reflected cleavages in the policy arena. The split found in other countries 
between a (predominantly) bourgeois party (or coalition) and a (predominantly) 
working-class party (or coalition) did not exist in Italy. There, the main split was 
instead the communist/anti-communist divide (Elia 1970). As a consequence, 
from the early 1960s, most governments were formed around cross-class 
coalitions including the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Socialist Party (PSI), 
while the Communist Party (PCI) was always in opposition. The relative sizes of 
the PCI (roughly a third of the electorate) and of the predominantly communist 
trade union confederation (CGIL, organising roughly half of unionised workers) 
were significant impediments to institutionalised “political exchange” between 
labour and the government.
Indeed, the communist/anti-communist divide was also reflected in the 
industrial relations milieu. In the aftermath of WWII, the labour movement split
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according to political affiliations. The CGIL was the largest union confederation: 
its decision-making bodies were composed o f a majority o f PCI members, and a 
minority o f PSI members. Conversely, the CISL was the confederation o f  
Christian unions and so was predominantly linked to the DC. The UIL was 
formed by socialists and left-leaning liberals belonging predominantly to the PSI 
(Figure 5.1 displays their relative size).
Links between parties and unions were not formal; that is to say that 
there was not, for example, automatic party membership for union members, as in 
Sweden, or statutory voting rights for unions in party decision-making, as in 
Britain. The links were nonetheless strong and operated through a considerable 
overlapping o f  membership, exchange o f personnel between organisations, and 
reciprocal support (Weitz 1975; Golden 1988).
_  4 o n n n
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Figure 5.1 -  Members of Trade Unions Confederations in Italy (1975-2003).
Source: Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (2002), CGIL, CISL, and UIL websites (data 
collected August 2006)
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The Failed Concertation Attempt in the 1980s
Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Italy’s inflation rates 
became its most serious socio-economic problem. In 1983, the first socialist-led 
coalition government was sworn in, and it attempted to involve labour in a 
program of voluntary wage restraint centred on an important cut in the automatic 
wage indexation. This was accompanied by compensation measures such as tax 
breaks, and additional transfers. The CGIL participated in the negotiation process, 
together with the CISL and the UIL, but at the very last moment the PCI decided 
to oppose the cuts and forced the leadership of CGIL to follow it: Mr Craxi, the 
socialist Prime Minster, made it clear that he would not cause a major rift in the 
labour movement by signing a separate agreement with CISL and UIL (Ginsborg 
2003: 111-113; Cianca 2004). As a consequence, the government enacted wage 
indexation cuts through a decree-law which was openly backed by the CISL, the 
UIL, and the socialist minority within the CGIL, while the majority of the CGIL 
and the PCI vehemently opposed it.60
The PCI contested the very legitimacy of the cuts. The logic of its 
argument contended that, given that the CGIL represented the majority of Italian 
workers, its opposition to the measure should have prevented the government 
from acting unilaterally. In line with this logic, the PCI promoted a popular 
referendum to repeal the decree-law. However, one year later, the referendum was 
defeated and the measure duly upheld (Baccaro, Carrieri and Damiano 2001: 47). 
This was the first major instance in which socio-economic reforms were 
eventually decided upon directly through democratic means. It would not be the 
last time that the results of democracy favoured moderate stances rather than
60 EIRR, No. 122 March 1984, page 4 and No. 126 July 1984, page 4.
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militant positions. However, these events proved that political cleavages were 
strong impediments to institutionalised “political exchange” between labour and 
government.
The Changing Political System
The scenario changed very rapidly when the communist/anti-communist 
divide lost its salience, and the Italian political system evolved towards a bi-polar 
system. The dissolution of the Communist party was key to this development, 
starting a period of profound change in the Italian political system (Ginsborg 2003: 
297-304). The PCI split into two separate parties. The larger one, first called PDS, 
then, from 1998, DS, positioned its policies within mainstream social democracy: 
it asked for, and was granted, affiliation to the Party of European Socialists, the 
European family of mainstream centre-left parties (Ladrech and Marliere 1999). 
The smaller party, which was called after the “re-founding of communism” (RC), 
took a more leftist stance.
As a consequence of this change, in 1990, the leader of CGIL -  who by 
tradition was the leader of the communist faction within -  dissolved the 
communist faction and became a member of the PDS. During the 1990 congress, 
he designed a union platform able to include both former communists and 
socialists, while a smaller militant group, including metalworkers unions, took a 
more leftist minority stance.61 The CGIL was no longer divided according to pre­
determined party affiliations; instead, a standard majority-minority logic on 
unions’ policies became the governing rule.
While the largest part of the Italian left was still re-organising, and 
undergoing a period of deep ideological and programmatic reappraisal, the most
61 In http://www.rassegna.it/2002/speciali/congresso-cgil/storia/1991.htm: last accessed July 2006.
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important governmental parties, including the DC and PSI, dissolved under the 
pressures of judicial investigations (Newell 2000: 61-65). Table 5.2 shows that 
after this period, the name (and most members) of the six most numerous party 
groups in the lower chamber of parliament were completely different.
1987-1992
Party Seats
1994-1996
Party Seats
DC 232 Northern League 117
PCI 177 AN 109
PSI 94 PDS 109
MSI 35 FI 99
PRI 21 RC 39
Greens 13 PPI 33
Table 5.2 -  The Six Largest Party Groups in the 
Italian Lower Chamber.
Camera dei Deputati, source: Newell 2000, Table 2.1 p. 
24 and Table 2.4 p. 40.
For the effect of a new electoral law, the parties tended to cluster around 
two competing coalitions: a centre-left coalition, built around the PDS-DS, and a 
centre-right coalition built around the personality of Berlusconi. In brief, the 
Italian political system evolved from a “consensus” model towards a 
“majoritarian” model (Lijphart 1984). Notably, the trade union leaderships, and 
various political groups holding links to confederal unions and aligned to the DC 
and the PSI all realigned within the centre-left coalition. Therefore, while the 
three union confederations and their factions were associated until the 1990s with 
parties that pursued different policy agendas, after that point they found 
themselves coupled with parties allied in the same coalition. The party/union links 
remained, for the most part, informal yet effective. However, open support for the 
centre-left coalition became the rule rather than the exception (Mascini 1994; 
1996a; 1996b).
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The Beginning of Concertation: Income Policies
While it dealt with the “revolution” of its political system, Italy also 
faced an economic crisis. Between 1992 andl993, the GDP contracted for the first 
time since 1975, consumption and investment decreased, outstanding public debt 
approached 110% of GDP, and at the end of 1992 speculative attacks motivated 
by the increase of real interest rates forced the lira out of the EMS. The currency 
crisis came close to threatening the liquidity position of the central bank. Debt 
default, however, was avoided through unprecedented austerity measures imposed 
in 1992 and 1993, which aimed to reduce borrowing requirements, and, therefore, 
interest payments (Signorini and Visco 2002: 78-87).
To the surprise of many observers (Schmitter and Grote 1997: 8-9), 
these austerity measures were sustained by two subsequent tripartite income 
agreements, signed by all the trade union confederations on the 30th of July 1992 
and the 23rd of July 1993. The first one included the complete abolishment of the 
wage indexation system and a one-year pay freeze, and was followed by a cut in 
the official interest rate by the central bank. The second one included new rules on 
anti-inflationary wage increases and a new system of wage bargaining. The 
second agreement was particularly relevant as it established the rules for wage 
setting for a long period thereafter (Regini 1999: 14-16).
According to most economic observers, and to the two prime ministers 
who brokered the two deals, these agreements were key to avoiding the collapse 
of the Italian economy (Scalfari 1994; Pedersini 1997; Regini 1997). They 
favoured the process of fiscal consolidation, and contributed significantly to 
inflation control. In doing so, they prevented the two subsequent devaluations of 
the currency (in 1992 and 1994-95) from becoming inflationary, thereby turning
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them into real devaluations (for an econometric estimate see: Fabiani et al. 1998). 
This was largely down to the 1993 agreement, which created a strongly 
coordinated decentralised system of wage setting, approximating complete 
centralisation while leaving some room for decentralised adjustments.62 Under its 
framework, social partners would bargain at national sector level, basing on the 
(govemmentally determined) expected rate o f inflation (Dell'Aringa and Lucifora 
2000: 59; Biagioli 2003: 116-117). Figure 5.2 displays a measure o f wage 
militancy, which took a clear downward trend after 1993.
- . 2 -
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
Figure 5.2 -  Wage Militancy in Italy 1974-2002.
The figure displays a measure of wage moderation suggested by Blanchard and co­
authors (2000; 2003). Under a number of non-restrictive assumptions this measure 
essentially weights actual wage increases against labour productivity increases, 
taking into consideration technological improvements and therefore discounting 
capital accumulation. The dashed line marks 1993, the year in which the most 
important income policy agreement was reached. Source: author’s calculation from 
AMECO database. See Statistical Appendix for details.
62 The rationale for having a two-tier bargaining system is rooted in the territorial differences that 
characterise the Italian economy (Dell’Aringa and Lucifora 2000).
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From a political perspective, the 1992 and 1993 agreements were signed 
when the traditional key actors in Italy, i.e. political parties (Scoppola 1997), were 
at their weakest point. “It is worth underlining the paradox whereby the labour 
unions [...] were called to collaborate with the governments precisely when 
political parties, under attack from many fronts, were indeed expelled from it” 
(Ginsborg, 1998: 520, my translation). Arguably, during 1992 and 1993, unions 
were able to co-ordinate with governments precisely because political parties had 
lost most of their salience, as well as their divisive influence on unions’ policies.
However, the two deals were not easily reached. The 1992 agreement 
was struck at the peak of the economic crisis, and the CGIL was reluctantly 
pushed to sign by the Prime Minister’s stated intention to resign if the negotiation 
failed: the trade unions did not want to bear the responsibility of another political 
crisis. The agreement met both with intra-union dissent in the CGIL and with 
grassroots protests. The militant faction within the CGIL denounced the 
agreement as illegitimate, on the same grounds of the PCI’s opposition to the 
1984 cut in wage indexation: it contended that it was not democratically 
determined. During the autumn of 1992, union confederation leaders were 
violently opposed by competing unions that were surging at the local level.
In the midst of what it appeared as a legitimacy crisis of traditional 
confederal unionism, CGIL, CISL and UIL signed the 1993 agreement. This, 
however, was to be endorsed by a binding referendum among all the workers. 
Along with the aforementioned clauses on wage and bargaining, the agreement 
included measures to secure that trade unions could check their responsiveness to 
workers. Indeed, the agreement provided that elective Work Councils 
(Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie) had to be established in all public and private
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workplaces. The legitimacy of confederal unionism could therefore be tested the 
hard way, i.e. by measuring consensus among workers through secret ballots 
(Baccaro, Carried and Damiano 2001).
Roughly 1.5 million workers participated in the referendum on the 1993 
agreement, which got an approval rate of 68 %. “The referendum proved to be a 
powerful legitimising device for the union confederal leadership. In fact, no 
grassroots uprising took place this time” (Baccaro, Carrieri and Damiano 2001: 
48). A de facto  divided labour movement was unified through democratic means. 
Even though 32 percent of workers, one in three, rejected the accord, this dissent 
was not expressed in open protests and the minority eventually accepted the will 
expressed by the majority.
The 1992 and 1993 governments were not typical “partisan” 
governments. Indeed, the intensity of the political crisis (more than 200 out of 
roughly 1000 MPs were under judicial investigation, see Ginsborg 1998: 525) had 
given increased leverage to the President of the Republic in the choice of 
Ministers. However, in both 1992 and 1993 key cabinet posts were held by 
socialists, including PM Giuliano Amato in 1992 and the Minister for Labour, 
Gino Giugni, in 1993. Indeed, the unions retained their role of “social partners”, 
established during 1992 and 1993, during all subsequent periods in which centre- 
left coalitions were in office, and it was gradually extended to include virtually 
every aspect of socio-economic policy-making.
This analysis of the beginning of concertation in Italy in the early 1990s 
has confirmed many conclusions reached with the analytical model presented in 
the previous chapter. The cohesiveness of organised labour proves to be a key 
factor leading to concertation. Until the early 1990s, when the communist/anti­
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communist divide still existed, political factors stood in the way of cohesion. 
However, once political impediments dissolved, additional institutional means to 
cohesiveness were still needed. As my model formalised, when socialist 
governors cease to implement labour-friendly policies, and instead seek for 
unions’ endorsement of eminently deflationist policies, additional institutional 
tools (i.e. democratic decision-making rules) are required in order to fill the 
information (or opinion) gap between union leaders and the rank-and-file. The 
first agreement in 1992 was adopted without democratic endorsement and the 
consequent emergence of competing unions threw the stability of the union 
leadership into question. The second agreement, in 1993, was instead endorsed by 
the majority of workers, meaning that the minority had to conform, and so 
cohesiveness was ensured. From the perspective of the government, the agreement 
of organised labour over the austerity package proved to be a powerful instrument 
of consensus, which helped to smooth the fiscal consolidation process.
Reforming the Pension System with the Unions
In 1994, the three Italian union confederations vehemently opposed a 
pension reform proposed by the centre-right government led by Berlusconi. The 
Italian pension system, in common with that of many European countries, had 
been in considerable financial distress sine the late 1980s An ageing population, 
and the predominance of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) type of benefit plan financed 
from payroll taxes, wherein pensions were computed according to final salary 
rather than actual capitalisation, combined to increase the drain of pensions on 
public coffers. The deadline set by the Maastricht agreements for the European 
single currency put further pressure on Italy to reform, if it was to enter the Euro 
with the first group. Compared with Austria, Germany, France and Sweden -
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which are traditionally considered to provide generous social insurances -  the 
Italian pension system was facing the highest problemrload, including the highest 
proportion of pension expenditures to GDP (Schludi 2001: 7).Virtually all 
political actors, including the governor of the Central Bank, most political parties, 
and economic commentators, agreed that there was a need reform, but all attempts 
up until this point had proved unsuccessful or ineffective (Ferrera and Gualmini 
1999).
The centre-right coalition won elections in 1994. The trade union 
confederations -  after having paid lip service to the principle of autonomy from 
party politics -  put forward candidates for public office on the electoral lists of 
many different parties, except for the centre-right ones (Mascini 1994). 
Unsurprisingly, once in office, Berlusconi attempted to reform the pension system 
unilaterally, sparking the strongest wave of protests since the Hot Autumn of 1969. 
The trade unions called a general strike, which was suspended when the 
government withdrew its proposals the day before it was due to begin. A few days 
later, the government resigned (Baccaro 2002b: 417). The general strike was 
decided upon during a private meeting between the general-secretary of the PDS, 
the editor of the party’s newspaper (a leading political figure), and the general 
secretaries of all the three union confederations. 63 The issue was clearly not 
confined to the realm of industrial disputes. Opposing the Berlusconi government 
was a highly political decision.
If the centre-right government could not reform pensions without the 
unions, who had claimed a role in the making of the reform, clearly nobody could. 
Indeed, given that union protests had been instrumental in the collapse of the
631 obtained this information through private conversations with party and union officials whose 
identity was asked to remain confidential.
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centre-right coalition, the centre-left could not afford but to seek union consensus 
to its policy program. Indeed, in. January 1995, a technocratic government 
supported by the previous centre-left opposition (including the former communist, 
now social democratic party, PDS) engaged in negotiations on pension reform 
with the unions and the main employers’ association.64
Employers withdrew from negotiations at an early stage, arguing that the 
proposed reform was not incisive enough. The unions and the government 
eventually agreed on a reformed pension system that contained several important 
innovations, including a “defined contribution” method for pension determination 
(in lieu of the previous “defined benefit” system) and the gradual phasing out of 
seniority pensions, which were among the primary causes of the financial troubles 
(Pierson and Myles 2001: 322-334). According to Pierson and Myles, who have 
conducted a cross-country analysis on the political economy of pension reforms, 
the Italian one was one of the most far-reaching in the long run in terms of 
expected savings for public finances (id. 326).
Indeed, the reform affected virtually all sectors, including the heavily 
unionised ones. As expected, it sparked protests among radical unions 
(particularly metalworkers’ unions) and leftist parties like the RC. The method 
used to ensure the viability of the accord was the same as in 1993: democratic 
voting. Confederal unions organised over 40,000 assemblies in all major 
industries to explain the content and the rationale of the accord. Unlike in 1993, 
the net losses for workers were very evident. The workers had to be persuaded 
that it was in their own interest to render the pension system financially 
sustainable, and that an overall reduction in entitlements was necessary to
64 Interviews with union officials and party politicians have revealed that the pension reform was 
not just negotiated, but co-written by officers o f the treasury and trade unions’ experts.
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reaching this objective. The referendum on the accord passed with 64% of the 4.4 
million participant voters in favour. When whole occupational sectors are 
considered, only metalworkers and university workers rejected the accord, but 
they eventually accepted the will of the majority (Baccaro and Locke 1996 18-24).
This second stage of the Italian case confirms my theoretical 
understanding of its mechanisms, and also the assumption on which my model is 
based. Concertation appears to be an eminently political phenomenon, and, more 
precisely, is the renegotiated version of the “political exchange” between the party 
(or centre-left coalition) and the trade union confederation(s). As I will show in 
Section 5.3, the pension reform undertaken by the centre-left majority was only 
minimally different from that proposed by the centre-right: the marginal 
differences between the two related to seniority pensions, which affected a 
minority of unionised workers. In other words, the main difference between the 
two reforms was the method.
Through their protests against the centre-right reform, and their 
compliance with the centre-left reform (to which they heavily contributed), the 
trade unions consolidated their role in the policy arena in general, and in the 
centre-left policy camp in particular. From the viewpoint of centre-left politicians, 
the protests were instrumental in bringing down the centre-right government, and 
their agreement was key to successfully implement a pension reform. To reach 
these aims the centre-left had only to secure minimal concessions to unions 
(which is consistent with my theoretical model) and gain their consensus for an 
outright retrenchment of the welfare state, which was one of the most far-reaching 
in Europe.
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The Olive-Tree Governments and the Flexibilisation of the Labour
Market
When in 1996 the centre-left Olive-Tree coalition eventually won a 
general election, it was clear to everyone that the trade unions would continue to 
play an active role in socio-economic steering. Concertazione with the social 
partners became enshrined as the key method of addressing all socio-economic 
issues (Santilli 1996). The 1993 agreement on income policy was confirmed in 
1996 and 1998 within broad wide-ranging tripartite understandings (Presidenza 
del Consiglio dei Ministri 1996; Trentini 1999). In 1997, the 1995 pension reform 
was amended through bipartite talks in order to strengthen savings and introduce 
anti-poverty measures. This time, the referendum among workers passed with a 
comfortable 84% majority (Baccaro 2002b: footnote no. 16). Additionally, the 
trade unions secured a statutory role in the managing of the newly introduced 
private pension schemes (Paparella 1997; see Table 5.2 for a chronology of 
concertazione during Olive-tree coalition governments).
The most important policy innovation, however, related to the fields of 
labour law and employment regulation. According to OECD metrics (OECD 1999, 
Table 2.5 p. 66) in the mid 1990s the Italian labour market incorporated the most 
rigid regulations after Turkey, Greece and Portugal. According to a very 
influential view, the high level of unemployment that Italy shared with other large 
European economies was indeed a consequence of such rigidities (OECD 1994; 
Siebert 1997; IMF 2001).65 Implicitly buying into this argument, the centre-left
65 For seemingly more robust econometric results contradicting this view see: Baccaro and Rei 
(2005) and Baker et al. (2005).
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government embarked on tripartite negotiations aimed at improving labour market 
flexibility.
In 1997 a major package of reforms was introduced and the Italian 
labour market changed significantly. New working schemes were introduced, and 
the cases in which they could be employed were subsequently enlarged. Agency 
work was introduced for the first time; procedures for employing part-time 
personnel were simplified; fixed-term contracts and apprenticeship contracts were 
made easier to adopt. In brief, the range of cheaper non-standard flexi-jobs, 
characterised by lower protections and fewer welfare entitlements, was sensibly 
increased alongside the “old” standard employment (Baccaro and Simoni 2004a). 
The labour market therefore included multiple layers of regulations, including 
flexible and non-flexible occupational regimes. The centre-left reforms, as such, 
are usually referred to as re-regulations rather than de-regulations (Lodovici 2000). 
Flexible workers were essentially the newly employed, while those already in 
occupation, that is, the entire body of unionised workers, were not affected by the 
reforms.66
The trade unions did not simply contribute to the design of the new rules,
but also secured for themselves a regulatory function with regard to the flexible
workforce. Legal provisions included norms giving to the social partners the role
to determine all the details not specified in the legal framework. These included,
for example, the quota of specific flexi-jobs that each industry could employ as a
proportion of total workers. The employers’ peak association, Confindustria,
openly contested these restrictive measures and continued to campaign for
outright labour market liberalisation, including the relaxation of employment
66 According to the main Italian institute for statistics, after the implementation o f  this reform more 
than half o f the new jobs took “atypical” forms, i.e. part-time contracts, fixed-term appointments, 
and so on (ISTAT 2002: 178).
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protection (EPL) in large industries. The staunch opposition of trade unions to any 
further liberalisation eventually pushed employers to endorse the centre-right 
coalition in the run-up to the 2001 elections (CESOS 2000; Confindustria 2001; 
Baccaro and Simoni 2004c).
Conclusions: The Party/Union Alliance Under Globalisation
The transformation of the Italian party system overlapped with the 
introduction of institutionalised concertation between centre-left governors and 
trade union confederations. A thorough evaluation of the policy results will be 
done in the third section of this chapter so as to offer a comparison with the case 
of the United Kingdom, which was characterised instead by the end of party/union 
cooperation. However, the analysis of the Italian case carried out in this section 
has largely confirmed my previous conclusions.
Cohesion of organised labour is the key factor that allows for policy 
collaboration between trade unions and centre-left governments in Italy. Until the 
early 1990s, cohesion was impeded by political divisions. However, the end of 
such divisions was not enough to sustain cooperation. In fact, given that the 
centre-left policies were based on low inflation and fiscal discipline, the trade 
unions needed to devise new strategies to prevent conflicting interests within 
labour from causing union fragmentation. As has already been observed by 
previous studies, democratic methods played a central role in this respect 
(Baccaro, Carrieri and Damiano 2001; Baccaro 2002a; 2003). Democratic rules 
unified labour around unappealing policy reforms, avoided policy drift at local 
level, and channelled dissent inside the boundaries o f existing union 
confederations.
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Figure 5.2 has shown that union membership in Italy did not decline in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Systematically collected data show that union density has 
only slightly decreased (Ebbinghaus 2003: 453). This means, according to my 
model, that centre-left politicians should retain an electoral incentive for 
coordination with unions each time the latter comply with their “new” set of 
economic policies with limited policy concessions. Thanks to democratic means 
of achieving labour cohesiveness, this is precisely what happened in Italy. If  one 
considers the whole period of concertation between 1992 and 2001, the main, if 
not the only, policy gain for unions was in labour policies. Unions were able to 
shelter their members from the deregulation of the labour market, and to shift the 
burden of deregulation onto the growing pool of non-unionised workers employed 
in the service sectors. This, again, suggests that as the labour market becomes 
increasingly fragmented, non-union voters have less and less capacity to influence 
governmental polices, even if their ideological preferences bring them to endorse 
centre-left parties.
Consistently with my previous analysis, the emergence and continuation 
of concertation in Italy between 1992 and 2001 is a distinctly partisan 
phenomenon that should be understood in political terms. Indeed, trade union 
officials at the negotiating tables in 1992-1993, 1995 and 1996-2001 were facing 
politicians elected in, or appointed by, centre-left coalitions dominated by the 
social democratic party. Before the massive political re-alignment that happened 
in Italy between 1992 and 1994, political divisions within the left and within the 
labour movement had proved any “political exchange” unworkable.
The next section will tell a very different story, characterised by the 
opposite trajectory of party/union relations. In the UK union density sharply
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decreased throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but the decline was not 
counterbalanced by an increased cohesiveness of the Trades Union Congress 
(TUC).
Date Issue
September 1996 Tripartite “Pact for Work”. Includes measures to promote 
employment, framework agreement on flexi-jobs, local 
development measures. Confirms the 1993 income policy 
agreement.
January 1997 Supplementary (private) pension schemes will be managed in 
a tripartite fashion.
March 1997 National bipartite agreement on workers representation in the 
public sector.
June 1997 Major concerted innovation in labour law introduces 
significant flexibilisation measures -  the so-called “Treu 
Package”.
September 1997 Agreement to reduce the deficit of the pension system through 
organisational means.
October 1997 Establishment of elective work council in the public sector.
November 1997 New bipartite agreement on pension reform. Increases savings 
from the 1995 agreements while introducing anti-poverty 
measures.
December 1997 Approved training measures as a follow-up of the “Pact for 
Work”.
April 1998 Tripartite agreement on child labour signed.
April 1998 Tripartite agreement on temporary agency work.
November 1998 National framework for vocational training approved: schemes 
will be managed by tripartite bodies.
December 1998 Tripartite agreement “Social Pact for Development and 
Employment”. Confirms the 1993 agreement on income 
policies and sets a number of policies to reduce labour costs, 
reduce taxes, and reform the vocational training system.
March 1999 Tripartite agreement to regulate strikes in public service 
sectors.
June 1999 Tripartite “Protocol of intent” to guarantee social peace during 
the Jubilee of year 2000.
December 1999 Social partners ask the government to extend agency 
temporary work through a joint agreement.
January 2000 New, concerted, regulation on part-time work aimed at 
increasing the number of part-timers.
Table 5.3 -  Chronology o f Concertazione during the Olive-Tree Coalition Governments.
Source: European Industrial Relations Observatory On-line, various issues.
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5.2 From Symbiosis to Divorce: the British Case in Detail
“We were promised fairness not favours by the government yet it seems 
that the employers still have the favours and employees have not had the 
faimess”(Morris 2003). This bitter statement made by the general secretary of the 
TGWU union gives a hint of the extent of the party/union “divorce” that occurred 
under the New Labour government in Britain in the late 1990s.67 Before 
embarking on an analysis of this recent development, this section will review the 
main traits of the party/union relations and the institutional frameworks on which 
they were crafted. The second part of this section reconstructs developments over 
the long Conservative rule of the 1980s and 1990s, and looks at how these led to 
the confrontational party/union relations of the late 1990s.
From the Myths of Early Industrialisms to the “Social Contract”
The relationship between the TUC and the Labour party was at its 
beginning as close as that between a parent and child. The founding meeting for 
an Independent Labour Party (ILP) was convened by a minority of TUC members 
in 1893 (Hyman 2001). Seven years later, the Labour Party was established by a 
number of TUC affiliates, and other socialist organisations such as the Fabian 
Society and the ILP (Minkin 1992: 3). The structure of the Labour party was a 
federal one, meaning that the different components, including the affiliated trade 
unions, exerted governing functions as organisations. From the 1918 constitution 
onwards, trade unions controlled over 90 % of the party’s annual conference, 
which, in turn, elected the National Executive Committee (NEC). The “block 
vote” was at the heart of party-union link. According to this procedure, each union
67 At the moment o f  writing, New Labour is still in government, but I will limit my analysis to the 
years up to 2003.
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appointed its own delegates to the party conference, and these were bound to vote 
in the same way, according to their union’s mandate. Therefore, even a slim 
majority within a large union would secure many votes to the conference. 
Through the use of the “block vote”, the party was de facto controlled by a 
combination of unions’ leadership and parliamentary elites. Indeed, the bigger 
unions (such as the transport workers’ union, engineers’ unions, or public sector 
unions) have often acted as “praetorians” of the party leadership, defending it 
against ambushes from internal political factions (Minkin 1992 379-361; Webb 
1999: 101-102; Ludlam and Taylor 2003: 731-732).
Given this governance structure, it is not surprising that post-war Labour 
cabinets were characterised by intense collaboration between government and 
unions in policy making. The Atlee governments between 1945 and 1951 enacted 
the ideal-typical “political exchange” whereby unions would negotiate voluntary 
wage restraints against increased welfare state provisions (Thorpe 2001: 104-124; 
Mares 2006: 175-179). As reviewed earlier in Section 1.1, post-war decades were 
characterised by the so-called Keynesian consensus, where state intervention in 
the economy was the preferred means by which to sustain full-employment. 
Britain was no exemption to this trend, and the Labour governments implemented 
their policy program in strict accordance with trade unions.
In the late 1970s, while Keynesian consensus was collapsing under the 
pressure of oil crises and stagflation, the Labour party won elections with a 
mandate centred on typical “political exchange” (Dale 2000b). According to 
virtually all observers and key informants I have interviewed, the years between 
1974 and 1979 years are key to an understanding of recent developments in the
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party/union relationship, because of the negative impact that failed party/union 
cooperation had on the party’s fortunes.
In 1973, while still in opposition, the Labour party signed a “Social 
Contract” with the TUC. This was a wide-ranging agreement which envisaged the 
imposition of price controls, a reduction in income taxes for the lower income 
cohorts, tapping of rents, and the provision of job subsidies in exchange for the 
union’s willingness to moderate wage increases (Pelling 1987: 291). A fair 
exchange between governmental policy and unions was certainly central to the 
Labour manifesto for the 1974 elections (Craig 1990: 190-1). Once Labour 
formed a new government in 1974, this “social contract” became the cornerstone 
of its efforts to reduce inflation. In 1974, trying to comply with this contract, the 
TUC recommended that wage claims should be limited to maintain purchasing 
power. In July 1975 and 1976, the TUC conference recommended that pay 
increases were limited to 6% and 5% per week respectively (Peden 1991: 203). In 
1978 the government attempted (unsuccessfully) to set up an agreement with the 
TUC for a 5% ceiling on wage increases (idem: 204). In February 1979, in the 
run-up to general elections, a new “Social Contract” was signed between the 
Labour party and the TUC to reiterate their intention to steer the economy and 
industrial relations in close partnership (EIRR 1979: 26-32).
However, the involvement of organised labour in macroeconomic 
steering did not lead to successful socio-economic performances. Wage drifts 
remained very high throughout the period, so that average wage increases were 
double or treble the agreed levels (Peden 1991: 204). Inflation was thus untamed, 
and unemployment started to rise. Wildcat strikes dominated industrial relations 
as workers attempted to regain the purchasing power lost though inflation, so that
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union actions increasingly caused social chaos. The authority of the TUC 
leadership over affiliate unions was extremely weak, so that each union crafted its 
own claiming policy, culminating in the “winter of discontent” wave of protest 
between 1978 and 1979 (Scharpf 1991: 83-88; Mares 2006: 202). Virtually every 
sector went on strike, and Britain was paralysed. In January 1979 the biggest one- 
day stoppage since the General Strike of 1926 took place, involving over one 
million local authority workers (Peden 1991: 205). At the end of Labour’s term, 
inflation rates still exceeded 8%, unemployment had more than doubled since 
1974, and over 2400 strikes occurred across the country during the last year of the 
government (European Commission 2004; International Labour Organisation 
2006). The dire social and economic situation led to the greatest political swing 
since 1945 and gave the Conservative party a comfortable majority, which was 
repeated in the subsequent four general elections.
A few conclusions follow from this account of UK party/union relations 
on the eve of change in the world economic consensus. The Labour party and the 
TUC were very close allies in the post-war decades. However, during the late 
1970s, the alliance failed to deliver the expected economic outcomes, and 
eventually met with electoral defeat. The economic recession did not ease the 
situation. However, under an unfavourable overall scenario, the trade union 
movement proved to be far from cohesive. As unofficial strikes became the norm 
rather than the exception between 1978 and 1979, individual trade unions seemed 
to pursue rent-seeking and their own interest, which they perceived to coincide 
with the net income of their members, rather than as connected to the whole of 
society (Clark 2001: 17). Militant unionism was inevitably blamed for the 1979
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electoral loss, and, in retrospect, this cost the labour movement dearly in terms of 
actual benefits for workers and unionists, and also in terms of political influence.
From the perspective of my model, the late 1970s can be seen as a 
situation in which the expectations of trade unions are far removed from the 
policies that the social democrats want to implement. Indeed, when the recession 
hit Britain, public finances and efforts to reduce inflation did not allow for the 
expansion of the welfare state or for a rise in the incomes of unionised workers. In 
the absence of a strong confederation authority, each union pursued its own 
agenda, thereby de-facto ending the “Social Contract” with the Labour party.
The Dark Era of Conservative Governments: 1979-1996
The Conservatives did not conceal their anti-union political program. 
Their electoral manifesto depicted the unions and their role in public policy as a 
threat to the constitutional order and to the prerogatives of Parliament, more than 
as a source of economic disaster (Dale 2000a: 266-70). The Conservatives’ policy 
program was thus tailored to curtail union power (Letwin 1992: 130-158). 
Margaret Thatcher pushed anti-union policies in an incremental manner, passing 
Employment Acts in 1980, 1982, and 1988. and the Trade Union Act in 1984. 
These laws limited the right to strike and to picket. They abolished closed shops 
and imposed additional burdens on unions, such as the obligation to call a ballot 
before a strike and also to vote before issuing political funds (Thorpe 2001: 200).
At the same time, the Conservatives embarked on a wide plan of 
liberalisation of public companies, which reduced the clout of public sector unions. 
Similarly, they severely limited increases in welfare spending, although they were 
not able to reverse the universalistic character of the health and welfare 
institutions (Schmidt 2000: 238-241). A tight control on money supply took the
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place of wage restraints as a means of tackling inflation, allowing unemployment 
to soar (Peden 1991: 214-215). In an effort to generate low-inflation expectations, 
and establish market-driven growth, money control and unilateral policy action 
took the place of collaboration with trade unions throughout the Conservative rule 
(Letwin 1992: 118-123; Mares 2006 206-212).
The effects of these policies on unionism were very profound. By 1995, 
fifteen years after Thatcher’s electoral victory, total union membership had almost 
halved, from 12.1 million to 6.8 million, while union density decreased by 20%, 
dwindling to a mere 33% of total workers (Golden, Lange and Wallerstein 2002).
Party/Union Relations in Opposition Times: Between Modernisation and Spin
During the three Thatcher terms the Labour party never managed to 
mount a serious challenge to the Tory predominance in the electorate. Subsequent 
Labour manifestoes for the 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992 elections show a gradual 
movement towards more centrist positions, the abandonment of traditional 
interventionist economic policies, and the endorsement of the new world 
economic regime, including a shift from Eurosceptic to Europhile political stances 
(Dale 2000b). Looking at the main development of party/union interactions, two 
major events can be seen to have characterised the period 1979-1992 because of 
their effect on subsequent developments: the post-electoral “constitutional revolt” 
and the 1984-1985 miners’ strike.
In the aftermath of electoral defeat, the left of the Labour party mounted 
a campaign to increase the level of democracy within the party. The key 
contention was linked to the allegedly excessive power held by the Parliamentary 
Labour Party (PLP) vis-a-vis the other components, i.e. the trade unions and the 
Labour Party territorial constituencies (CLP). Reflecting a view often shared by
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scholarly observers (for example: Pames 1956; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1995), it 
was believed that increased internal democracy would have increased the 
militancy of the party, re-aligning policy with the left. On this issue, “[t]here was 
no agreed and consistent drive among union leaders to secure a new constitutional 
settlement after 1979. [...] not a single resolution or amendment was submitted by 
the unions relating to [...] constitutional issues” (Minkin 1992: 196, emphasis in 
the text). In a special conference called to amend the rules governing the election 
of the party leader, major unions such as the GMWU (public sector) and the 
AUEW (engineers) aimed to preserve PLP predominance, even if they favoured 
some reform of the rules. Other unions, such as the NUM (miners), and left-wing 
organisations supported a greater role for unions and the CLP. At the end of this 
process a new electoral college for the party leader was approved. The leader had 
formerly been elected by the PLP, but after the reform the new college was split 
three ways: 40% consisted of union representatives, 30% was made up of CLP 
representatives, and the PLP formed the remaining 30%.
This debate on constitutional settings underscored the differences 
between the unions’ stances on internal party politics. Rather than being a unified 
body, organised labour clearly comprised many independent sector-specific 
organisations loosely grouped under the TUC framework. Each developed its own 
union policy and political orientation, which it pursued independently.
The miners’ strike was the most remarkable example of how this type of 
labour organisation spilled over into the industrial relations milieu. The miners’ 
strike lasted for almost one year between 1984 and 1985, and is remembered as 
one of the most dramatic post-war industrial disputes in Europe. Over 10 people 
died, and more than ten thousand were arrested during clashes between the police
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and picketing workers. Having started as a “normal” industrial dispute over 
massive dismissals, the protest quickly assumed the features of a political dispute 
between the left-leaning National Union of Miners (NUM) and the right-wing 
government. The former did not ballot the strike among workers, and its 
leadership was therefore accused of manipulating the will of workers for its own 
political aims. In retrospect, and in a comparative perspective, the most striking 
feature is that the leadership of workers on this occasion was completely in the 
hands of the NUM leadership, whereas the TUC leadership and party leadership 
had very little influence.
The Labout party leader, Neil Kinnock, was unable to take any stance 
whatsoever on the issue during the strike. He tried to distance the party from the 
violent events and suspended all relations with the NUM leadership. In retrospect, 
he regretted not having asked for a ballot among workers, and therefore leaving 
the initiative to the radical left leader of the NUM (Williams 2004).68 While the 
party’s reputation was damaged by its complete inability to deal with the issue, it 
was also losing touch with the left-wing sympathisers with the miners’ struggle 
(Thorpe 2001: 202-203). In 1985, after the strike had been defeated, Kinnock 
gave a speech to the party conference in which he strongly criticised the conduct 
of the dispute. By doing so he contributed to the image of a profoundly divided 
labour movement, and of a party still unable to muster its relations with core parts 
of its constituencies (Minkin 1992: 139).
The miners’ strike is a very effective example of an industrial dispute 
lead without a clear political objective, and in complete disconnection with a
68 Kinnock’s words about the NUM leader (Arthur Scargill) 20 years after these events are quite 
impressive. “Oh, I detest him (Scargill). 1 did then, I do now, and it’s mutual, [ ...]  He hates me as 
well. And I'd much prefer to have his savage hatred than even the merest hint o f  friendship from 
that man”(Williams 2004).
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nationwide strategy of organised labour. A similar event happened one year later, 
in 1986. The “Wapping dispute” was characterised by bitter confrontations over 
industrial restructuring caused by technological improvements in the printing 
industry. The trade unions were eventually defeated after refusing a compromise 
settlement. Interestingly, a few years before, the printers’ unions had refused a 
TUC plan devised by the young John Monks, which had aimed to ease the 
transition to the new technologies, and to prevent industrial disputes (Littleton 
1992; Taylor 2000: 261).
During the Tory governments, the trade unions proved to be far from 
cohesive both with regard to internal party politics and to their relations with the 
employers and the state. The Labour party leadership was indeed managing 
relations with many different unions, rather than one cohesive confederation. 
Scholarly observers underlined that the policy and organisational fragmentation of 
the TUC did not diminish during the Labour party’s time in opposition (Visser 
1988).
Preparing to Win With New Labour
After its defeat in the 1992 elections, the Labour party continued its 
movement towards policy reappraisal, i.e. the final abandonment of Keynesianism, 
and the embracement of a fully fledged policy program. This was eventually spun 
into the “Third Way”, or “New Labour”, rhetoric, i.e. a new comprehensive policy 
package, allegedly different both from the new right, and from the “old left” 
(Mandelson and Liddle 1996; Giddens 1998). While the Conservatives seemed to 
lose touch with the British populace, the process of the Labour party 
“modernisation” gained momentum.
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For its symbolic value, the most relevant policy change was the 
amendment of Clause 4. This was a section _of the LP constitution that included 
among the party’s aims the commitment “to secure for all the workers [...] the 
common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange”. It 
was a largely anachronistic clause that had never played a real role in the design 
of party policies. However it had represented for many years a source of identity 
for the party, and its umbilical relationship with socialism and unionism (Thorpe 
2001 137-138).
The resolution o f the Labour leadership group to change this clause to a 
more generic phrasing was motivated by two factors. On the one hand the new 
leadership wanted to demonstrate its command over the party’s agenda. Indeed, 
previous efforts to change the clause had failed miserably because of unions’ 
resistance. Additionally, the amendment of Clause 4 was a clear signal to the 
electorate of the fact that the Labour party would no longer be a hostage of 
militant unions (Blair 1997). The amendment was approved at a special party 
conference, where the 70% unions vote was split 55% to 45% in favour of change. 
The largest unions, including Unison (public sector) and the TGWU (transport), 
opposed the change. Again, internal decision-making mechanisms were key to 
determining this voting behaviour. The peak leadership of the TGWU did in fact 
support the reforms. Additionally, opinion polls among workers of both sectors 
showed that a majority supported the reforms. However, the voting behaviour of 
unions’ delegations to the party congress was determined by the union’s 
intermediate bodies. In summary, the absence of democratic means of decision 
making froze union factionalism within the party conference, in spite of a
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potential majority among members on a unified policy platform (Mcllroy 1998: 
551-552; Thorpe 2001:224).
Before the 1997 elections, other internal constitutional reforms were 
implemented to decrease the extent to which separate bodies such as trade unions 
and the CLP could affect the leadership control over the policy agenda. In 1995, 
the unions’ presence in the NEC was reduced to 50%. Interestingly, the motion 
was proposed by Dan Duffy of the TGWU and supported by all the unions. 
Unions’ sponsorship of individual MPs was abolished, and a motion was passed 
ruling that the Party’s manifesto had to be endorsed through a referendum of 
members, rather than approved by the NEC (Mcllroy 1998: 545; 553). 
Additionally, the NEC’s influence on policies was further reduced by the 
introduction of the National Policy Forum, whose functioning machinery 
prevented the chance of a single faction adding policy issues to the party’s agenda 
without the endorsement of the leadership (SCGN 1999; Webb 1999: 102-103).
The trade unions supported this measure, but major differenes between 
their policy stances remained despite all the efforts of the TUC’s new leadership 
to push the “New Unionism” agenda. In fact, in 1994, the TUC began a formal 
“relaunch”. A more modem policy program, geared towards “partnership” with 
employers in the workplace rather than industrial confrontation, was devised 
(Heery 1998; 2002). According to Robert Taylor, who was for a long time 
employment editor of the Financial Times, the modernisation drive of John 
Monks, TUC general secretary, was more substantial than that of Tony Blair 
(Taylor 2000).
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In order to reverse declining trends in membership, the TUC embarked 
on a_process of organisational and policy change that in some respects paralleled 
the one implemented by the Labour party. The General Secretary insisted that
“[t]he days when trade unions provided an adversarial opposition force are 
past in industry. We have to admit that one o f  the reasons for the UK’s
inadequate post-war economic record has been bad industrial relations and
trade unions must take some o f the blame” (reported by: Taylor 2000: 264).
These words closely resemble the very expressions used by Tony Blair 
to signify the distance between “Old” and “New” Labour’s approaches to
industrial relations (Taylor 1995). John Monks was the first TUC leader to
address the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), which he did a few months 
before the 1997 election, pledging cooperation between unions, business and 
governments to ensure macroeconomic stability, low inflation, low unemployment, 
competitiveness, more investment in education, technology and transport, and 
improvements in relations with the European Union. Monks argued that unions 
and business
“have a common interest - a common interest in the success o f our 
enterprises, in wealth creation and in a country whose products and 
services can compete with the best in the market places o f  the world 
and which can maintain a decent, courteous and cohesive society.” 
(reported by Wagstyl and Wightin 1996: 20).
From the viewpoint of the confederation structures, a renewed effort was 
made to improve TUC efficiency and to increase its outward projection: “less 
minutes, more press releases” (Heery 1988: 64). A school for cadres was
implemented, so as to give the unions’ structure, and the union officials an
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increasingly professionalised profile that rendered recruiting campaigns much 
more effective. Additionally, a remarkable process of mergers between unions 
was pursued, which increased member concentration (Heery, Kelly and 
Waddington 2002). The overall objective of this strategy was to endow the 
confederation with stronger unitary capacity, and clearer policy stances vis a vis 
the state and employers. The ultimate aim was indeed to reach the same status of 
“social partner” held by many of its sister confederations on the European 
continent (Heery 1998; Taylor 2000: 259-269).
However, despite these efforts, differences between affiliate unions and 
evidence of lack of internal co-ordination continued to emerge. Indeed, the TUC 
did not incorporate internal decision-making mechanisms that could have 
prevented policy drift at the level of affiliate unions, or that could have bound 
dissenting unions to unitary policies. Indeed, the TUC was not the only voice of 
the workers. The largest union, Unison, dominant in the public sector, had passed 
motions in the 1995 and 1996 conferences to demand the return to public 
ownership of privatised utilities, increased investment in the public sector, repeal 
of Conservative anti-union legislation, opposition to pay restraint policy, and 
rejection of the Maastricht criteria for monetary union (Mcllroy 1998: 554). The 
TUC insisted in public statements that unions were reliable partners for both 
Labour and Conservative governments and that they were willing to pursue the 
method of partnership, hence cooperation, between employers and employees, as 
well as between governments and social partners (Taylor 1996d; Wagstyl and 
Wightin 1996). This statement continued to be overshadowed by factionalism. In 
the 1994 and 1995 Congresses, motions asking for “total repeal” of Tory laws on 
unions were approved, while the TUC general secretary denied that this was an
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objective of the unions (Mcllroy 1998: 548).69 In the 1996 Congress, a 
Unison/NUM motion endorsed a proposal supporting a specific level of minimum 
wage despite the TUC General Council’s opposition. In fact, the TUC leadership 
had agreed that a tripartite body should have discussed the issue.
Against this background, Tony Blair made it clear to unions that they 
should not expect comprehensive involvement in policy making in the future 
Labour government. Distrust in the unions’ capacity to moderate their stances and 
compromise on policy making would endure even after the elections. However, 
during the electoral campaign, Blair’s persistence in highlighting party/union de­
linkage was reinforced by strong advice from his pollsters. Focus groups showed 
that swing voters from the Tory side were ready to support Labour only if Blair 
showed clear resolve against union militancy (Gould 1998: 257-258). As a 
consequence, New Labour’s electoral pledges to the trade unions were confined to: 
(1) vague commitments to change the worst parts of anti-union legislation, 
including the establishment of individual rights to join a union; (2) the 
commitment to establish a minimum wage, whose level was to be decided upon 
once in office depending on the economic context (Taylor 1995).
On the eve of the 1997 election, the TUC remained keener than Labour 
on partnership between the two. However, the policies advocated by many of its 
affiliates appeared to be too closely linked to interventionism and regulation than 
Labour party leadership could accept (Taylor 1995; Mcllroy 1998: 551). Most 
accounts suggest that the TUC was aware of the fact that the Labour government 
would have not adopted concertation to devise its socio-economic strategy (Taylor
69 It is often forgotten that a 1989 party conference (in which unions still held 90% o f total votes) 
had rejected a motion supporting the “total repeal” o f  Tory legislation on unions with a majority o f  
63% (Minkin 1992: 472). Against this background, Blair’s famous address to the TUC conference 
in 1995 stating that “There is not going to be a repeal o f  all Tory trade union laws” (Taylor 1995: 8) 
is much less impressive.
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1996a; 1996b). Influential commentators suggested that the unions should have 
pushed to be formally divorced by the Labour party before elections, so as to 
increase their bargaining power from an independent position (Taylor 1996c). 
Deriving their strength from the renovated organisational capacity, many unions 
started to distance themselves from the Labour party in a highly demonstrative 
way (Heery 1998: 355).
Party/Union Divorce During the New Labour Government
“[0]ne o f the main distinguishing characteristics o f  this government 
[...] is its rejection o f the use o f  organisations o f business and labour 
for purposes o f  socio-economic steering” (Crouch 2001: 93).
Under the New Labour government, the UK became an exemplary case 
of party/union divorce, and this is evident from the very few policy results of 
party/union interactions in the three policy areas that I have adopted as points of 
reference, i.e. macroeconomic management, welfare (spending) policies, and 
labour law and employment regulations.70
On the subject of macroeconomic management, the Labour government 
adopted an orthodox approach to inflation. A few weeks after winning the 1997 
election, the government reformed the Central Bank statute and gave 
responsibility for monetary policy to a newly designed committee in which the 
Bank’s officials held a majority. The Chancellor charged the committee with the 
mission of targeting inflation at 2.5 % per year. On the one hand, this was a clear 
signal to markets about the seriousness (i.e. the commitment to a mainstream 
economic approach) of New Labour’s stance on economic management (Annesley
701 will not discuss New Labour’s political philosophy at length because this is well-placed within 
the more general trajectory o f  social democratic policy reappraisal already discussed in Section 4.1 
(Przeworski 2001).
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and Gamble 2004: 146). On the other hand, a 2.5 percent target would prevent 
over-zealous bankers from pushing inflation below that level irrespective of the 
consequences for employment (Glyn and Wood 2001: 203). These measures were 
largely inspired by the need to build a good reputation of competence in economic 
management. Indeed, economic incompetence had been held responsible both for 
Labour’s defeat in 1979 and the decline in Conservative consensus that had 
occurred since 1992.
Building on this, the government applied very prudent fiscal stances. 
Following his own electoral pledges, the Chancellor did not change the spending 
plans of the Conservatives during its first two years in office. He then declared 
publicly two “golden” rules for sensible public spending, which led net public 
debt to decrease constantly from 48% of GDP in 1997 to 35.2% of GDP in 2003 
(Glyn and Wood 2001: 206; Bank of England 2006). Under this policy framework, 
wage moderation from the side of the unions was not needed, and indeed it was 
not sought (nor did the unions ever showed any willingness to do this). Wage 
statistics confirm this: between 1997 and 2003, real unit labour cost increased by 
5%, at a rather constant pace throughout the period (European Commission
2006g).
Likewise, union collaboration was not sought in the construction of the 
new welfare state institutions. These were coherently centred on the supply-side, 
and mainly aimed at improving employability and linking welfare entitlements to 
employment (O' Brien 2000). Incentives to enter employment, rather than rely on 
state assistance were paired with disincentives to remain unemployed. Training 
measures for the long-term unemployed were devised, so as to increase the active 
labour force. At the same time, anti-poverty measures took the form of tax credits
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and tax exemptions (White 2001: 11). The Treasury estimated that, thanks to these 
measures, the real take home minimum wage of a single parent with two child 
was double the actual minimum wage level, i.e. 6.6 GBP per hour instead of 3.6 
(Oppenheim 2001: 81-82).
Indeed, labour regulation, including the introduction of a minimum wage 
as a key anti-poverty measure, was the only policy area in which the government 
sought some collaboration with the trade unions. This can be better understood as 
“informal collaboration” or, as a scholar put it, “the new politics of pressure” 
(Mcllroy 2000). However, the key electoral promises to trade unions referred to 
this policy area, and a clear effort was made to secure them a role in policy 
making (Ludlam and Taylor 2003: 734).
Once in office, the government set an independent tripartite Low Pay 
Commission, charged with the role of identifying the most appropriate level of the 
minimum wage (Gennard 1998: 21). The results of the commission were, 
however, not welcomed by unionists. The minimum wage was set at £3.60 per 
hour, whereas the TUC had asked for £4 per hour, and big unions, such as Unison, 
£5 per hour (Glyn and Wood 2001: 218). The Labour party delivered what it 
promised (the minimum wage), but not at the level the unions preferred.
Similar accounts can be given of the reform of employment regulation 
and industrial relations law. After intense months of tripartite negotiations that 
failed to deliver consensus on an overall policy package, the government issued a 
white paper called “Fairness at Work”, which formed the basis of subsequent 
legislation (DTI 1998; Ludlam and Taylor 2003: 735). The latter eventually 
enlarged rights for workers: the statutory period of work required for eligibility 
for protection against unfair dismissal was reduced to 12 months. However,
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financial compensation, and not reinstatement, as the unions had asked, remained 
the main penalty for unfair employers. The potential compensation figure was 
nonetheless increased by almost five times, to £50,000. Additionally, dismissal of 
strikers was made partially unlawful, increasing the scope for industrial action 
(Hamann and Kelly 2003: 647).
With regards to unions’ rights, the government reinforced the chances of 
union recognition, albeit making it conditional on an absolute majority in a ballot 
among workers. However, if a union was able to recruit half of the workers in a 
company, employers were compelled to recognise it. Additionally, discrimination 
in the workplace against trade union members was no longer tolerated (Glyn 
2001b: 218; Hamann and Kelly 2003: 648).
Opinions on New Labour’s labour market reforms vary widely. A 
relative majority contends that these measures by far and large follow the track 
previously marked out by the Tories. However, Blair’s words insisting that Britain 
has the “most lightly regulated labour market of any leading economy in the 
world” (DTI 1998: 4) can either be read as demonstrating the need to protect these 
measures from attacks from “neo-liberal” vestals (Ludlam 2001: 114-116), or as 
proof that Labour’s policies fundamentally endorsed the status quo ex-ante (Mares 
2006: 213-217). Empirical data are mixed. One the one hand it is hardly 
disputable that rights for employees improved, and that by the effect of Labour’s 
reforms unions’ recognitions (and members) increased for the first time in twenty 
years (Heery, Kelly and Waddington 2002). On the other hand, no role for unions 
as a movement was apparent in the governmental policies as a whole, and indeed 
their weak involvement in policy making during the first term of Labour
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government became even weaker during the second term in office (Hay 1999; 
Howell 2000; Ludlam and Taylor 2003 742-743).
Conclusions: Fragmented Divorce
The fragmentation of the labour movement, and the dire events during 
the “winter of discontent” deeply affected the continuation of the party/union 
alliance in the United Kingdom under the Labour government at the end of the 
1990s. The efforts made by the TUC leadership and the personal conviction of its 
secretary general proved to be insufficient to convince the Labour party that 
unions could cooperate and sustain a role as “social partner”.
Pollsters’ insights into the electorate certainly conditioned this policy 
decision, but personal experiences of the party leadership played a great role too. 
Tony Blair and the other Labour leaders remembered the events of the 1970s, the 
“winter of discontent”, and the miners’ and printers’ disputes, very well. Likewise, 
they remembered the effect these events had on the internal life of the Labour 
party -  which eventually split in the 1980s -  and on its electoral fortunes. The fear 
that these types of events could be repeated was very strong throughout the run-up 
to the 1997 elections, and during Labour’s first term in office. As a consequence, 
the government leadership made sure that there was no chance these events could 
happen again: the adopted strategy was to keep the unions at arm’s length.71 This 
decision was based on the underlying judgment that observance of union policy 
during 1979 and during 1996 could not conclude that unions had changed their 
organisation policies. At the same time, the efforts made after 1994 to reduce 
fragmentation and promote cooperative behaviour were considered to be too little, 
too late.
71 Interview with Stephen Huges, MEP.
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As a consequence, the type of relationship that emerged in Britain in the 
late 1990s was characterised by a mutual distancingv whereby both party and 
unions emphasised their independence and their different roles in British society. 
The unions were granted the same role as other lobby groups in policy making, 
and in fact lamented the fact that their role was lower than that of one of the main 
employer organisations, the CBI. On the other hand, the TUC continued 
improving unions’ organisation in the labour market, and sought a wider role in 
the policy arena as an actor within the civil society social movements. The TUC 
claimed to be the main (mass) organisation in the UK seeking justice on domestic 
and international issues. At the same time, each affiliate union was not 
constrained by confederation policies, and was free to pursue industrial action to 
increase pay and improve working conditions.
This analysis corroborates the conclusions of my model. The trade union 
density decline in the 1980s and 1990s reduced the electoral incentives for the 
Labour party to include unions in policy making. The TUC fractionalisation -  or 
perceived fractionalisation -  further reduced the incentive. This was confirmed by 
the round o f negotiations on the level of minimum wage and the reform of 
employment regulations. The government conceded small concessions to union 
requests, and these proved insufficient to buy their whole consensus. As my 
model has predicted, then, once the party defects from cooperation, a path is likely 
to emerge. Once unions are evicted from the policy process, they cannot force 
their participation in the political economic management, because inflation is 
controlled by the Central Bank. Instead, the government has a clear incentive to 
seek increasingly the endorsement of non-unionised sectors and alternative 
interest groups. This is confirmed by the fact that upper- and middle-class,
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including capital-owners, seemed to give their endorsement in large numbers to 
the Labour party in the 2002 and 2005 elections (Leader 2005; Hinsliff 2006). 
However, research papers scrutinising the behaviour of different portions of the 
electorate are confined to the analysis of 1997 elections (Heath, Jowell and 
Curtice 2001): therefore, deeper research would be necessary in order to confirm 
this part of my model with certainty.
5.3 The Social Democratic Political Economy in Comparative 
Perspective.
The reconstruction of the relationships between centre-left governments 
and trade unions in Italy and Britain has confirmed my previous conclusions. This 
section will now briefly develop a comparative analysis between the policy results 
of union and non-union policies. I explained in the introduction to this chapter that 
the choice of Italy and the UK as critical tests of my theory was related to the 
distribution of my dependent variable. More precisely, the change in the policy 
results of party/union interaction in Italy and the UK was the largest among all 
European countries, and it occurred in opposite directions (Table 5.1). In Italy, 
party/union cooperation increased over time, while in the UK it decreased. 
Therefore, the comparison of their actual policy result in substantive terms is also 
likely to yield large differences. Interestingly, the comparison will show that, 
when endorsing liberalism and economic orthodoxy through concertation, unions’ 
gains (in Italy) were limited to the preservation of a defensive role in the labour 
market, and the political arena.
One stream of the literature links the British party/union divorce, i.e. the 
absence of a role for trade unions in policy making, to the fundamental 
abandonment of the values and objectives of socialism by centre-left politicians
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(Hay 1999; Howell 2000; Mares 2006b). Theorists of New Labour have argued 
instead that the latter keeps traditional Labour values steady, while adapting them 
to new circumstances (Mandelson and Liddle 1996; Giddens 1998). Instead, the 
contention of the aforementioned literature is that the eviction of unions from the 
policy process by the Labour governments is evidence per se of detachment from 
the interests of the working class.
I had already briefly shown in Section 2.2 (under the sub-heading 
“Excluding Standard Explanations Continued”) that this argument does not stand 
up to empirical verification. In fact, it seems that polices concerted with unions do 
not deliver consistently better outcomes for mid-to-low income groups. This final 
section explores in the socio-economic performances of Italy and Britain from a 
comparative perspective and aims to understand what payoff for unions, and the 
working class in general, was secured by the unions’ compliance with partnership 
agreements, as opposed to the ones provided by unilateral policy-making in the 
United Kingdom.
Trends in Incomes and Receipts
Data displayed in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that, after centre-left 
governance periods, Italian workers did not fare better than in the United 
Kingdom. Since 1992, at the outset of social partnership, real compensation 
measured at household level contracted in Italy due to the combined effect o f slow 
growth and wage moderation. Italian households had to wait until 2001 for their 
income levels to be restored to 1992 values. Conversely, in the UK a better 
economic performance from 1997 translated into strong growth in real 
compensation. At the same time, wage share of GDP in the UK reversed a 
declining trend and began to grow again, from 61.8% in 1997 to 64.5% in 2002.
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Instead, wage restraint in Italy from 1992 was paired with a steady decrease of 
wage share of GDP, from 61.5% in 1992 to 54% in 2002.
Income trends confirm that Italian concerted policies in the 1990s did 
not appear to be more favourable to workers than the Labour party’s unilateral 
policies. Income distribution in Italy deteriorated (from the workers’ viewpoint) 
very sharply at the beginning of the 1990s: the 90th/10th percentile ratio increased 
by almost 1 point between 1989 and 1995. Given that in 1992, wage moderation 
(Figure 5.2) overlapped in time with contraction of real compensation per 
employee, it is conceivable that increased income inequality was a side-effect of 
income policy agreements. Income distribution remained then rather steady 
throughout the social democratic governance period. (It should be kept in mind 
that income data reported in Table 5.5 are comparable within country over time, 
but are not comparable across countries.)
Income distribution in the UK remained quite steady during Labour’s 
governments too. In fact, inequality decreased by a very marginal level. This 
means that the fruits of economic growth were distributed in constant proportions 
across income cohorts. However, it should be noted that this statistic marks a 
change in the trend recorded during previous Conservative governments, when 
higher income cohorts were able to secure increasing shares of the total national 
income (Table 5.6).
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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Real GDP Growth (% year-■on-year)
Italy 3.30 4.18 3.39 2.02 1.55 0.78 0.95 2.18 2.77 0.77 1.94 1.36 1.98 3.56 1.77 0.32 0.10
UK 4.50 4.96 2.29 0.62 1.30 0.33 2.40 4.39 2.79 2.72 3.24 3.16 3.08 4.04 2.24 1.99 2.47
Real Compensation of Households
Italy 89.6 92.1 94.8 97.6 99.4 100.0 98.3 97.0 96.1 97.2 99.3 96.2 98.4 101.2 103.6 104.4 104.3
UK 83.1 87.3 90.5 92.8 92.5 92.3 92.5 94.1 95.8 96.6 100.0 105.0 109.7 116.6 120.7 122.3 124.7
Wage share of GDP
Italy 62.6 61.6 61.3 61.9 62 61.5 60.4 58.4 56.4 56.6 56.8 54.1 54 53.3 53.4 53.5 54
UK 64 64.4 65.7 67 67.6 67.2 65.9 64.4 63.6 62 61.8 62.3 62.9 64 64.8 64.3 64.5
Social benefits for households as share of GDP
Italy 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21
UK 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Table 5.4 -  Comparative Data on National Income and Compensation 1987-2003.
Source: own calculation on European Commission (2006a, b, c, d, e, f). Bold characters identify the beginning o f concertation in Italy (1992) 
and the Labour party government in the UK (1997).
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90th/I0th Percentile ratio
1989 1995 2002
Italy 5.78 6.56 6.54
United Kingdom 4.03 3.93 3.99
Table 5.5 -  Income Distribution 1089-2002.
Source: own calculation from Banca d’ltalia (various years) 
and Office for National Statistics (2004).
10th 25th 
Year Perc. Perc. Median
75th
Perc.
90th
Perc.
Conservative Governments
1978 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1987 1.06 1.08 1.17 1.26 1.38
1995 1.14 1.18 1.28 1.42 1.57
Labour Governments
1996 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2001 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.14 1.15
Table 5.6 -  Distribution of Household Real Disposable 
Income, UK, 1978-2001.
Source: own calculation from Office for National Statistics 
(2004).
Spending Policies
When considering the outcome of party/union relations, income trends 
must be gauged together with social security expenditure. Indeed, it is known that 
unions will accept wage moderation and stagnant incomes if they can receive 
additional social transfers (Mares 2006). In other words, they consider social 
benefits to be part of the salary package when setting their preferences. In this 
respect, again, no remarkable difference results from a comparison of data from 
Italy and the UK. Private and publicly financed social benefits (last row in Table 
5.4) remained steady in both countries under social democratic governments, and 
were slightly higher in the UK as a share of GDP. The internal composition of
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social expenditure did not change much in the two countries either (Table 5.7). 
Critics of New Labour are right when they blame the fact that the government 
strongly followed the path set by Conservative governments. However, seen from 
a comparative perspective, concerted policies seem not to be more friendly to 
workers than those of New Labour, at least at the level of aggregate data.
1993
United Kingdom 
1997 2002 1993
Italy
1997 2002
Old Age 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.50 0.53 0.51
Health Care 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.26
Disability 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06
Survivors 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.10
Family/Children 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.04
Unemployment 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Housing 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Social Exclusion 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 5.7 -  Composition of Social Expenditure in Italy and the UK 1993-2002.
Source own calculation from European Commission (2005).
The analysis of the Italian pension reform further corroborates these 
conclusions. In this case, it is possible to assess the policy with a domestic 
connterfactual, i.e. the failed pension reform that had been unilaterally pushed 
forward by the centre-right government few months earlier. Very interestingly, the 
differences between the actual reform and the failed reform are minimal. The 
savings determined by the successful one were roughly 10% less than the failed 
reform would have determined. The major difference between the two reforms 
regarded the composition of savings. Almost the entire savings of the centre-right 
reform were concentrated in the virtual abolition of seniority pensions. These 
pensions allowed workers to retire after a certain number of years in employment 
(in particular, this was 35 years for metalworkers) irrespectively of their age. On 
the contrary, the centre-left (successful) reform distributed the costs of
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retrenchment over a larger social base, gradually phasing out seniority pensions 
(Baccaro and Locke 1996: 16).
However, this difference did not significantly diminish the extent of 
welfare retrenchment and its effect on workers. It certainly affected many 
different sectors; heavily unionised groups, including public sector workers, who 
gave up most of their privileges, industrial workers and service sector workers 
(Baccaro and Locke 1996: 17). Indeed, the most visible difference between the 
two reforms was the method adopted for their approval.
Labour Policies
The only policy area in which a clear difference appears between 
concerted and non-concerted policies is the field of labour market reforms. 
Interestingly enough, however, comparative accounts are still counterintuitive at a 
first glance, as British unilateral reforms resulted in increased rights for workers, 
whereas concerted policies increased the overall flexibilisation of the Italian 
labour market.
The Labour government reformed the norms for recognition of unions so 
that, conditional on their compliance to a quite burdensome procedure required to 
achieve recognition, workers acquired the “right to join, or not join” a union. In 
1998 and 1999 union membership increased for the first time in 19 years. 
Between 1995 and 1998, that is, before the new labour laws, between 80 and 100 
recognition agreements were signed each year. This figure jumped to 270 in 1999 
with a further 130 cases in the first half of 2000 (Heery, Kelly and Waddington 
2002: 1). These results cannot be linked only to the changed legislative 
framework. In fact, from the early 1990s, British unions embarked on a massive 
organisational and political reappraisal focusing on campaign management and
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recruitment (Heery 1998; 2002; Heery, Kelly and Waddington 2003). However, 
the new legislative framework certainly did not hurt this process.
In addition to trade union recognition rights, the Labour party introduced 
norms that mildly increased worker protection, as well as the minimum wage and 
additional parental leave rights. As Glyn and Wood put it, “the Employment 
Relations Act is fundamentally concerned with individual employment rights 
rather than those of trade unions” (Glyn and Wood 2001: 219).
In stark contrast, it seemed that the labour market reforms under centre- 
left cabinets in Italy were more concerned with trade unions and trade union 
members’ rights than the rights of the individual employee. Reforms in Italy 
increased flexibility and thereby reduced the average level of worker protection. 
However, this was not obtained by a relaxation of existing norms, but through the 
introduction of new types of working regimes. As a consequence, the Italian 
labour market assumed the features of a segregated market, in which two different 
groups coexist. On one side was the traditionally unionised workforce, primarily 
employed in the public sector and in the industrial sector. On the other side sat the 
new recruits, primarily employed in the tertiary sector -  where unions have a 
much lower penetration. The former enjoyed the whole set of employment 
protection legislation (EPL), including protection against dismissal, welfare 
entitlements such as maternity leave, health insurance, unemployment insurance 
and pension schemes. Conversely, the latter, employed through the new flexi- 
contracts, did not enjoy any of the EPL, and very few welfare entitlements. As an 
effect of these measures, between 1996 and 2001, two-thirds of the newly 
employed were contracted under the new forms of jobs, approaching 25% of all 
salaried employees (ISTAT 2002; Baccaro and Simoni 2004c: 176).
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Against this background, a reasonable interpretation would be that union 
members had agreed to moderate their wage claims and to reduce their 
prospective pensions, but in return they were sheltered from labour market 
liberalisation. This arguably also yielded substantial benefits to the unions as 
organisations. Indeed, fragmented labour markets are known to be very difficult 
fields for union recruiting campaigns (Ebbingghaus 2002). Public stances taken 
by Italian union leaders support this interpretation. They argued that centre-right 
attempts to deregulate the labour markets outright, relaxing EPL legislation, were 
to be interpreted as direct attacks on the unions as organisations, as much as 
attacks on the dignity of workers (Cofferati 2002). In other words, by limiting the 
extent of labour deregulation (and acquiring new functions in the management of 
the new working regimes) unions actually preserved their role in the Italian labour 
market, and, a fortiori, in Italian polity.
Conclusions
Qualitative analysis of the cases of Italy and the United Kingdom has 
shown that ideological differences in governmental political economic stances 
cannot be held responsible for diverging party/union relations in the two countries. 
Additionally, in both countries trade union leadership had appeared keen to pursue 
concertation and partnership.
Unleashed by the collapse of political divisions, Italian trade unions 
played a key role during the Italian crisis of 1992-1995 by easing the process of 
inflation control, through wage moderation, and fiscal consolidation, with their 
acceptance of welfare retrenchment. In so doing, they favoured Italian 
participation in the EMU. The agreements were sustained through democratic 
decision-making rules, so that the rank-and-file were kept within the boundaries
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of mainstream confederal unionism. The position gained by trade unions within 
the centre-left compact was subsequently used to strengthen their positions jn  the 
labour market. They accepted labour market liberalisation only as long as it did 
not apply to their members, whose employment rights remained largely untouched. 
Additionally, unions secured for themselves a continued role in the regulation of 
the liberalised labour market. This, in turn, would ensure that they would retain a 
role in the policy arena.
Conversely, in the United Kingdom, a fragmented labour movement was 
not invited to share policy-making prerogatives by the New Labour government. 
The result of this was not substantially different from the policy outcome of 
Italian concertation, as far as income distribution and expenditure were concerned. 
However, it entailed the sustained marginalisation of organised labour from the 
policy arena, and from the management of the labour market. Arguably, the 
modest increase in unions’ rights, and their increased effort towards a renewed 
role in British society, keep open the possibility for the development of 
cooperation in the future. If the Labour party finds itself in electoral difficulty, it 
might again revert to its old ally if the structural fragmentation of organised 
labour is not seen to impede the definition of a credible unitary union strategy. 
What has dominated so far, however, is rather a progressive shift in the opposite 
direction. The New Labour party has increasingly sought non-union votes, thereby 
confirming one of the conclusions of my model on path-dependency of 
contemporary party/union relationships.
This chapter ends the empirical analysis of this thesis. The two tests of 
Italy and the UK have corroborated my main conclusions, and the comparative 
accounts presented in the third section of this chapter have suggested further that
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party/union cooperation in the late 1990s did not yield substantial advantages for 
low-to-middle income cohorts, to which most union members are likely to belong. 
However, the methods adopted to pursue the policies are not void of 
consequences. Indeed, if policies are adopted through concertation, and the latter 
entails the defence of the unions’ role in the labour market, then the unions remain 
key constituencies of the centre-left party or coalition. In the next, concluding, 
chapter, I will expand on this -  and other -  conclusions so as to highlight how the 
argument of this thesis could contribute to theories of European political economy 
and the understanding of political trends, as well as suggest further research 
avenues.
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Chapter 6
The Renegotiated Alliance Between the Left 
and Organised Labour in Western Europe
[ ...]  Love is not love, 
Which alters when it alteration finds, 
[ ...]  Oh, no! it is an ever-fixed mark 
That looks on tempests.and is never shaken; 
It is the star to every wand’ring barque 
[...]  Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks, 
But bears it out.even to the edge o f  doom. 
If this be error and upon me proved, 
I never writ, nor no man ever loved.
William Shakespeare, Sonnet CXV1
At the beginning of the empirical work of this thesis in Chapter 2, I 
measured the party/union alliance using a metric based upon a simple insight: in a 
given country, if the alliance between the social democratic party and the trade 
unions is still alive, policy output of the collaboration between the two actors 
during social democratic governments must be visible. This method implies 
dropping the widespread assumption that ascribes the party/union alliance to 
solely “Keynesian” policies, and leaving it instead to empirical verification.
What I found could be called a “renegotiated alliance” between the 
mainstream left and organised labour in Western European countries. During the 
1980s and 1990s, social democratic governments approved the majority (on
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average 72%) of their socio-economic policies with the collaboration of their 
sister trade union confederation. The policies that derive from party/union 
cooperation are far removed from the “old” Keynesian set and include the 
acceptance of the monetarist macroeconomic regime that was adopted in 
European countries after the late 1970s. As a consequence, the alliance can be 
renegotiated only under certain conditions, which do not always exist. Indeed, in a 
sizeable minority of cases the alliance was not sustained.
Social democratic parties retain electoral incentives to include trade 
unions in policy making, but no longer retain incentives linked to their economic 
strategy because inflation is controlled by central banks. The electoral incentives, 
however, are contingent on the fact that unions accept only modest policy gains 
from negotiations: excess policy concessions would alienate non-union workers 
from the social democratic vote. In turn, unions are able to accept modest gains 
(which, under an unfavourable overall scenario are nonetheless positive) only if 
they are very cohesive. I have shown that confederation democracy is key to 
cohesiveness, and therefore key to explaining party/union cooperation.
The first aim o f this chapter is to summarise the steps that led me to this 
argument of the “renegotiated alliance”. The overview of my findings will be 
contained in the first two sections of this chapter. I will start by recalling how the 
hypothesis was derived from the examination of current literature and readily 
available evidence. I will then review my first empirical results: since the 1980s 
policy collaboration between social democratic governments and trade unions has 
remained a relevant phenomenon of European politics. I will summarise the 
conclusions I have drawn on the analysis of the two actors, which I have
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undertaken separately in order to explain the persistence of the (albeit weakened) 
_ party/union alliance in Europe.
Through the careful analysis of existing literature, and original empirical 
evidence processed through panel-data regression analysis, I have shown that 
confederation democracy, and not internal hierarchy as contended by current 
interpretations, pushes unions to cooperative behaviour. Democracy reduces the 
impact of factionalism, and therefore it has a positive effect on cohesion. In turn, 
original empirical data have demonstrated that social democratic parties have 
converged towards concertation, and so they tend to formalise the involvement of 
trade unions in policy making. Based on existing theories on political preference 
formation, I have argued that social democrats rely on unions to solve their 
electoral dilemmas.
The second section of this chapter then recalls the conclusions derived 
from my game theoretical model of party/union interactions, and from the 
examination of the critical case studies of Italy and the United Kingdom. The 
game theory explained that the importance of democracy within union 
confederations increased over time, and it clarified the impact of intervening 
variables such as union density and the social democratic policy program. The 
qualitative examination of party/union relations in Italy and the UK has, in turn, 
confirmed the main conclusions of my theory. Due to the relevant explanatory 
power that my theory attributes to democratic institutions, this argument has an 
eminently institutionalist nature. I will show that my argument is originally placed 
in the classic partition between historical institutionalism and rational choice 
institutionalism.
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The final section of this chapter highlights four conclusions of this 
dissertation that can be relevant to other fields of the political economy. In so 
doing, it will suggest avenues for future research, rather than offering definite 
answers. First, I will show that my conclusions on trade unions, including the 
importance of decision-making processes and the significant involvement of 
union involvement in policy making, might suggest a need for further research on 
the interpretations of European unemployment. Second, an extension of this 
argument would suggest that different modes of policy-making might influence 
economic outcomes too. Third, another research path could investigate a 
hypothesis that emerged at the end of Chapter 4, namely that in a post-industrial 
society the political clout of trade unions might increase, rather than decrease, 
because the rest of the society undergoes a process of strong fragmentation.
The final lines of this thesis will suggest that, given that trade unions 
remain at the core of social democratic constituencies in many European countries, 
the difference between centre-left and centre-right could be more important than 
conventional wisdom would suggest, and that we could expect policy contestation 
on economic matters to increase again in the future.
6.1 Overview of Findings (1): Trade Unions Institutional Pre­
requisites and Social Democratic Strategies Under Examination
The Party/Union Alliance as the Phoenix of European Politics
This thesis has been devoted to answering a question key to 
understanding the contemporary Left in Western Europe. Given the changed 
social and economic context that developed in European countries during the
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1980s and 1990s, which factors can explain instances of renegotiated party/union 
alliances vis a vis more strained types of interactions between the two actors? 
Indeed, the social and policy foundations of the traditional party/union alliance 
had collapsed. De-industrialisation had reduced the salience of working class 
support for social democratic parties, and the “political exchange” between wage 
moderation and public spending seemed no longer to be viable because of the 
effect of changed economic constraints. However, cases of sustained party/union 
coordination over policy making and cases of party/union ‘delinkage’ were both 
observable across Europe. This thesis has sought to give a comprehensive account 
o f this apparently puzzling set of events.
Mainstream studies in the fields of industrial relations and party politics 
interpreted the new context of the 1980s and 1990s as characterised by 
party/union “de-linkages” across the continent. The change in the social 
democratic policy strategy, including the abandonment of Keynesianism and the 
endorsement of low-inflation strategies leaving little room for public spending 
have been linked to an inevitable detachment between the two partners (Scharpf 
1991; Hyman and Femer 1994; Kitschelt 1994; Femer and Hyman 1998; 
Notermans 2000; Howell 2001). Only one strand of the literature has argued that 
under a low-inflation regime, cooperation between social democratic parties and 
large trade unions can be viable because it can reduce the unemployment 
consequences of disinflation through a spending strategy geared towards the 
supply-side of the economy (Garrett and Lange 1991; Garrett 1998).
These interpretations, however, clash with a limited number of thought- 
provoking papers. First, electoral incentives could still push the social democratic 
party to cooperate with unions (Aylott 2003). Second, instances of failed
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cooperation are not necessarily linked with social democratic parties 
implementing restrictive policies, but are better explained with reference to 
institutional deficiencies of organised labour (Astudillo Ruiz 2001). Additionally, 
cooperation can be associated with restrictive policies (including welfare state 
retrenchment and wage moderation) and with unexpected institutional 
configurations of organised labour, such as a low level of internal hierarchy and 
the use of democratic means of decision-making (Baccaro 2003).
This analysis had shown that the “de-linkage” argument rests on the 
(sometimes implicit) assumption that associates the party/union alliance with so- 
called “Keynesian” economic policies. If, instead, the substance of the policy 
outcome of party/union interaction is left to empirical verification, the de-linkage 
conclusion can change (Kitschelt 1994; Femer and Hyman 1998; Howell 2001; 
Piazza 2001). Therefore, I decided to set my research strategy on an empirical 
ground. This allowed me to verify the conclusions of the existing literature against 
a set of systematically collected data, and to design my own working hypothesis. 
Therefore, the first sub-question I answered was: where and when did parties and 
unions renegotiate their alliance?
The systematic coding of textual information contained in the European 
Industrial Relation Review -  a periodical magazine providing regular updates on 
industrial relations- showed that between 1980 and 2003 European social 
democratic governments processed a remarkable 72% of their socio-economic 
policies -  on average -  in formal or informal collaboration with their sister trade 
union confederation (see Figure 6.1 and Section 2.1 for details). Socio-economic 
policies include welfare, labour, and income policies. If compared with the (albeit 
limited) data between 1974 and 1980, and with established accounts of the
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“Golden Age” of social democracy in the 1950s and 1960s, the extent of 
collaborative party/union policy-making in the last two decades of the twentieth 
century had clearly decreased, and become more volatile, but it was also far from 
negligible.
This piece of empirical evidence is remarkable in light of the extensive 
literature contending that unions’ political clout was reduced by the process of de­
industrialisation and fragmentation of the labour market, and that social 
democratic parties no longer needed unions to help implement their “new” 
political economic strategy because the new role of independent central banks had 
eliminated the need for wage restraint (Kitschelt 1994; Boix 1998; Femer and 
Hyman 1998; Martin and Ross 1999). Indeed, my data show that between 1980 
and 2003, European social democratic governments and trade unions coordinated 
on a wide variety of topics in numerous countries.
Similarly, my empirical findings cast serious doubt on the conventional 
wisdom that associates de-industrialisation and globalisation with policy 
convergence. A naive version of this convergence argument would contend that 
internationalisation of the capital and goods markets had the effect of pushing 
policies, and therefore systems of interest intermediation, towards the Anglo- 
Saxon liberal model. In order to reach better economic performance in the 
globalised economy, the role of trade unions both in the labour market and the 
policy arena should decrease (Scharpf 1991; OECD 1994; 1997; IMF 2001). My 
data show that, even if the social democratic policies are based on a substantial 
acceptance of the macroeconomic constraints that derive from a low-inflation 
regime under capital mobility, and quasi-fixed intra-European exchange rates, in
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the great majority of cases they still attempt to implement their policies with the 
collaboration of trade unions.
These results also contrast with the stream of the literature that debates 
more strongly against the “convergence” argument (Garrett and Lange 1989; 1991; 
Garrett 1998; Garrett and Way 1999). Indeed, party/union collaborations are not 
necessarily coupled to expansive policies(Baccaro 2002a), as some of the 
literature would deem necessary; similarly it is not unusual to observe very tense 
party/union interactions and ended alliances in combination with mildly expansive 
social democratic economic policies (Glyn and Wood 2001). Finally, variation in 
the policy results of party/union interactions is observable over time in almost 
every country, including countries with very different and distinct institutional 
settings (Cameron 1984; Hall and Soskice 2001).
Against the backdrop of this analysis, and the apparent disconnection 
between my set of empirics and existing theories, I drew a comprehensive 
hypothesis to explain the “renegotiated alliance”, building on a number of 
significant country studies (Astudillo Ruiz 2001; Baccaro 2002b; Aylott 2003) 
and alternative theoretical insights (Lange 1984; Golden 1993). This hypothesis is 
grounded on an eminently political conception of the party/union alliance. It 
contends that social democratic parties retain electoral incentives to coordinate 
their policies with unions. However, they are only willing to secure very few 
policy concessions for organised labour. In turn, when available benefits for 
members are low, trade unions must be very cohesive in order to fill the 
information gap between their leaders and rank-and-file. I hypothesised that the 
key variable allowing unions to increase their cohesiveness and adopt cooperative 
behaviour is the degree to which they are democratic at the level of the
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confederation; this also explains party/union cooperation versus non-cooperation 
in policy making.
This hypothesis required me to break down my research question into 
two parts. First, under which institutional conditions did trade union 
confederations adopt a cooperative stance towards social democratic parties in the 
hard-currency low-inflation regime that had characterised Europe since the early 
1980s? Similarly, in a post-industrial society, why would social democratic parties 
still adopt the majority o f their policies in coordination with trade union 
organisations?
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Figure 6.1 -  Party/Union Alliance in 15 European Countries 1974-2003.
Bars display yearly values; the curve displays three-year moving averages. It should 
be remembered that non-social democratic governments are not included in the 
sample on which the party/union alliance is measured. Countries include the EU15 
except Luxemburg and include Norway. Source: coded by the author, see Statistical 
Appendix for details.
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The Relevance o f Democracy: Corporatism Turned on its Head
With regard to the unions’ side of the bargain, my analysis-focuses on 
the features that unions must embody in order to adopt cooperative, as opposed to 
militant, behaviour. This analysis is deeply embedded in the tradition of neo- 
corporatist studies which since the late 1970s have tried to understand the 
conditions under which trade unions are likely to cooperate with governments and 
employers, which largely coincided with the conditions under which they could 
exert restraint on wage claims (Pizzomo 1978; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979b; 
Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Goldthorpe 1984; Streeck and Schmitter 1991).
The neo-corporatist literature has argued that socially optimal outcomes 
are more likely to be reached by union confederations that are: (1) encompassing 
-  i.e. organising workers across many different occupational sectors; (2) 
concentrated -  i.e. enjoying a high degree of monopoly over workers 
representation; (3) centralised -  i.e. the whole body of members complies with 
decisions taken at the centre of the organisation (Pizzomo 1978; Goldthorpe 
1984). The literature further argued that hierarchical means were needed to 
achieve centralisation, so confederations should exert strong control over 
members and affiliates (Golden, Wallerstein and Lange 1999; Traxler, Blaschke 
and Kittel 2001). This latter conclusion, however, has never been definitively 
empirically proved (Lange 1984; Golden 1993).
In fact, my analysis shows that hierarchical means are ill-suited to 
achieving centralisation. Instead, high accountability of the centre of the 
organisation and the democratic ratification of central decisions (that is, 
democratic means to achieve centralisation) will prevent factionalism, and 
therefore promote cohesion around leaders and policy platforms.
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In order to reach this conclusion, I first measured confederation 
democracy across 16 OECD countries (see Section 3.2). This measure was based 
on Dahl’s “Criteria for Democracy” and depends on (1) the degree to which 
confederation leaders are accountable to union rank-and-file, as opposed to 
accountable to intermediate leaders; and (2) the degree of involvement of union 
rank-and-file in the ratification of collective agreements (Dahl 1989; 1998). 
Confederation democracy proved to be strongly negatively correlated to wage 
militancy, a particular measure of labour costs (Blanchard 2000). Panel-data 
regression analysis on 16 OECD countries over 30 years (1974-2003) confirmed 
that confederation democracy contributes to wage moderation. Therefore, 
confederation democracy is -  in addition to encompassment (measured as union 
density) and representation monopoly (member concentration) -  an institutional 
prerequisite that promotes cooperative behaviour (see Section 3.3 for details).
This finding narrows the difference between the effect that structures 
and decision-making processes have on union behaviour. Concentration of 
members in few unions favours cooperation because it unifies workers, rather than 
dispersing them across many organisations. High accountability of the centre of 
the organisation and the democratic ratification of central decisions (centralisation 
as democracy) will avoid factionalism and therefore promote unity around leaders 
and policy platforms. Therefore, a simple way to identify cooperative unions is 
through the concept of cohesiveness, which is the result of the combined effect of 
concentration of members and centralisation (as democracy), the absence of the 
latter two features would lead, indeed, the labour movement to fragmentation (see 
Section 3.4 for the full discussion).
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Additionally, the importance of union democracy is likely to have
*
increased over time, i.e., since.the collapse of the “Keynesian consensus”. Under 
an overall restrictive economic framework, slow growth and high unemployment, 
and in the absence of substantial side-compensations (e.g. increased transfers, or 
increased welfare benefits) to ensure rank-and-file compliance, persuasion, 
deliberation, and voting have become increasingly important in ensuring the 
compliance of members with the compromises agreed by leaders, and therefore 
the viability of concerted modes of policy-making. This theoretical insight is 
confirmed by the formalisation of the game-theoretical model of party/union 
relations, which I developed in Chapter 4.
The Social Democratic Convergence on Concertation
The motives that drive social democratic parties to renew their alliance 
with trade unions provided another puzzle. Indeed, an influential stream of the 
literature predicts a “de-linkage” with organised labour essentially motivated by 
two reasons. First, at the beginning of the 1980s, social democrats across the 
continent undertook the most dramatic programmatic reappraisal in their history 
(Sassoon 1997; 1999). At its core was the move to shift the main target of 
economic policy making from full employment to low inflation, and the outright 
abandonment of previous, Keynesian-inspired, economic policies. The “new” 
social democratic program did not include substantial payoffs for unions (such as 
increased welfare benefits, or increased transfers to workers), again because 
unions’ cooperation was no longer needed to implement wage restraint (Boix
1998). Indeed, when inflation is guarded by central bankers -  as in most 
developed economies at present- rational unions should spontaneously moderate 
their wage claims if they want to avoid a surge of unemployment (Hassel 2003b).
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Second, the deindustrialisation, tertiarisation and feminilisation of the labour force 
tilted the .distribution of political preferences in Western societies. In fact, 
assuming that political preferences are strongly linked to the occupation type, the 
growing cohorts of workers in the service sectors are more pro-market and pro- 
libertarian than the traditional working class (Kitschelt 1994).
The “de-linkage” implied by these conclusions, however, seems not to 
have happened. In fact, the data on the renegotiated party/union alliance show a 
72% ratio of cooperation in socio-economic policy making between 1980 and 
2003. Thus, in order to shed light on the attitude of social democratic 
governments towards organised labour in the policy-making process, I have 
designed an indicator of a government’s willingness to share its policy 
prerogatives with the “social partners”, i.e. capital and labour. This indicator tries 
to capture governments’ preferences for concertation ex-ante, i.e. independently 
from the trade union stances. It consequently does not explain how (or if) the 
policy was actually approved, but only focuses on the governmental initial intent 
(see Section 4.2).
Systematic scrutiny of the intentions of social democratic governments 
in 15 European countries has highlighted that, between 1974 and 2003, social 
democrats converged on the policy method of concertation on labour and welfare 
issues, i.e. the formal involvement of labour and business in policy making. In 
other words, while the overall magnitude of the party/union alliance was 
decreasing and the policy results were more volatile (Figure 6.1), instances of 
sustained collaboration between the parties and the unions increasingly assumed 
more formal characteristics (Figure 6.2).
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Figure 6.2 -  Social Democratic G overnm ents’ Convergence on Concertation.
The lines (three-year moving average measurement) show the share of attempts to 
pursue concerted policies made by social democratic governments, across all socio­
economic issues. The black line includes welfare policies and labour policies and the 
dotted line also includes income policies.
I have interpreted this data using existing studies on electoral socialism 
and social democratic electoral dilemmas (Kitschelt 1994). Very interestingly, the 
same model o f party competition that led Herbert Kitschelt to predict the de­
linkage o f the left and organised labour, proved to be powerful in explaining my 
set o f empirics that contradicts its own conclusion. I argue that if  labour is 
encompassing and cohesive (i.e. concentrated and democratic at the confederation 
level), the social democratic party can still benefit from policy collaboration, even 
if  this collaboration is not needed to control inflation. Indeed, if  political 
preferences are linked to occupational sector (as assumed by Kitschelt 1994), 
preferences must have multiplied according to the decomposition o f the labour 
market. Therefore the policy strategy of social democrats rests on a sequence o f  
materialistic and non-materialistic distributive compromises. If organised labour
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is encompassing and cohesive, cooperation on policy making will provide the 
social democrats with the best compromise between union and non-union cohorts: 
it will ensure that the number of votes they gain from the growing pool of pro- 
market libertarian workers employed in non-union service sectors is no lower than 
the number of votes they lose from their traditional constituencies. Additionally, if 
social democrats are able to negotiate their socio-economic policies with trusted 
representatives of workers from a variety of sectors (as leaders of encompassing 
unions are) they will find the task of setting strategies much easier as at least a 
portion of distributive compromises will be solved within trade unions during the 
negotiating phase.
To summarise, if the trade union movement is cohesive, social 
democrats have a strong incentive to grant it some policy concessions, in order to 
win its endorsement of their economic policies. In turn, under an unfavourable 
overall scenario, trade unions will be given a chance to influence the policy 
outcome, minimise the negative consequences of neo-liberal policies for their 
members, and for the unions as organisations. If instead unions are fragmented, 
policy concertation will not be a viable policy tool for social democrats. Indeed, if 
the confederation cannot represent all its affiliate unions and members effectively 
and credibly, the negotiations will include separate discussion on a myriad of 
disconnected issues with each portion of the labour movement. As a consequence, 
the policy concessions that the party would need to grant to unions in order to 
gain their compliance would be several and significant, causing the alienation of 
non-union cohorts of workers. Additionally, if the confederation has no means of 
solving internal distributive conflicts between members and affiliates, the 
negotiations are likely to break down, triggering social unrest. Therefore, when a
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union confederation is fragmented, social democrats have an incentive to detach 
from organised labour and to pursue their policies unilaterally.
This argument accounts for the increased preference for concentration 
displayed by social democratic governments (Figure 6.2), even because in the 
majority of European countries the size of trade union confederations 
(encompassment) has stalled but not decreased significantly (Golden, Wallerstein 
and Lange 1999; Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000; Ebbingghaus 2002). Hence, they 
remain an attractive electoral group -  cutting, as they do, across occupational 
sectors -  for social democratic parties.
6.2 Overview of Findings (2): The New Roads for 
Collaboration between the Left and Organised Labour
The Game Theory of Renegotiated Alliances
After having analysed separately the trade unions and the social 
democratic parties, I formalised their interaction during a social democratic 
government into a game-theoretical model, which allowed for the emergence of a 
number of additional conclusions (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4). First, I identified the 
conditions under which the relative importance of confederation democracy in 
sustaining party/union cooperation increases. The importance of confederation 
democracy increases: (1) as union density (i.e. the usual proxy for union 
encompassment) stalls or decreases; (2) the more the social democratic parties 
depart from their traditional stances on pro-market policies; (3) as the payoffs that 
unions can win from negotiations decrease. All three of these phenomena were 
common in European countries during the 1980s and 1990s. First, the number of 
union members generally declined or did not increase, as the growing
256 t
occupational sectors were primarily in service industries, which are traditionally 
resistent to union penetration. Second, from the early 1980s, social democratic 
parties across the continent decided to abide by the new set of economic 
constraints and endorsed inflation -  as opposed to unemployment -  as the first 
target of economic policy making. Third, given the new distribution of political 
preferences, the public in European countries was more pro-market and libertarian 
in comparison to the post-war decades. As a consequence, excessive policy 
concessions to unions would have resulted in a massive loss of votes from the 
growing pool of employees in the modem service sectors. As such, the salience of 
democracy for the compliance of rank-and-file over major concertation 
agreements increased over time.
Additionally, the game-theoretical model highlighted a paradox. 
Collaboration/non-collaboration between parties and unions under social 
democratic governments primarily depends on the cohesiveness of organised 
labour, and therefore on its components: confederation democracy and 
membership concentration. However, the first mover in my game is the governing 
party, which has to decide whether or not to include trade unions in the policy­
making process. The equilibrium of the game, under perfect information, is 
decided unilaterally by the actor -  the party -  whose institutional features do not 
influence the equilibrium. Indeed, if  the unions are not cohesive the party will 
defect, and the unions will have to adjust. If, instead, the unions are cohesive, the 
party will collaborate and so will the unions. This contributes to explaining why 
trade unions, during the last two decades have increasingly participated with 
social movements endorsing non-materialistic aims. Under low-inflation 
macroeconomic regimes, they no longer have the means to force party politicians
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into collaboration. As a consequence, unions try to gain increased political role 
outside the political economic realm, i.e. among social movements.
Italy and UK as Critical Cases to Confirm the Theory
My overall theoretical argument has been tested through a detailed 
examination of the trajectories of the party/union relationship in Italy and the 
United Kingdom. Unlike a great deal of qualitative literature, where the choice of 
cases is somewhat arbitrary, I chose Italy and the United Kingdom because they 
are two critical cases in the distribution of the dependent variable of this study, i.e. 
the policy results of party/union interactions during social democratic 
governments. The analysis tracked the process that led to very intense policy 
concertation in Italy during the 1990s and bitter policy divergence between the 
Labour party and the unions in Britain around the same period.
Post-war Italy was characterised by a heavily politicised industrial 
relations system: divisions in the policy arena de facto blocked all the attempts 
made at institutionalised “political exchange” throughout the post-war period 
(Regini 1984). However, in the 1990s, after communist ideology had lost most of 
its salience, trade unions participated systematically in socio-economic steering, 
by agreeing to discipline wage increases, and by striking numerous deals with 
centre-left politicians on labour and welfare issues (Regini 1999). This process is 
largely explained by the ability of trade unions to unify under a shared policy 
platform. First, the collapse of communism laid the ideological base for unity, 
eliminating a factor of structural policy division within the labour movement. 
Second, the systematic use of secret balloting among workers to endorse 
subsequent agreements on wage increases and pensions reforms strengthened the 
legitimacy of confederation leadership, and the accords themselves (Baccaro
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2003). Therefore, the large minority that opposed coordination with the 
government on eminently liberalising policies was unable to organise any 
significant protest, or to establish new competing unions, because it was defeated 
in ballots by the majority of workers.
The UK is an example of the opposite case. It was the cradle of the 
industrial revolution, and it witnessed one of the most paradigmatic cases of 
party/union symbiosis that had happened since the late 19th century (Minkin 1992; 
Ebbinghaus 1995). However, after 1997, the relationship between the New 
Labour government led by Tony Blair and the TUC (Trades Union Congress) 
became typical of party/union divorce (Crouch 2001). This can be explained by 
reference to my theory. Trade union density in the UK declined significantly 
during the 1980s because of Conservative anti-union policies and the 
fragmentation of the labour market. At the same time, the Labour party underwent 
a strong policy shift towards endorsing mainstream orthodox economic principles 
(hence following the same process as mainstream continental socialism). Under 
these conditions, organised labour has to be very cohesive to generate an electoral 
incentive for social democrats to include it in policy making. However, due to its 
traditional structure as the “Union of Unions”,72 the TUC remained a relatively 
fragmented confederation. The Labour party did not trust the efforts made by 
TUC leadership from the mid 1990s to reduce policy fragmentation and militancy, 
and to embrace cooperative behaviour. As a consequence, the government 
pursued its policy agenda unilaterally.
The comparison of policy results between the collaborative case (Italy) 
and the non-collaborative case (UK) shows that the gains secured by the unions in
721 owe this definition to Steve Purcey (ILO).
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the former were relatively marginal. They did not include substantial differences 
in income distribution, or level of transfers, but were confined to organisational. 
advantages for trade unions and to sheltering union members from labour market 
liberalisation. However, these gains should not be overlooked. Organisational 
advantages such as, for example, statutory roles in regulatory bodies, reinforced 
and entrenched the position of trade unions in Italy in the labour market and in the 
policy arena of the centre-left coalition. In other words, as it did in the post-war 
decades (Esping-Andersen 1990), party/union cooperation ended in path 
dependence, as my game theoretical model had predicted. The reliance on trade 
union support strengthens the presence of unions in the post-industrial society and 
polity, and therefore renders future party/union cooperation more likely. Similarly, 
my model suggested that ended alliances lock parties and union into non- 
cooperative equilibria. The evidence on this point is not yet conclusive, but prima 
facie it seems that non-union interest groups increasingly endorsed the Labour 
party in the 2001 and 2005 general elections, hence confirming the insights of my 
model.
The Place of This Argument within the Institutionalist “Family”
The argument I have developed in order to understand the renegotiated 
alliance between social democratic parties and trade unions is eminently 
institutional as it attributes great explanatory power to variation in a single 
institution; that is, democracy among unionised workers. However, the specific 
methodology I have adopted places my argument in an original position within the 
institutionalist literature.
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In a famous introduction to an edited volume, Kathleen Thelen and Sven 
Steinmo (1992) differentiated between rational choice institutionalism and 
historical institutionalism:
[...]  perhaps the core difference between rational choice institutionalism and 
historical institutionalism lies in the question o f preference formation, whether 
treated as exogenous (rational choice) or endogenous (historical institutionalism). 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 9, emphasis in the text)
In other words, rational choice institutionalists assume that preferences 
are given and, therefore, that the role that institutions play is confined to shaping 
the strategy of actors. Historical institutionalists, in contrast, suggest that the very 
goals of actors are determined by the institutional environment. They 
problematise the process of preference formation rather as a “socially and 
politically” (idem: 11) constructed phenomenon.
The argument presented in this thesis is not easily placed in either of 
these two categories; in fact it suggests that the same institution can play both 
roles, depending on the actor concerned. Union confederation democracy, which 
is my key explanatory institution, shapes the preference formation of one actor -  
namely the trade union confederation -  and shapes the strategy of the other actor -  
the social democratic party.
My regression analysis proved that the more democratic a confederation 
is -  that is, the more the leaders are accountable to the members and the more the 
members are involved in the ratification of collective agreements -  the more trade 
unions as a whole exert wage restraint (Section 3.3). Considering the level of 
wage restraint as a revealed (collective) preference, this thesis has shown that 
decision-making processes (which are institutions) systematically affect
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preference formation across countries.73 However, the same institution (via the 
effect it exerts on overall labour cohesion, see Section 3.4) affects the strategy, 
rather than the preferences, of the social democratic government, as my game- 
theoretical model has shown (Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
Therefore, the same institution can play the role of both shaping 
preferences and shaping strategies depending on the actor referred to. My specific 
example seems to suggest that one should expect internal institutions to influence 
the preferences o f collective actors and, in turn, influence the strategies of third, 
interacting, actors. This insight can be particularly relevant to the process of 
formulation of working hypotheses in political science at large. In fact, the 
expected effect o f institution can be key to setting a coherent and clear research 
strategy.74
Against this analysis, the distinction between historical institutionalism 
and the rational choice institutionalism proposed by Thelen and Steinmo, it is 
analytically useful both for having more transparent research setting, and more 
effective explanations of political events, but this distinction might be redundant if 
it has the aim of giving a partition of the field. Both a rational choice and an
73 A comparative case study has shown that different decision-making mechanisms are key to 
explaining divergent preferences at the micro level too (Baccaro 2001).
74 Consider the following example o f a hypothetical research project in the field o f European 
studies. A typical research topic in this field is concerned with the explanation o f  support for or 
opposition to the European integration project (Inglehart 1970; Niedermayer 1991; Franklin, 
Marsh et al. 1994). Imagine a research project concerned with the impact that referenda on the 
ratification o f treaties have on public opinion in member states. One could be interested in 
examining the impact that referenda have on public opinion, that is to say shaping the preferences 
o f citizens on European integration. However, referenda could also have the effect o f  shaping the 
strategy o f political actors (and not their preferences) within countries, pushing populist political 
formations towards anti-European rhetoric to gain consensus from “angered” portions o f  the 
electorate (Ost 2005). Clearly, it may be that referenda shape the preference o f  the population via 
their effect on the strategy o f  political actors. It is plausible, however, that in countries where 
referenda are not called and treaties are ratified by the parliament, populist rhetoric will insist 
much less on Euroscepticism and more on other issues (e.g. immigration, national identity, etc.). 
This example, which is clearly hypothetical, nonetheless shows that it is very easy to think about 
other cases in which the same institution affects preferences and strategies depending on the actor 
that is considered. It is key to a coherent research strategy to formulate the expected effect clearly.
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historical approach are needed depending on the level of analysis, on the 
proximity between the institution and the actor considered, and, most importantly, 
on the research question at stake.
After having given an overview of my main findings and placed this 
study within the broader literature on institutionalist political economy, this 
chapter now moves into its final section. I will highlight four theoretical insights 
of my argument, explain how they are relevant to neighbouring topics, and discuss 
how they can improve the understanding of contemporary European politics.
6.3 How My Theoretical Insights Suggest Further Research
Paths
This last section of the thesis will highlight how four conclusions of this 
dissertation can be relevant to neighbouring fields in political economy. In so 
doing, it will suggest avenues for future research, rather than offering definite 
answers. Therefore, this section will show the contribution of this thesis to a 
theory-based development of the political science.
First, my thesis has shown that trade unions are continuingly and 
systematically involved in policy-making across European countries. Given the 
limited gains that they can secure from negotiations, this fact suggests a correction 
on their complete utility function, which could alter existing interpretations of 
European unemployment. Second, this dissertation has proved that decision­
making processes can influence economic outcomes, since confederation 
democracy influences wage militancy. An extension of this argument would 
suggest that different modes of policy making might influence economic 
outcomes too. Third, the formalisation of the game-theoretical model has 
suggested that in the fragmented post-industrial scenario, the political clout of
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trade unions could increase, rather than decrease. Lastly, given that trade unions 
remain at the core of social democratic constituencies in many industrialised 
countries, the differences between the centre-left and the centre-right could still be 
more important than conventional wisdom would suggest.
Organised Labour and European Unemployment
This thesis has not directly addressed the typical question on the impact 
that different systems of interest intermediation have on economic performance 
and related indicators, such as unemployment level and inflation level. This 
question has been widely addressed first by scholars of neo-corporatism, and by 
more recent political economic approaches (Cameron 1984; Calmfors and Driffill 
1988; Soskice 1990; Golden 1993; Iversen 1999; Franzese 2001; Mares 2006). 
However, by demonstrating the importance of decision-making processes within 
unions, and by underlining the significant role still played by unions in the policy 
arena, this dissertation is indirectly suggesting that, even in such a dense field, 
unexplored avenues for research could still exist.
The latest comprehensive account of the trends in European 
unemployment has been given by Isabela Mares (2006). Her book builds on the 
previous theoretical understanding of the relationship between unemployment and 
the wage bargaining structure (Calmfors and Driffil 1988), and on the effect of 
institutional interactions between wage bargaining and monetary policy (Iversen
1999). Mares adds to the explanatory variables the level of taxation to account for 
inter-temporal and cross-country variation in unemployment levels. However, like 
earlier literature, Mares assumes that the strategic capacity of unions essentially 
depends on their structure and, most importantly, on the level at which wage 
bargaining happens: firm level, industry level, or national level. My argument first
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suggests that by focusing only on the wage bargaining structure, these authors 
miss most of the action, which actually happens during the process of wage 
negotiation. In other words, the effect that the level of wage setting might exert on 
overall wages, and thus economic performance, might be channelled through the 
decision-making processes that are associated to different levels of bargaining. In 
other words, the process critically affects the unions’ preference structure, 
enabling, or not enabling, trade unions to reach their theoretically optimal 
outcome.
Indeed, both Iversen (1999) and Mares (2006) build their models on the 
assumption that “trade unions enjoy strategic capacity” (Iversen 1999: 109, 
emphasis in the text); hence the extent to which unions can make use of this 
capacity depends on the level of wage bargaining. Once this assumption is laid, 
the utility function of unions can be set as the sum of utilities of union members, 
and it becomes one of the key equations in determining the level of wages and, 
therefore, unemployment.
Leaving aside formal notation, the utility function of unions in its most 
complete form, as developed by Mares (2006: 41), is dependent on: (1) the 
monetary stance of the central bank, (2) real net wages, (3) transfers to union 
members, and (4) social services available to members. However, my thesis has 
shown that unions as collective actors also care about two other types of “goods”: 
first, the institutional arrangements that endow them with statutory roles in the 
labour market, which are known to increase their strength (Rothstein 1992); and 
second, their role as core constituencies of the social democratic parties, which, in 
the future, might lead to increased benefits for members (Pizzomo 1978).
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However, in order to include these two variables in the utility function of 
unions, it is necessary to drop the assumption of “strategic capacity” because the 
two latter “goods” reflect the preferences of the leaders, and not of the rank-and- 
file. In other words, the maximisation of the utility function (and therefore its 
interaction with employers’ and states’ preferences in determining wage and 
unemployment levels) would be also a function of the strategic capacity of leaders 
to achieve their preferences, even if they cannot deliver increased real wages, 
increased transfers, or increased social services to members.
This new utility function of unions could help to design a more complete 
account of European political economy, grounded on a coherent political science 
narrative, and with increased explanatory power.
The Political Science Narrative of European Political Economy
Hall and Soskice have pointed to the fact that the study of European 
political economy should highlight the importance of institutions
“that provide the actors potentially able to cooperate with one another 
with a capacity for deliberation. By this, we simply mean institutions that 
encourage the relevant actors to engage in collective discussion and to 
reach agreements with each other” (Hall and Soskice 2001: 11).
This thesis has followed their suggestion and reached a positive 
conclusion on the importance of confederation democracy in taming wage 
militancy, as well as in promoting cooperation between organised labour and the 
left.
A logical extension of this argument would be to explore if, and if so 
how, processes of decision making and policy making affect economic results,
266
including employment levels. Under the assumptions that prices are set as a mark­
up on costs, and that wages are set by actors and not by the market, it may be the 
case that, in Europe, employment performance has been comparatively better in 
countries where the government reformed labour market institutions in 
coordination with the social partners (i.e. labour and business). This hypothesis 
would contend that joint institutional innovation, and not labour de-regulation, 
was the factor that allowed a number of European countries, including the small 
open economies, to reduce unemployment levels during the 1980s and 1990s. By 
including unions and business in policy making, states ensured that reform of the 
labour market did not have a negative effect on productivity and incomes, and 
instead had a positive effect of employment. On the contrary, if partial 
deregulation was not accompanied by institutional innovation, as it happened in 
France and in Italy, the net effect of flexibilisation was negative because it 
depressed productivity and internal demand.
Data on labour costs on the UK confirm prima facie this logic, albeit 
only counterfactually. Britain is known to have one of the most lightly regulated 
labour markets in Europe, and is normally considered to be an example of 
“Liberal Market Economies” (Hall and Soskice 2001). Neo-classical economics 
suggest that labour market de-regulation is conducive to better employment 
performance because of its direct effect on controlling wage dynamics (IMF 2001; 
Nunziata 2001). However, comparative data on labour cost in the UK suggest 
different conclusions. Between 1993 and 2003, while unemployment in the UK 
more than halved, from 10.4 to 4.9 per cent of the labour force, real compensation 
per employee (RULC) constantly increased, totalling an increase of more than 5% 
in ten years. In the same period, RULC in the Euro area decreased by 3%, and yet
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unemployment in 2003 still approached almost 9% of the active workforce 
(European Commission 2006h; 2006f). In other words, it is plausible to 
hypothesise that labour market deregulation in the UK was embedded in a 
coherent institutional setting, and therefore it delivered positive employment 
performance, even though it did not have the effect of taming wage push. On the 
contrary, deregulated labour has sub-optimal effects in predominantly coordinated 
market economies, where the innovation of labour market institutions, and not 
their dismantling, is the key to good employment performances.
This reasoning is in line with a very recent paper by Torben Iversen and 
David Soskice (2006) that encourages political scientists to bring into their works 
the insights offered by New Keynesian economics, in order to develop an original 
political science narrative of European political economy grounded on political 
explanations (and institutional variables), and which would potentially be more 
convincing than current mainstream accounts based on neo-classical economics. 
This thesis indeed suggests that policy-making methods might bring about 
distinctive economic performances, under Neo Keynesian assumptions. This 
research idea would require extensive empirical research, but it might also deliver 
important results.
Organised Interests and the Policy Process
The conclusions of my thesis suggest another clear research path related 
to the impact of globalised markets and post-industrial production regimes on the 
policy processes of Western countries. The formalisation of the party/union 
relationship that I carried out in Chapter 4, Section 4 highlighted an apparent 
paradox: the more a society is fragmented with regard to its policy preferences, 
the greater the political clout of its trade unions. In recent years, industrial
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relations analyses and quasi-normative literature on the role of organised labour 
have overlooked this hypothesis, which seems quite plausible from the 
perspective of classical literature on “collective action” (Olson 1982).
Recent accounts on trade unions have underlined two sources of 
weakness for organised labour. On the one hand, vertical movements by the 
employers, which increasingly manage firms at the international level (upwards) 
and prefer wage bargaining at firm level (downwards), have undermined the clout 
of trade unions, whose preferred level of action remains the national level (Femer 
and Hyman 1998; Martin and Ross 1999; OECD 1999). At the same time, the 
increased feminilisation and tertiarisation of the labour force have had a negative 
impact on unions that could not adjust rapidly enough to the increased diversity in 
the workplace, and were therefore less able to penetrate the new service sector 
workplaces (Ebbingghaus 2002).
These conclusions are quite robust and based on extensive empirical 
research. However, by focusing only on the changes in labour markets from the 
unions’ perspective, this literature might have missed the links between the 
continuing capacity of unions to mobilise consensus, and the fragmentation of the 
post-industrial society at large. Indeed, in many European countries, unions still 
enjoy the loyalty of many workers: membership decline has been uneven and, 
overall, limited (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). At the same time advanced 
capitalist economies have undergone a process of strong societal fragmentation 
(Crouch 1999; Esping Andersen and Regini 2000). This fragmentation was also 
caused by the process of labour market decomposition, whereby the number of 
occupational sectors increased and working patterns diversified. However, society 
has also fragmented for the effect of other cultural and demographic phenomena.
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Increased religious, cultural, and ideological variation within society generated a 
myriad of intertwined social groups.
Consequently, in countries where unions retained most o f their 
membership, the political clout of organised labour might have increased because 
trade unions no longer face a small number of strongly organised large interest 
groups (e.g. farmers, capital owners of large national factories), but instead face 
an extremely fragmented society. In other words, the unions’ absolute strength in 
the labour market might have decreased because of de-industrialisation and 
globalisation, but the effect of de-industrialisation and globalisation on the rest of 
society might have increased the unions’ relative political strength.
Should this hypothesis be proved right, it would add significantly to an 
explanation of the resilience of welfare state institutions (Pierson 2001), which are 
known to benefit union members more than other groups (Mares 2006) in spite of 
nearly two decades of neo-liberal ideological dominance. It should be emphasised, 
however, that a great deal of empirical research of quantitative and qualitative 
nature would be needed to investigate this matter. This thesis has shown that 
certain institutional factors can improve unions’ cohesion and therefore increase 
their political clout under globalisation. However, a much larger research project 
paying special attention to the interplay between trade unions and emerging 
interest groups would be needed to explore the argument developed in these last 
few paragraphs. While a lot of attention has been devoted to the interaction 
between unions and employers’ groups (Swenson 1991; Thelen 2001), there has 
been much less focus on the interplay of unions with other emerging actors in the 
“civil society.” In order to achieve a greater understanding of the policy process in 
Western European countries, the most recent accounts of industrial relations and
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the role of trade unions in the policy process need to be bridged with the growing 
literature on the role of other “civil society” organisations -  such as NGOs, Jobby 
groups, and religious and community-based associations (Kaldor 2003; Anheier, 
Kaldor and Glasius 2004).
Conclusions: Increased Contestation in World Politics?
In a nutshell, the argument of this thesis on the renegotiated alliance 
contends that, in Western Europe, when unions are cohesive the Left and 
organised labour coordinate over policy/making even in the post-industrial 
scenario characterised by low-inflation hard-currency regimes. This argument 
implies that the structure of European political systems makes them prone to 
increased policy contestation in the future between the mainstream centre-left and 
the mainstream centre-right.
In fact, centre-left parties and unions have renegotiated their alliance in 
the majority of European countries. This means that organised labour remains at 
the core of social democratic constituencies, thereby sustaining an important 
difference between the mainstream centre-left and the mainstream centre-right. It 
has been observed that from the early 1990s, these two groups of parties 
considerably narrowed their programmatic differences, particularly on economic 
matters (Budge 1994). However, my thesis suggests that they still diverge quite 
significantly in terms of their underlying electorate. From one viewpoint, my 
thesis suggests that the Lipset-Rokkan argument on “freezing” cleavages still 
holds explanatory power (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Put another way, my thesis 
suggests that the difference between left and right is resilient and largely based on 
the social composition of their electorate, rather than being solely ideological
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(Bobbio 1995), and that this difference is wider than their actual policies would 
suggest.
Decreased policy contestation on economic issues depends on the fact 
that national actors believe that their interests are less divergent and consequently 
assume that they can gain more from cooperation (it is possible that this belief is 
induced by neo-liberal ideological domination, see Przeworski 1998). However, 
should this belief change due to unforeseeable economic events, or as a result of 
new political ideas, it might cause one of two things to happen. If policy 
contestation on economic issues takes the form of a simple distributive conflict 
between the well-off and worse-off, the political struggle might be fought by 
future incarnations of the current centre-left and centre-right parties, because it 
would find a favourable channel of expression in the structure of existing political 
and social coalitions. If, instead, the new conflict of interests, perhaps steered by a 
new political ideology, is based on political cleavages that cut across income 
groups as well as different countries, then national political systems will need to 
re-structure, and will eventually be completely transfigured.
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Statistical Annex
This statistical annex contains coding rules and sources for the variables that I 
have designed and measured, or derived, for this thesis. These include:
a) The index of the Party/Union Alliance (presented in Chapter 2)
b) The Index of Government Attempts at Concertation (Chapter 4).
c) The index of “Social Democraticness” of Governments (Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 4).
d) The index of Union Confederation Democracy (Chapter 3).
e) Wage Militancy and Other Variables Used in the Regression Analysis 
(Chapter 3)
a) The Index o f the Party/Union Alliance
This index aims to capture the intensity of the alliance between social democratic 
governments and the trade unions, understood as the degree of involvement of 
trade unions in policy making. The construction of the index proceeded in three 
steps: (1) Identification of the three policy areas in which collaboration between 
social democratic governments and trade unions might occur; (2) Coding of 
instances of collaboration/non-collaboration in all Western European countries 
between 1974 and 2003 in each of the three policy areas; (3) Averaging the scores 
for each year for each country to reach a (discrete) country measure of either 0,
0.33, 0.66, 1, or no value (i.e. when a non-social democratic government is in 
office).
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(1) The three policy areas in which policy collaboration might occur are: (a) 
Macroeconomic management; (b) Welfare policies; (c) Labour policies.
(a) Macroeconomic management: includes income policies and the 
overall stance (i.e. restrictive/expansive) of fiscal policies.
(b) Welfare policies: includes all substantive spending policies, i.e. 
universal pension schemes, unemployment benefit schemes, 
health insurance schemes, etc. Does not include labour rights 
for which employers (and the state as an employer) bear the 
costs (e.g. a policy that establishes rights for parental leave).
(c) Labour policies: includes labour and employment regulations, 
employment and labour laws, i.e. regulations on dismissals, 
flexibilisation of labour markets, union rights in the workplace, 
etc. The key difference between this policy area and the 
previous one concerns their funding: policies under this 
heading are not spending policies as such, even though they 
might affect public finances because the state is the employer 
of public sector employees.
(2) For each country (see below) in each policy area in each year between 1974 
and 2003 I have assigned a 1 (0) score if the social democratic government 
implemented its policy stance with (without) the collaboration of its sister 
trade union. (Years in which a non-social democratic government was in 
charge have not been taken into consideration and therefore do not contribute 
to the total score of the index.) In order to identify collaboration versus non­
collaboration I have relied on information contained in all the issues of the 
European Industrial Relations Review (EIRR) between 1974 and 2003.
A score of 1 is assigned each time textual evidence suggested that:
a) The social democratic (SD) government processed the policy 
concerned through a formal agreement including the trade 
union confederation (formal collaboration).
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b) Th€ SD government implemented the policy concerned in open 
agreement with the trade union confederation (evidence being 
joint public statements, or public statements made by trade 
union leaders).
c) The government gave unions and employers the mandate to 
determine a policy (e.g. a labour regulation) through bipartite 
agreement. The social partners failed to agree, but the SD 
government endorsed the unions’ stance by incorporating them 
into the policy they implement, increasing the failure of the 
bipartite negotiations.
d) The government decided not to change the existing policy 
(which had been agreed with unions during an earlier year) 
because the unions did not agree on the proposed change.
e) The lobbying action of trade unions was successful in changing 
the government’s stance.
Case (a) is the only instance offormal collaboration; whereas cases (b) to (e) 
are considered informal collaborations (see Chapter 4 Section 2).
A score of 0 is assigned instead when no textual evidence suggested that the 
party/union collaboration was active, and in particular if:
f) The government did not act in accordance with trade unions, i.e. 
either the unions opposed governmental policies, or they 
expressed neutral assessments of them.
g) The government claimed that it was enacting “labour-friendly” 
legislation (e.g. increasing rights for employees), but it limited 
its relationship with the unions to mere consultation.
In addition, the following three rules were applied during the coding. These 
are particularly relevant because they also apply to the coding of the next 
variable (Government Attempt to Concertation).
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i. Each of the three policy areas includes a variety of different 
policies. If in year X the social democratic government of 
country A implemented two different policies in the same area 
through different policy-making methods, the most relevant 
policy determines the score. This assessment of “relevance” is 
perhaps the most difficult qualitative assessment for the coder 
to make. The policy considered most relevant should be the one 
which had the greatest impact on public spending, or the one 
which had the widest broad consequences from the viewpoint 
o f labour. E.g. in March the government of country A formally 
agreed with trade unions on the adjustment of unemployment 
benefits to inflation. This agreement would score 1 in the 
“welfare” policy area. However, if in August during the same 
year a large social conflict erupted over a major pension reform, 
this second episode would dominate the yearly score (i.e. 
resulting into a 0), because the stakes were much higher in the 
August disagreement than in the March agreement.
ii. If  in year X in country A one policy is processed through 
collaboration with the unions, and later in the same year 
another policy is processed without collaboration but with no 
textual evidence of unions’ disagreement, then the first 
collaborative episode retains priority in the coding (this applies 
even if the sequence is reversed).
iii. All the variables are sticky over time, meaning that they keep 
their score until something happens to change it. Similarly, 
when the change occurs, it sticks. This rule does not apply to 
the “macroeconomic management” area in the case where an 
income policy agreement expired and was not renewed.
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■■■h^ h h mmmMM
Austria OGB SPO
Belgium ABVV/FGTB SP/PS (BSP/SPB until 1978)
Denmark LO SD
Finland SAK SDP
France CFDT PS
Germany DGB SPD
Greece GSEE PASOK
Ireland ICTU Labour
UIL (1974-1991); PSI (1974-1991);
Italy UIL and CGIL (1992-2003) PDS-DS (1992-2003)
Netherlands N W PvdA
Norway LO DnA
Portugal UGT PS
Spain UGT PSOE
Sweden LO SAP
United Kingdom TUC Labour
b) The Index of Government Attempts at Concertation
This variable aims to capture a government’s willingness to process socio­
economic policies through concertation, that is, to involve the trade unions 
formally in policy design and/or implementation. This variable has been coded on 
the same countries, the same policy areas, the same time frame (1974-2003), and 
is based on the same source as the previous variable. However, here I have 
included both social democratic and non-social democratic governments.
This variable gets a score o f 1 in the “macroeconomic management” policy area 
when textual evidence suggested that:
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• The government asked the social partners to meet and to set a tripartite 
income policy.
• The leaders of the trade unions and the employers organisations were 
invited by the government to negotiate with each other in order to 
determine wage increases for the private sector (which often becomes 
the condition to avoid statutory pay freezes)
• An income policy agreement was in force. This means that if in year T 
a three-year income policy was agreed, the variable will have a score 
of 1 for the years T, T+l; and T+2. However, if the agreement was 
reached at the end of the year, so as to start from the following year the 
latter counts as year T, and if in the T-l year there was no agreement in 
force, the score for T-l is 0.
The variable scores 0 in the “macroeconomic management” policy area when 
textual information suggested that:
• The government imposed a pay freeze.
• There was a situation of “free bargaining for all” without any 
intervention whatsoever by the government.
This variable gets a score of 1 in the “welfare policy” area when textual evidence 
suggested that:
• The government asked the trade unions to get together (with or without 
the employers organisations) and devise a strategy for policy making 
in spending areas.
• The trade unions were given a role in the management of spending 
policy. If the policy was devised by the government, with no evidence 
of the participation of trade unions, but this policy delegates to them a 
management role, the variable still scores 1. In this case it is assumed 
that the policy was devised with the unions.
• If in country A the trade unions were institutionally involved in the 
management of spending policies (e.g. unemployment benefits), the
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rule of “stickiness” -  number (iii) in the previous section -  does not 
apply and instead a rule of “relapsing” applies. This means that if  in 
year T the government decided to enact autonomously an important 
spending policy, e.g. a reform of the pension system, without the 
collaboration of the trade unions then the “welfare policy” variable in 
year T gets a 0 score. However, if  the trade unions were still in charge 
of managing a sizeable portion of the welfare institutions, so that after 
the turmoil of year T+l institutional collaboration was restored, then 
the “welfare policy” score returns to 1. N.B. This rule is the only case 
in which rule number (iii) on the “stickiness” of variables is not 
applicable: it always applies otherwise.
This variable gets a score of 0 in the “welfare policy” area when textual evidence 
suggested that:
• The government enacted welfare policies, i.e. spending policies, 
without explicitly inviting the collaboration of social partners.
This variable gets a score of 1 in “labour policy” when textual evidence suggested 
that:
• The government asked the trade unions to get together (with or without 
the employers organisations) to determine policy making on topics of 
labour regulation and employment relations.
• The government delegated the regulation of labour and union/employer 
relations to collective agreements. In particular, in a number of 
countries the social partners devised ground rules on employment 
relations autonomously via collective negotiations. This is considered 
an agreement on labour matters (and scores accordingly) to the extent 
to which the government either turns bipartite regulation into law, or 
gives it force of law, or otherwise acknowledges the autonomy of 
social partners on this subject.
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• Similarly to the previous policy area, the “relapsing” rule rather than 
the “stickiness” rule applies to countries whose labour and 
employment relations were regulated through collective agreements.
This variable gets a 0 score in “Labour Policy” when textual evidence suggested 
that:
• The government enacted labour or employment policies without asking 
explicitly for the collaboration of trade unions.
This variable was coded within a wider research project on Social Pacts at the 
Labour Institute for Labour Studies, carried out in collaboration with Professor 
Lucio Baccaro. Preliminary results of the project were presented in a conference 
paper in 2005 (Baccaro and Simoni 2005).
c) The Index of Governmental “Social Democraticness”
This variable aims to capture the weight of social democratic, socialist or labour 
parties within the cabinet. It is coded for the same countries as previous variables, 
between 1974 and 2003. Parties are listed in Table A.I. Sources for this variable 
include the EIRR, sources easily available on the Internet such as party electronic 
archives, and other reference material.
• This variable gets a score of 1 when a socialist, social democrat, or 
labour one-party government is in office.
• This variable gets a score of 0.66 if socialists form the senior party 
within a coalition government, or if the coalition is among parties of a 
similar weight and the socialists hold the premiership.
• This variable gets a score of 0.33 if the socialist party is the junior 
member in a coalition government (even if holding premiership), or if 
the coalition is among parties of similar weight and the socialists do 
not hold the premiership.
• This variable gets a score of 0 if socialists are in opposition.
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The score starts taking the appropriate value (e.g. 1 in case of social democratic 
one-party government) in the year in which elections are held.
d) The Index of Union Confederation Democracy (CONFDEM)
This index aims to capture the level of democracy within union confederations. It 
comprises two equally-weighted dimensions: accountability of peak levels (AP) 
and consultation and ratification of collective agreements (CR). The two 
dimensions are then averaged and normalised to 1 to make up the index for each 
union confederation. Yearly country scores are then derived by weighting the 
level of democracy of each confederation against its relative size in terms of 
members (data on membership comes from Golden, Lange, and Wallerstein 2002).
Scores for the AP dimension were attributed to each union confederation as 
follows:
AP = 2 if (a) the peak leadership of the union confederation was elected for a 
finite term AND (b) the delegates to the national congress were elected by 
members (either directly or indirectly through a chain of delegation), as opposed 
to appointed by the boards of the affiliated unions.
AP = 1 if either (a) or (b) does not apply.
AP = 0 if neither (a) nor (b) applies.
Scores for the CR dimension are attributed to each union confederation as follows:
CR = 2 if ballots among union members (or, a fortiori, workers) were adopted to 
ratify national collective agreements with the state, with the state and employers, 
or at the industry level. CR = 2 even if ballots were adopted to ratify only the very 
divisive and contested agreements.
CR = 1 if national collective agreements with the state, with the state and 
employers, or at the industry level were ratified through “softer” procedures than
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balloting, such as show of hands, or mass assemblies in which dissent was 
allowed to emerge.
CR = 0 if national collective agreements with the state, with the state and 
employers, or at the industry level did not exist, or if the participation of members 
in their ratification was not contemplated.
List of Countries and Sources
Information for the index of confederation democracy was derived from 
interviews with key informants (i.e. national experts on industrial relations and/or 
trade union officials), backed up with secondary sources when necessary. The two 
numbers after the EIRR acronym refer to the journal issue and page respectively.
The interviewees on Italy and the UK are more numerous compared to other 
countries because information gathered through those interviews was used also to 
complement information gathered for the case studies developed in Chapter 5.
Country
Austria
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Union
Confederation(s)
OGB
ACTU
ACV/CSC;
ABW/FGTB
Interviewee Secondary Sources
CLC
Martina Krichmayr EIRR, 16.5; Stresser 
(ILO official, formerly 1992: 132-133-159;
OGB official)
Rae Cooper 
(University of 
Sydney)
Luc Demaret (ILO 
official)
Ms. Barbara Byers 
(CLC official); 
Brian Langille 
(University o f  
Toronto)
Traxler 1998: 248
EIRR, 162.9; 
215.16; Vilrokx and 
Van Leemput 1998; 
Blanpain 2004: 222
Carter et al. 2001: 
58
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D enm ark
Finland
France
G erm any
Ireland
Italy
N etherlands
N orway
Spain
LO Steen Scheuer EIRR, 4.17, 170.5;
(Roskilde University); Jacobsen and
Bo Sorensen (LO) Hasselbalch 1998:
218; Galenson 
1998: 18, 63
SAK; STTK David Seligson 
(ICFTU official);
Lilja Kari (Helsinki 
School of Economics)
Kari 1998
CGT; CFDT; CGT- J.P. Delhomenie (ILO Despax and Rojot
FO official);
J. Javiller (Universite 
Paris X and ILO)
1987:165;171
DGB Frank Hoffer (ILO Jacobi and Miiller-
official);
Martin Behrens (Hans 
Boeckler Foundation)
Jentsch 1998
ICTU Patricia O'Donovan 
(ILO, formerly ICTU 
official);
Kevin Hodson (ICTU 
shop-steward)
Baccaro (2003)
CGIL; CISL; UIL Lucio Baccaro (MIT, Treu 1998: 154;
formerly ILO 129; 198; EIRR
official);
Antonio Lettieri 
(CGIL);
Anna Colombo (EP 
functionnaire);
Marco Piattella (EP 
functionnaire); 
Vittorio Baldan (EP 
functionnaire, former 
DS functionnaire); 
Pasqualina 
Napoletano (MEP); 
Susanna Florio (CGIL 
and CES 
funcionnaire);
12.8;
FNV Tom Etti (FNV Blanpain 2004b:
official) 148
LO; YS Tor Monsen (ILO Dolvik and Stokke
. offical, formerly LO 1998: 145; YS
official) website
UGT; CCOO Lydia Fraile (ILO Alonso Olea and
official) Rodriguez-Sanudo 
2001: 117, 118.
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Sweden LO U. Edstroem (LO 
official)
Adlercreutz 1997: 
154; 156; 201
Switzerland SGB/USS Wemer Carobbio 
(USS official)
Bernstein and 
Mahon, 2001: 164; 
165;172
United Kingdom TUC Andrew Charlwood 
(Leed University); 
Stephen Huges 
(MEP);
Bill Morris (former 
TGWU General 
Secretary);
Steve Purcey (ILO 
offical);
Wemer Sengenberger 
(ILO official);
TUC, 2006
United States AFL-CIO Jim Baker (ILO 
official);
J.Zellhoefer (AFL- 
CIO official)
e) Wage Militancy and Other Variables Used in the Regression Analysis
Sources and Formula for Wage Militancy (dependent variable)
This formula is derived from Blanchard and Philippon (2003), and an email 
exchange with Olivier Blanchard.
WM = Wage Militancy
Raw data:
TFP -  AMECO database series: “Total factor productivity: total economy”
RCE = AMECO database series: “Real compensation per employee, deflator 
private consumption; total economy”
AWS = AMECO database series: “Adjusted wage share total economy”
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Algebra:
Technologically Warranted Wage Growth (TWWG) = Yearly change in TFP -  
Yearly change in AWS
WM = Yearly change in RCE -  Yearly change in TWWG
WM was computed for all the countries on which the European Commission 
provides comparable data, for each year between 1973 and 2003. These include: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. In the regression analysis I had 
to exclude Greece because I was unable to collect sufficient information on the 
institutional variables.
Real Unit Labour Costs (RULC), used in the correlation analysis, comes from the 
AMECO Database provided by the European Commission, series “Real Unit 
Labour Cost, total economy”.
Sources of Independent Variables
Union density (UP)
Measure derived from a dataset kindly provided by Mr. Xavier Debrun (IMF). 
Inter-confederation concentration (CONC)
Data collected by Golden, Lange, Wallerstein on union concentration across 
confederations, i.e. HERF index in Golden, Lange, Wallerstein (2002)
Wage bargaining coordination (WBCOOR)
Kenworthy Wage Coordination Index. Kenworthy 2003: 41
Hierarchical Control (CONT)
Kenworthy union centralisation (hierarchy). Index ranging from 0 to 4. 
Kenworthy 2003: 35
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GDP Change (AGPD)
Own Calculation from AMECO series “gross domestic product at 1995 market 
prices.”
Unemployment Rate (UR)
AMECO series “unemployment rate total: Eurostat definition.”
Terms of Trade Shocks (TOTS)
Measure derived from a dataset kindly provided by Mr. Xavier Debrun (IMF).
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